Harnsberger v. Wright

• Decision Date: 14 October 1946
• Citation: 39 S.E.2d 737,185 Va. 586
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: HARNSBERGER et al. v. WRIGHT.

39 S.E.2d 737

185 Va. 586

HARNSBERGER et al.

v.WRIGHT.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Oct. 14, 1946.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rockingham County; H. W. Bertram, Judge.

Suit by Paul R. Wright against George S. Harnsberger, administrator, and others to recover compensation for services rendered to Alice M. Wright, deceased. From an adverse decree, defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

Before HOLT, C. J., and HUDGINS, GREGORY, EGGLESTON and SPRAT-LEY, JJ.

Geo. S. Harnsberger, of Harrisonburg, and Greenlee D. Letcher, of Lexington, for appellants.

Ward Swank, of Harrisonburg, for appellee.

HOLT, Chief Justice.

In this cause the plaintiff, Paul R. Wright, is seeking to recover compensation for services rendered to Alice M. Wright, now dead.

This plaintiff was born on the 21st day of September, 1899, and became an orphan at nine years old, or in 1908. He was then taken into the home of his second cousin, Miss Alice Wright, and lived there until November 8, 1936, when he was married.

He was never adopted. As a child, he did such services about the home and farm of his cousin as he was capable of performing, and as a man he continued to work upon it. There was no other male member of the household. From the date of his majority, September 21, 1920, to the date upon which such services ceased, November 8, 1936, he charges that his services were reasonably worth $40 a month, and that there is or was due him for such services $7,740. On this sum he tells us that he has been paid $2,183.09, and that there is a balance due him thereon of $5,556.91, with interest from November 8, 1936. He also claims an interest in wheat and barley sown in the fall of 1938, which was harvested in the early summer of the following year.

Alice M. Wright died on February 8, 1941. This suit was instituted on September 22, 1945.

If plaintiff's claim rests upon the principle of quantum meruit, it is barred by the statute of limitations. Code, § 5810. And it has not been revived by any promise in writing signed by the debtor. Code, § 5812. Miss Wright was not obliged to plead the statute; now that she is dead, her representative must. This claim might have been asserted in her lifetime and might have been a good claim.

The suggestion that she stood to him in loco parentis is without merit. He worked for this second cousin on the farm after he became of age and did full service there for more than sixteen years and has actually been paid on account $2,183.09.

His main contention is that he has an equitable lien against this dead woman's estate. In this he is sustained by the opinion of the chancellor below.

"In the nature of the subject, the authorities do not attempt other than general definitions of an equitable lien." Armour Fertilizer Works v. Taylor, 129 Va. 1, 7, 105 S.E. 574, 576.

Moral obligations alone will not sustain them. 33 Am.Jur. 428.

Such a lien must rest upon a contract, express or implied. If that relied upon be for work done, it continued to be a debt. Miss Wright, as we have seen, at her elec tion, could have defeated it by a plea of the statute of limitations. Her representative has no election but must plead it. And so for services alone no such lien can arise. But it is said that the right to assert it has been expressly recognized by the debtor, and as evidence thereof this writing is vouched:

"June 6 1926

"Alice Wright Mt Clinton Va This satment is writen buy my hand and it is as what I wont done with My Estate after my death first of all Dets shall be paid and also ever one that renders enny help in enny way I wont them two be paid A nd wont a nice Coffen & a good wood Box and have the Furnel at the house and I wont Paul Paid full wages for all work done that I have not Paid him for, and I wont sister Anna two have $10.00 ten dolors Monney and all of the reste of my Property Two Go Two the Memorel Hospile I name John Rolston for for the Man Two setle my Estate".

In McElroy v. Rolston, 184 Va. 77, 34 S.E.2d 241, we held that this unsigned memorandum was not a will. That is to say, we held that when the intestate said "I wont Paul Paid full wages for all work done that I have not Paid him for, " that unsigned statement manifested no settled purpose, it established no lien and constituted no waiver of the statute of limitations.

In Seaton v. Seaton, 184 Va. 180, 34 S.E.2d 236, it was held that you could predicate no right upon a provision in a will theretofore held to be void.

In Brown v. Ford, 120 Va. 233, 245, 91 S.E. 145, 149, governing principles are thus stated:

"As stated by 2 Pomeroy's Equity (2d Ed.) § 1235: 'The doctrine may be stated in its most general form that every express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal, or fund, therein described and identified, a securityfor a debt or other obligation * * *...