Harold O'brien, Admr. v. Rosana Cook Holden

• Decision Date: 04 May 1932
• Parties: HAROLD O'BRIEN, ADMR. v. ROSANA COOK HOLDEN ET AL
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

160 A. 192

104 Vt. 338

HAROLD O'BRIEN, ADMR. v. ROSANA COOK HOLDEN ET AL

Supreme Court of Vermont

May 4, 1932

February Term, 1932.

Amendment of Action at Law into Suit in Equity---Equity---Amendments---New Matter in Amendment---Parties in Equity---G. L. 1797---Retention of Jurisdiction in Equity When Once Taken---Trusts---Failure To Make Provision for Disposition of Corpus of Trust for Sole Benefit of Declarant---Validity of Such Trust---Parol Evidence Affecting Provisions of Written Declaration of Trust---Voluntary Trust in Personalty by Parol---Words Necessary To Create Voluntary Trust in Personalty---Intent of Declarant---Extent to Which Parol Evidence Is Admissible---Requirement That Declaration of Trust Show Objects and Nature of Trust---Sufficiency of Declaration of Trust To Show Object and Nature---Designation of Trustee---Implied Appointment of Trustee---Trust as Revocable or Irrevocable---Revocation of Voluntary Trust in Personalty for Sole Benefit of Declarant---Revocation of Trust by All Parties Interested---Implied Revocation---Conclusiveness of Findings of Chancellor---Judicial Notice---When Decree Will Not Be Disturbed Because of Erroneous Finding---Terms of Trust in Personalty May Not Rest Partly in Writing and Partly in Parol---Modification of Voluntary Trust in Personalty for Sole Benefit of Declarant.

1. When action at law is amended into suit in equity and transferred to court of chancery, case becomes in all respects as much suit in chancery as though it had originated as such, and any changes in form or substance allowable in chancery cases may be made in or to it.

2. Amendments in chancery are to be liberally allowed as to parties, prayer for relief, and as to substance germane to and in enlargement or explanatory of substantial parts of bill.

3. New matter in amendment of bill in chancery must be germane to and consistent with subject-matter of original bill, not foreign or repugnant to it, and must be in enlargement of original bill, and not entirely new bill.

4. In chancery, all parties interested in subject-matter of suit are to be made parties, either as plaintiffs or defendants.

5. Where action at law to recover unpaid items of income accrued under trust fund was amended into suit in equity and transferred to court of chancery under provision of G. L 1797, held. that, subject-matter of both suits being same and based on same trust, fact that plaintiff in equity sought more than in action at law, and that rights of third persons could be considered and disposed of in equity, did not make "new bill" within meaning of rule as to amendments in chancery.

6. When equity takes jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain jurisdiction until complete relief is granted.

7. Where written declaration of trust was for sole benefit of declarant, both as to corpus and income, trust did not fail because no provision was made for disposition of corpus at her decease to others, and corpus then became part of her estate.

8. Trust for sole benefit of declarant is valid.

9. Where written declaration of trust was for sole benefit of declarant, both as to corpus and income, and, no provision having been made for disposition of corpus at her decease to others, it would become part of her estate, parol evidence that she had orally directed that at her decease corpus should be divided equally among her children, thereby entirely changing disposition of trust so that it would never become part of her estate, held inadmissible.

10. Instrument apparently complete and unambiguous cannot be qualified by parol evidence, either as to its legal intendments or express terms.

11. Rule as to inadmissibility of parol evidence to vary terms of written instrument applies to declarations of trust.

12. Voluntary trust where property included is all personalty may be established without writing.

13. No particular formality of expression is required to create voluntary trust in personalty, it being entirely question of intent on part of declarant.

14. On question of declarant's intent to create voluntary trust in personalty, parol evidence is admissible, but such evidence cannot be used for purpose of modifying or extending declaration itself.

15. Declaration of trust should show with sufficient certainty objects and nature of trust.

16. Voluntary declaration of trust in which both corpus and income were to be used for sole benefit of declarant, held to show with sufficient certainty objects and nature of trust although not prescribing manner in which property was to be handled, or how it was to be applied to declarant's benefit.

17. Trustee need not be designated in declaration of trust or named by any simultaneous or subsequent appointment in writing.

18. Court of chancery will not allow trust to fail for want of trustee.

19. Appointment of one as trustee may be implied from course of dealing with trust property, when it is with knowledge and acquiescence of declarant.

20. Trust once established is ordinarily irrevocable unless power to that end is reserved in declaration.

21. Where trust is created for sole benefit of person creating it, he may revoke or amend it with or without consent of trustee.

22. When one creates trust for his sole benefit, he may recall legal title at any time for any purpose.

23. When all persons concerned in trust are alive and sui juris they may revoke or modify it.

24. For declarant of trust for her sole benefit to give securities held thereunder to another, would amount to implied revocation of trust and establish legal title to them in donee as owner.

25. Ordinarily, statement of chancellor that his findings are not predicated upon evidence received under exception and objection will be accepted by Supreme Court at its face value, but such statement cannot be applied to chancellor's finding that it was part of declaration of trust that trustee at death of declarant should divide corpus between latter's children, when there was nothing upon which finding could be predicated, except oral evidence modifying written declaration of trust received under objection and exception.

26. Supreme Court may make use of its general knowledge of administration charges to say whether they will be sufficiently large to affect amount of individual shares of heirs in trust fund, established by their ancestor for his benefit, if corpus thereof be treated upon his decease as part of his estate.

27. Decree will not be disturbed on account of finding erroneously made, if it can be rejected without affecting legality of decree.

28. Where written declaration of trust for sole benefit of declarant made no provision for disposition of corpus thereof, at her decease, error in admitting parol evidence as to declarant's direction to divide corpus at her decease among her children, upon which chancellor based finding that such direction was part of declaration of trust, held harmless, since finding could be rejected without affecting decree which went no further than to establish trust, specify securities belonging to it, and order trustee to account.

29. Terms of trust in personalty cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol.

30. Where written declaration of trust was for sole benefit of declarant, and no provision was made therein for disposition of corpus at her decease, receipts given to declarant by donee of trust securities, while evidence that such securities belonged to trust, were inadmissible as evidence of establishment of trust on terms therein recited, or to modify terms of original trust, since only declarant could specify terms of trust and no one else could, by agreement admission, or otherwise, add to or take from it.

APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Heard on bill of complaint, demurrer to bill, motion to dismiss bill, motion to strike out certain paragraphs of bill, motion to strike out certain parties defendant, and findings of fact by the chancellor. Heard at the September Term, 1931, Rutland County, Buttles, Chancellor. Demurrer and all motions overruled, and decree ordering defendant Rosana Cook Holden to account. This defendant appealed. The opinion states the case.

Decree affirmed, and cause remanded.

Marvelle C. Webber for the defendant, Rosana C. Holden.

Lawrence, Stafford & O'Brien for the plaintiff.

Present: POWERS, C. J., SLACK, MOULTON, THOMPSON, and GRAHAM, JJ.

OPINION

POWERS

This suit was commenced as an action at law brought by the administrator of Mary A. K. Cook against Rosana C. Holden to recover certain unpaid items of income which had accrued under a trust created by the intestate. The defendant therein obtained an order that the action be amended into a suit in chancery and transferred to that court, in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Act. This order having been complied with, the plaintiff filed a complaint which materially broadened the scope of the original complaint--though it involved only the same trust--and brought in several new parties defendant, all of whom were interested in the outcome of the case as covered by the new complaint. It will suffice for present purposes, to refer only to the pleadings filed by Rosana C. Holden. She demurred to the complaint, and filed a motion to dismiss the same. She also filed motions to strike out certain paragraphs of the bill and to strike off certain parties defendant. Speaking broadly, these efforts were all directed to the same end. They were predicated upon the claim that the case made by the new complaint involved an entirely new case, one in no way involved in the action at law, and that it introduced new parties and interests. All this, it is insisted, is irregular and not permissible.

The chancellor disposed of the questions so raised by rulings adverse to Mrs....