Harold Selman Inc. v. Box Elder County
| Decision Date | 29 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 20090479.,20090479. |
| Citation | 251 P.3d 804,2011 UT 18,679 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 |
| Parties | HAROLD SELMAN, INC.; Fred Selman; Laura Selman; and Bret Selman, Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants, and Petitioners,v.BOX ELDER COUNTY, Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, and Respondent. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Shaun L. Peck, Brandon J. Baxter, Logan, for plaintiffs.Stephen R. Hadfield, Brigham City, for defendant.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 Fred, Laura, and Bret Selman, petitioners in this case, are principals of Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively, the “Selmans”). The Selmans own property that is bisected by the border of Box Elder County and Cache County. Running through the property is a trail that connects the cities of Mantua and Paradise. In 2007, both counties passed resolutions designating the trail as a county road. Shortly thereafter, Box Elder County commenced road construction activities on the trail. As a result of the construction, the Selmans brought several actions against Box Elder County alleging that the county's action violated numerous statutes. Additionally, the Selmans sought arbitration from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman (the “Ombudsman's Office”). The Ombudsman's Office accepted the case for arbitration, but Box Elder County sought to stay the arbitration and counterclaimed with a quiet-title action, contending it was the actual owner of the trail.
¶ 2 The district court stayed the arbitration, bifurcated the case, and held that the Ombudsman's Office did not have statutory authority to arbitrate the action since the threshold issue of ownership was in dispute. The court of appeals upheld the district court's decision. We granted certiorari on the issue of “whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act.” We hold that the plain language of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act 1 (the “Ombudsman Act” or the “Act”) grants the Ombudsman's Office authority to arbitrate the threshold issue of property ownership in takings and eminent domain disputes. Therefore, we reverse.
¶ 3 The Selmans own a parcel of real property (the “Property”) that is bisected by the border of Box Elder County and Cache County. Historically, the Selmans have used the Property as a summer grazing pasture for their livestock. They currently use the Property for farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits. Running through the Property is a trail that connects the cities of Mantua and Paradise. Survey maps dating as early as 1878 show the trail connecting the two cities. The Selmans use the trail to move cattle between portions of the Property.
¶ 4 When the Selmans acquired the Property in 1952, the abstracts of title prepared for the Property did not indicate any recorded public or private easement, grant of public roadway, or any other reservation indicating a public interest in the road. From the time of the original land grant to the present, no legal action has been taken to adjudicate any path or trail on the Property as a public road.
¶ 5 In 2007, both Box Elder and Cache County passed resolutions designating, based on historical maps, the trail across the Property as a county road. Shortly thereafter, Box Elder County commenced road construction activities on the trail, including the removal of a gate owned by the Selmans that blocked the trail. The Selmans allege Box Elder County's construction work “doubled, and in some cases, tripled the width of the trail” by cutting into portions of the Property that Box Elder County “previously acknowledged to be private property.” The Selmans further allege that this has “damaged the watershed ... and compromised the [P]roperty's use for agricultural purposes.”
¶ 6 In reaction to these construction activities, the Selmans immediately filed suit against Box Elder County alleging violations of chapter 41 of title 17 of the Utah Code,2 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,3 and the Land Conservation Easement Act.4 The Selmans also sought injunctive relief to stop Box Elder County's road construction activities. The district court partially granted the Selmans' request for injunctive relief and entered a temporary restraining order stopping all road construction activities and ordering reinstallation of the gate. But because litigation was pending regarding ownership of the trail, the district court did not allow the Selmans to lock the gate to close the trail.
¶ 7 Two weeks after the entry of the temporary restraining order, the Selmans filed an additional claim against Box Elder County and asserted additional causes of action. Specifically, the Selmans alleged violation of the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act; 5 trespass; and inverse condemnation. Both parties later agreed to consolidate the two actions against Box Elder County.
¶ 8 In addition to the claims against Box Elder County, the Selmans filed suit against Cache County to stop it from beginning road construction on its side of the trail. In the complaint against Cache County, the Selmans asserted the same six claims they had asserted against Box Elder County in their two previous complaints.
¶ 9 After filing the second suit against Box Elder County and the suit against Cache County, the Selmans requested arbitration of the dispute from the Ombudsman's Office pursuant to Utah Code section 13–43–204. Two weeks later, the Ombudsman's Office accepted the Selmans' arbitration request.
¶ 10 A week after the Selmans requested arbitration, Box Elder County answered the Selmans' complaints and asserted a counterclaim to quiet title in the trail. Additionally, Box Elder County filed a motion to bifurcate its quiet-title claim from the Selmans' claims and to stay the arbitration and all discovery on the Selmans' claims until the quiet-title counterclaim was resolved. Cache County followed by filing a similar answer and counterclaim in its case.
¶ 11 After hearing oral arguments, the district court bifurcated the case and granted Box Elder County's motion to stay arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office. The district court held that the threshold question of ownership of the disputed trail should be resolved before the Ombudsman's Office considered the eminent domain issue and that bifurcation was appropriate because determination of ownership would likely lead the parties to settle.
¶ 12 After the district court's decision, the Selmans appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Selmans argued that it was not proper for the district court to stay the arbitration proceedings because the matter was properly before the Ombudsman's Office. Specifically, the Selmans argued that Box Elder County's quiet-title claim falls under the umbrella of “takings or eminent domain issues” appropriate for the Ombudsman's Office to consider under the Ombudsman Act. Thus, the Selmans argued, the quiet-title matter should be included in, not litigated prior to, the arbitration.
¶ 13 The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision. The court of appeals reasoned that the provision of the Ombudsman Act granting the Ombudsman's Office authority to arbitrate takings and eminent domain disputes should be read narrowly so as not to include issues “peripherally related to a takings claim,” such as ownership of the property in dispute.6 Additionally, the court reasoned that since the statute suggests that only property owners may invoke the authority of the Ombudsman's Office and that since takings claims begin with the premise that ownership is not in dispute, ownership of the property “is a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether there has been a taking” and thus should be “resolved judicially before arbitration.” 7
¶ 14 The Selmans filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in June 2009, which we granted on the issue of “whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act.” We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(a).
¶ 15 On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, “giving no deference to its conclusions of law.” 8
¶ 16 We granted certiorari on the issue of whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Ombudsman Act. This requires us to determine whether the Ombudsman's Office has authority under the Ombudsman Act to address the issue of property ownership as it applies to takings and eminent domain disputes. We hold that it does. Thus, the district court erred in staying the arbitration proceedings.
I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACT ALLOWS THE OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE TO ARBITRATE PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AS IT APPLIES TO TAKINGS AND EMINENT DOMAIN DISPUTES
¶ 17 The arbitration provision of the Ombudsman Act does not support the court of appeals' conclusion that the issue of property ownership lies beyond the statutory authority of the Ombudsman's Office. Rather, the plain language of the Ombudsman Act indicates that the Ombudsman's Office has authority to arbitrate the issue of property ownership as it applies to takings and eminent domain disputes.
¶ 18 When interpreting statutes, our “ ‘primary objective ... is to give effect to the legislature's intent.’ ” 9 “To discern legislative intent, ‘we look first to the statute's plain language.’ ” 10 In doing so, “[w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” 11 Additionally, “ ‘[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole [ ] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter.’ ” 12 “When the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no...
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