Harold v. Radman

Decision Date13 April 1976
Docket NumberNo. 721,721
Citation31 Md.App. 184,355 A.2d 477
PartiesMary F. HAROLD et vir v. H. Melvin RADMAN.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Joseph F. Lentz, Jr., and Richard B. Jacobs, Baltimore, for appellants.

John H. Bolgiano, Baltimore, with whom were Smith, Somerville & Case, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before MORTON, MENCHINE and MASON, JJ.

MENCHINE, Judge.

Mary F. Harold, individually, William H. Harold as her husband, and both as husband and wife jointly, (appellants) sought damages for permanent injury, medical expense and loss of consortium respectively against Dr. H. Melvin Radman (appellee) for alleged medical malpractice in performing a hysterectomny operation and in subsequent aftercare. At trial before a jury in the Baltimore City Court, verdicts in favor of the defendant were directed by the trial judge at the end of the plaintiffs' cases. Appellants have appealed from the judgments thereafter entered.

The narrow issue presented in this appeal relates to the refusal by the trial judge to permit Dr. Harold Hirsh to testify as an expert witness. 1 In consequence of the trial court's rejection of the proffered witness, the appellants were left without expert testimony in the medical malpractice case. They maintain that the ruling of the trial judge constituted reversible error.

Prior to the rejection of the proposed witness a voir dire examination had been directed to the qualifications of the proffered witness.

The Voir Dire Examination of the Proposed Witness

On direct examination it was shown that the witness graduated from the Georgetown Medical School in 1942, and trained as an intern and resident for three years at the Gallinger Municipal Hospital, now known as the District of Columbia General Hospital. Thereafter, he became a Fellow in Medicine at that institution. He has been engaged in the practice of medicine since 1947. In 1950 he was certified by the Board of Internal Medicine. Certification in Internal Medicine meant that he had completed five years of training and had passed written and oral examinations and was allowed to practice the most skilled kinds of problems in medicine.

At the time of trial he was a Clinical Associate Professor of Medicine at Howard University School of Medicine. His teaching duties at Howard University School of Medicine occupied him from two to six months annually.

He had written about ninety medical articles and was the author or contributor to five medical text books. His writing primarily was in the area of infections and diseases of the urinary tract or bladder and the use of antibiotics.

He is a consultant of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and in the past had been a consultant for the Food and Drug Administration, and the United States Public Health Service.

At the time of trial he was engaged as a consultant to the Armed Services Institute of Pathology with respect to medical problems in the Armed Services, the Veterans Administration and the National Institutes of Health. His duties for the Armed Services Institute of Pathology required the review of cases for determination whether there had been violations of medical standard of care in any of the Armed Services.

In the course of his practice, he had had privileges at Suburban Hospital; Holy Cross Hospital in Montgomery County, and Prince George's County Hospital. He had been Chief of Staff for a home for the aged located in Montgomery County.

At one hospital he supervised the treatment of some thirty to sixty ward patients who were under the day to day care of two interns and a resident. This duty required him to review their diagnoses and treatment and note the progress of the patients until discharge.

He declared that he was familiar with the standard of medical care and skill exercised or expected to be exercised by physicians and surgeons engaged in the field of gynecology and urology in the Batlimore area.

Cross-examination developed that at the trial of the case his practice of medicine was confined primarily to consultation. He acknowledged that he had seen but two private patients within the month preceding trial. He acknowledged that his last operating room activity had been about one year before the trial, when he was in attendance for the purpose of teaching students during an operation by a surgeon. His last association as non-operating member of an operating team performing a hysterectomy occurred about three years prior to trial.

The witness acknowledged that he had never personally conducted any kind of significant surgery and that in the conduct of his specialty of internal medicine he would call in a surgeon for any recommended surgical procedures.

His cross-examination then continued with the following questions and responses:

'Q Have you ever done a hysterectomy?

A No, sir.

Q Do you feel yourself qualified to do the repair of a fistula?

A Personally?

Q Yes.

A. No, sir.

Q Do you feel yourself qualified to do a hysterectomy?

A No, sir.

Q And isn't it true that an internist who is not a surgeon, when such procedures are deemed necessary, the internist consults or calls in the surgeon and follows the advice and procedure of the surgeon?

A I don't think I would like to use the term follows. I think that we have a-come to an understanding as to whether the operation has to be done, and what kind of operation, and on many occasions, depending on the condition of the patient, and I have always participated with the surgeon or sometimes even by myself in explaining to the patient the need for it, because even before you start, you call a surgeon, and you have to explain to the patient why you are calling the surgeon, so you have to know the surgical indications, and I think that the internist also has a duty to his patient, and that his patient has to know what the complications are, and what will happen if those complications-show that from a technical point of view, no, I can't do the technology, but from the point of view of knowing whether the surgery is indicated, what the problems are, what complications could be expected, what should be done with the complications, I think that I know those as well as any surgeon, particularly in this kind of operation, which is so relatively common.'

His redirect examination on voir dire included the following:

'Q Doctor, have you ever diagnosed the need for a hysterectomy?

A Many times.

Q Have you ever diagnosed fistulas?

A On a number of occasions, yes.

Q Are you familiar with the procedure to repair a fistula?

A You are talking-where, sir?

Q Bladder or-

A Yes.

Q And are your familiar with the procedure used by a surgeon in hysterectomnys?

A Yes, sir.

Q The reason you have not operated in maryland, or any other place, is because you are not a surgeon; is that right?

A That is true, sir.

Q Are you familiar with the complications which may or do arise in hysterectomys and fistulas?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you familiar with what to do when these complications arise?

A Yes, sir.

(The Court) But did you, yourself, do it?

(The Witness) No, sir.

By Mr. Lentz:

Q You are not licensed to do it?

A Well, in truth, I am licensed, but I am not trained to do it, and I would not undertake it, because I am not equipped or qualified to do it. My license actually is as a physician-Surgeon, but my own self-discipline and my profession, which is what does not allow me to do it.'

The trial judge then ruled that the doctor was not qualified to testify as an expert witness. He said:

'Well, gentlement, the Court was hopeful, as it always is in medical malpractice cases, in particular, never having reached the point where he has got to make an official ruling on an important part of the case, and unfortunately I have been confronted with that issue, and I have heard argument of counsel. Mr. Lentz argued that Dr. Harold Hirsh is qualified to give an opinion in this case, and that Mr. Bolgiano questioned seriously the qualifications of the physician to give an opinion on surgical procedures. It is my conclusion in this case that Dr. Harold Hirsh is not qualified to give an opinion as to pass judgment upon a gynecologist and surgeon, who has to face disclaim for malpractice and for the following reasons: Dr. Hirsh has testified that while he teaches in Georgetown Medical Center and Howard University and is a clinical professor, that he is a board certified internist, his testimony is very clear that he is not a gynecologist, nor a urologist, and indeed he has never performed any type of surgery at all during his entire medical career. The only times that he has been in the operating room were as an observer together with his students, and as an internist, either in the course of surgery or after surgery, to take care of a patient medically, but not surgically.

'He has said that he has never performed any surgery. He has never had a knife in his hand, and that he is familiar with the infections or urinary tract and the bladder, but at no time has ever performed any surgery of any kind, let alone in the specialty of gynecology and urology.

'So, that for me to permit Dr. Hirsh to give an opinion as an expert in the field in which he is indeed not an expert, would simply permit this jury to conjecture and to speculate as to the issue of negligence, or not on the testimony of Dr. Hirsh. I don't know what Dr. Hirsh's opinion would be, but it does seem to me that I cannot permit him, because, in my opinion, he is not qualified as an expert in this particular specialty, and for that reason, or these reasons, I will grant the motion to exclude his testimony and any opinion which may be forthcoming. I will say, too, that I am making this decision not lightly, but after a great deal of soul-searching and full consideration of it.' (Emphasis added.)

The Law

In II Wigmore, Evidence, § 561 (3d Ed. 1940) it is suggested that the issue of expert witness qualification should be the exclusive prerogative of the trial...

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4 cases
  • Kopitzki v. Boyd
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 14, 1976
  • Radman v. Harold
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1977
    ...an opinion constituted an abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial. Harold v. Radman, 31 Md.App. 184, 355 A.2d 477 (1976). We begin our consideration of this case by examining the standards which we conclude should control the exercise of a tria......
  • Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation, 13576
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1978
    ...that one is not a specialist goes to the weight of the testimony rather than to one's competency to testify. Harold v. Radman (1976), 31 Md.App. 184, 355 A.2d 477; Wolfinger v. Frey (1960), 223 Md. 184, 162 A.2d 745; Frost v. Mayo Clinic (1969), 304 F.Supp. 285; Barnes v. St. Francis Hospit......
  • Searle v. Bryant
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1986
    ...171, 176-77 (1976) (pediatrician competent to testify concerning applicable standards of general practitioners); Harold v. Radman, 31 Md.App. 184, 355 A.2d 477 (1976), aff'd 279 Md. 167, 367 A.2d 472 (1977) (internist competent to testify as to applicable standards of A reading of the depos......

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