Harold v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 September 1980
• Docket Number: No. 424-79.,424-79.
• Citation: 634 F.2d 547
• Parties: Dolores P. HAROLD, Widow of David D. Harold, Deceased v. The UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

634 F.2d 547

Dolores P. HAROLD, Widow of David D. Harold, Deceased v. The UNITED STATES.

No. 424-79.

United States Court of Claims.

September 10, 1980.

John M. Gallagher, Jr., Media, Pa., for plaintiff; Alexander A. DiSanti, Media, Pa., attorney of record for plaintiff; Richard, Brian, DiSanti & Hamilton, Media, Pa., of counsel.

Benjamin F. Wilson, with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Alice Daniel and David I. Tevelin, Washington, D.C., of counsel.

Before COWEN, Senior Judge, and DAVIS and NICHOLS, Judges.

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COWEN, Senior Judge:

Plaintiff, the widow of David D. Harold, former Chief of the Aldan, Pennsylvania Police Department, sued here to recover a payment of $50,000, which she claims is due her by virtue of the Public Safety Officers' Benefit Act of 1976, Pub.L. 94-430, 90 Stat. 1346, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 3796, et seq. (1976).¹ Both parties have moved for summary judgment and there are no material facts in dispute. For the reasons stated herein, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to the claimed payment and accordingly grant her motion for summary judgment.

I.

The Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976 is neither a complex nor a lengthy statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (1976) directs the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to pay a $50,000 death benefit to the survivors of "a public safety officer who has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty * * *." Section 3796a of title 42, entitled "Limitations on benefits," sets forth three specific situations in which no death benefit shall be paid.² 42 U.S.C. § 3796b defines certain terms used in the Act and the final section, 42 U.S.C. § 3796c grants LEAA the power, inter alia, to establish rules and regulations for the administration of the death benefit program established by the Act. Pursuant to this authority, LEAA has promulgated a regulation, codified as 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(c) (1979), which defines "line of duty" for purposes of section 3796. This regulation provides in pertinent part that:

"Line of duty" means any action which an officer whose primary function is crime control or reduction, enforcement of the criminal law, or suppression of fires is obligated or authorized by rule, regulation, condition of employment or service, or law to perform, including those social, ceremonial, or athletic functions to which he is assigned, or for which he is compensated, by the public agency he serves. * * * 28 C.F.R. § 32.2(c) (1979).

LEAA accompanied its promulgation of this regulation with the following commentary in the Federal Register:

An officer is not acting within the line of duty when he is grossly negligent. See the dialogue between Congressmen Brown and Eilberg at Cong.Rec. H 10135-36 (Sept. 15, 1976, daily ed.). 42 Fed.Reg. 23259 (1977).³

As will be seen, plaintiff's right to recover the contested benefits turns on whether the LEAA commentary is a valid interpretation of the statutory phrase "line of duty."

II.

Plaintiff's husband, Chief Harold, died on February 4, 1977, as a result of an accidental, self-inflicted gunshot wound incurred on that date. Chief Harold was cleaning his police revolver in his home when it discharged. The weapon was fully loaded and the grips had been removed when the accident occurred. Shortly after her husband's death, plaintiff submitted to LEAA a claim for a section 3796 death benefit. In October 1978, the Director of the Public Safety Officers' Benefit Program ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to a death benefit because, in the director's opinion, Chief Harold's death did not occur in the line of duty as required by section 3796. The following two reasons were cited in support of the director's conclusion that Chief Harold's death did not occur in the line of duty:

(1) Chief Harold's death was not the result of a line of duty action, which he was obligated or authorized to perform while off duty.

(2) Chief Harold's death resulted from his gross negligence in the handling of his police revolver.

On October 30, 1978, plaintiff requested LEAA to reconsider the program director's decision. LEAA assented to this request and a hearing was held on plaintiff's claim on January 10, 1979. The hearing officer issued a decision on May 14, 1979, in which he affirmed the program director's determination that Chief Harold's death did not occur in the line of duty. The hearing officer based his affirmance solely on his finding that Chief Harold was grossly negligent in his handling of his weapon. He reasoned that by virtue of the commentary to section 32.2(c) of the regulations, the death was not sustained in the line of duty. He specifically rejected the other basis of the program director's initial determination, i.e., that Chief Harold's death did not result from an action which he was required to perform while off duty. Rather, the hearing officer found that because of the small size of the Aldan police force "it was an unwritten rule of the police department that the policemen were to clean their weapons at home." Therefore, he concluded that in this sense, Chief Harold's death did occur in the line of duty.

Plaintiff appealed the decision of the hearing officer to the LEAA administrator, who, on August 10, 1979, affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Specifically, the administrator found that "but for the gross negligence in the handling of his weapon that resulted in his death, Chief Harold's action in cleaning his weapon at home while off duty would have been in the `line of duty' * * *." Plaintiff then brought this suit.

III.

Plaintiff concedes for purposes of this action that Chief Harold was grossly negligent in his handling of his police revolver. As a consequence, the sole issue here is the validity of the administrator's determination that Chief Harold's gross negligence placed his activities outside of the line of duty. Since the only cited basis for this determination was the commentary to section 32.2(c) of the regulations, we must decide whether this commentary comports with the meaning attached by Congress to the term "line of duty" when it enacted the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976.

The starting point for any inquiry into the meaning of a statute is of course the language used by Congress in the statute. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 2930, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978); Ampex Corporation v. United States, 223 Ct.Cl. ___, 620 F.2d 853, 857-858 (1980). Defendant does not dispute the fact that the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act contains no provision which explicitly debars the payment of a death benefit to the survivors of a law enforcement officer when his death is caused by his own gross negligence. Indeed, to the extent that the language of the statute supports any speculation regarding the Congressional intent on this question, it suggests just the opposite.

In section 3796a Congress specifically delineated three sets of circumstances in which the payment of death benefits would be barred. Section 3796a provides:

No benefits shall be paid under this Act —

(1) if the death was caused by the intentional misconduct of the public safety officer or by such officer's intention to bring about his death;

(2) if voluntary intoxication of the public safety officer was the proximate cause of such officer's death; or

(3) to any person who would otherwise be entitled to a benefit under this subchapter if such person's actions were a substantial contributing factor to the death of the public safety officer.

Congress failed to make even an implicit reference to an officer's gross negligence in this list of disentitling circumstances when "it could easily have done so explicitly." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). This omission suggests to us that Congress did not intend an officer's gross negligence to preclude the payment of death benefits. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-87, 90 S.Ct. 314, 323-25, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969).

Nevertheless, defendant argues that the failure of Congress to include an officer's gross negligence in the section 3796a list of disentitling circumstances is irrelevant, because Congress intended the term "line of duty" to be interpreted as excluding acts performed in a grossly negligent manner. The sole support cited by defendant for the view that Congress adopted the rule set out in LEAA's commentary is a colloquy among Representatives Brown of Michigan, Eilberg and Sarbanes, during the floor consideration of the conference report on H.R. 366, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the bill which became the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act of 1976. This colloquy addressed the question whether an officer whose death resulted from his own gross negligence would be covered by the Act. The colloquy is reproduced in pertinent part below.⁴

While some of the quoted remarks can be viewed as corroborative of LEAA's interpretation of "line of duty," we think that the colloquy considered as a whole is ambiguous. At most, it casts a very hazy light upon the Congressional understanding of the term "line of duty." The ambiguity and resulting haziness are caused (1) by Mr. Eilberg's remark that there would be "no coverage" (i.e., no death benefit) if a law enforcement officer's death resulted from either the officer's gross negligence or from his negligence; and (2) by Congressman Brown's statement that the responses given him in the colloquy did not dispose of his question as to whether "line of duty" excluded "negligence." 122 Cong.Rec. 30520 (1976) (emphasis added).

In its brief, defendant takes the position that "undoubtedly" Congressman Eilberg was "of the belief that only gross negligence, and not mere negligence on the part of a public safety officer would preclude the officer's survivors from recovering benefits under the Act." Brief for defendant at 8...