Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified School

• Decision Date: 04 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 04CV1103 JAH(POR).,04CV1103 JAH(POR).
• Citation: 345 F.Supp.2d 1096
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Tyler Chase HARPER, a minor, By and Through his parents, Ron and Cheryl HARPER, Plaintiff, v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al., Defendants.

345 F.Supp.2d 1096

Tyler Chase HARPER, a minor, By and Through his parents, Ron and Cheryl HARPER, Plaintiff, v. POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; et al., Defendants.

No. 04CV1103 JAH(POR).

United States District Court, S.D. California.

November 4, 2004.

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Robert Tyler, Alliance Defense Fund, Murrieta, CA, for Tyler Chase Harper, A minor, by and through his parents Ron and Cheryl Harper, Ron Harper, Cheryl Harper, plaintiffs.

Paul Vincent Carelli, IV, Stutz Artiano Shinoff and Holtz, San Diego, CA, for Poway Unified School District, Jeff Mangum, All Individually and in their official capacity as Members of the Board of the Poway Unified School District, Linda Vanderveen, All Individually and in their official capacity as Members of the Board of the Poway Unified School District, Penny Ranftle, All individually and in their official capacity as Members of the Board of the Poway Unified School District, Steve McMillan, All individually and in their official capacity as Members of the Board of the Poway Unified School District, Andy Patapow, All Individually and in their official capacity as Members of the Board of the Poway Unified School District, Donald A Phillips, Individually, and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Poway Unified School District, Scott Fisher, Individually and in his official capacity as Principal of Poway High School, Lynell Antrim, Individually and in her official capacity as Assistant Principal of Poway High School, Ed Giles, Individually and in his official capacity as Vice Principal of Poway High School, David Lemaster, Individually and in his official capacity as Teacher of Poway High School, Does, 1 through 20 inclusive, defendants.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6)] [DOC. # 14] AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DOC. # 18]

HOUSTON, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. After careful consideration of the pleadings and relevant exhibits submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART defendants' motion to dismiss and DENIES plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background¹

Plaintiff Tyler Chase Harper ("plaintiff")² is a minor and enrolled at Poway High School ("the School") in the Poway Unified School District. Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff is a Christian with the firmly held religious belief that homosexuality is immoral. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. In the weeks prior to April 21, 2004, plaintiff became aware that the School planned to observe a "Day of Silence" that he believed "endorsed, encouraged, subsidized and promoted" homosexual activity. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. Plaintiff felt compelled to communicate his "sincerely-held religious beliefs" regarding "the Biblical condemnation of homosexual behavior to others in his school and his community." Id. ¶ 25. Therefore, on April 21, 2004 (the "Day of Silence"), plaintiff wore a T-shirt to the School on which the words "I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" had been placed on the front and the words "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL `Romans 1:27'" had been placed on the back. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 31.

In addition, on April 22, 2004, plaintiff wore a different T-shirt to school with the words "BE ASHAMED" "OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" placed on the front and the words "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27" placed on the back. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. During Plaintiff's second period class on April 22, 2004, the classroom teacher, defendant David LeMaster ("LeMaster"), informed plaintiff that he "was in violation of the school's dress code" and told plaintiff to remove the shirt "or leave class and report directly to the school office." Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff apparently decided not to remove the T-shirt but, instead, met with the School's Vice Principal, defendant Lynell Antrim ("Antrim"). See id. ¶ 35. Antrim informed plaintiff that the T-shirt was "clearly in violation of the dress code because it had a `homemade' message, as opposed to a printed or more permanent message on the garment." Id. Antrim further informed plaintiff that "the words on the T-shirt were `inflammatory,'" and that plaintiff should replace the shirt if he wished to return to class. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37. Plaintiff "politely" refused to change the shirt and was directed to wait to discuss the matter with the principal. Id. ¶ 38.

The School's Principal, defendant Scott Fisher ("Fisher"), then interviewed plaintiff, during which Fisher "repeatedly" inquired as to why plaintiff wore the T-shirt on both days. Id. ¶ 41. Fisher also informed plaintiff that the T-shirt was "too `aggressive' and that wearing it would not be tolerated at [the School]." Id. In addition, Fisher further informed plaintiff that any punishment meted out would be the same whether the T-shirt had been homemade or pre-manufactured "because the content was inflammatory." Id. ¶ 42. Finally, Fisher told plaintiff that, due to his courteousness and respect toward school authorities, plaintiff would be required to remain in an office during the rest of the school day, not be allowed to leave the office without an escort, and be required to depart the school grounds immediately thereafter "by the most direct route." Id. ¶ 43, 44. Plaintiff remained in an office as directed. Id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiff received visits from "various school security personnel" while he remained in the office. Id. ¶ 47. In particular, a former coach of plaintiff's, questioned him as to whether wearing the T-shirt "was `worth it.'" Id. ¶ 48. A deputy sheriff also questioned plaintiff while he was in the School's office. See id. ¶ 49. The deputy sheriff, wearing a badge and carrying sidearm, informed plaintiff he was "there to determine if [plaintiff] was a dangerous student, to find out why he wore the particular T-shirt, and to determine if he was going to engage in similar behavior in the future." Id. The deputy sheriff suggested plaintiff should "not be offensive to others" because the Christian faith is not based on hate and further informed plaintiff that the T-shirt was "`inflammatory' and `could encourage uprising and violence against homosexuals.'" Id. ¶¶ 51, 52.

At the end of the school day, plaintiff was directed to defendant Vice Principal Ed Giles' ("Giles") office. Id. ¶ 53. Giles explained to plaintiff that Giles knew plaintiff's family and youth pastor and that Giles was a Christian believer. Id. ¶ 55. Giles further explained to plaintiff that when Giles came to school "he had to leave his faith `in the car'" and "advised [plaintiff] that when he comes to [the School] ... he too must `leave his faith in the car.'" Id. ¶ 56, 57. Plaintiff informed Giles he could not do so. Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff was then informed to leave school directly without stopping at his locker for any homework assignments, to which he complied. Id. ¶ 59-61.

Just prior to the end of the school day, Giles telephoned plaintiff's father, Ron Harper ("Ron Harper"), and informed him of plaintiff's detention and suspension for the day due to the T-shirt. Id. ¶ 62, 63. Ron Harper was initially given the reason for the suspension as being due to the homemade nature of the T-shirt but, after further inquiry, Giles explained that, based on his view, the message on the T-shirt was "negative" and "`only positive community messages were allowed.'" Id. ¶ 64-66. The next day, Ron Harper went to the School to discuss the previous day's suspension and was told that plaintiff conducted himself respectfully and honorably and that "no disruptions, altercations or other incidents among students at the school" had occurred due to his son's T-shirt. Id. ¶ 67, 68.

II. Procedural History

The instant complaint was filed on June 2, 2004. Plaintiff's complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that defendants' actions violated plaintiff's rights: (1) to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment; (3) to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; and (6) pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal and punitive damages.

In lieu of an answer, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on June 22, 2004, which was set for hearing on July 30, 2004. Defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims on the grounds that each cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In the alternative, defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's damages claims on the grounds that they are barred pursuant to the immunity afforded under the Eleventh Amendment and move to dismiss the individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

On July 12, 2004, plaintiff filed his motion for preliminary injunction. The parties subsequently stipulated to reschedule the hearing date for both motions to August 26, 2004. Both parties filed their respective oppositions to the motions on August 12, 2004. The parties' reply briefs were each filed on August 19, 2004. On the Court's own motion, the hearing date was rescheduled to September 16, 2004.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). Dismissal of a claim under this rule is appropriate only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, ...