Harper Machinery Co. v. Ryan-Unmack Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1912
• Citation: 82 A. 1027,85 Conn. 359
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HARPER MACHINERY CO. v. RYAN-UNMACK CO.

82 A. 1027

85 Conn. 359

HARPER MACHINERY CO. v. RYAN-UNMACK CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 9, 1912

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Marcus H. Holcomb Judge.

Action by the Harper Machinery Company against the Ryan-Unmack Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. No error.

Richard H. Tyner, for appellant.

James D. Hart, for appellee.

RORABACK, J.

In 1910 the plaintiff was a corporation having an office and place of business in New York City, and as part of its business was engaged in leasing to contractors locomotives, cars, rails and machinery for construction work. At the same time the defendant was a corporation with its office and place of business in the city of New Haven. This corporation was engaged in the business of general contracting work. In July, 1910, the defendant was carrying on its work in the erection of a dam in the town of Morris, in Litchfield county, for a reservoir for the city of Waterbury. July 19, 1910, the plaintiff by a written contract leased to the defendant two locomotives, eleven dump cars, and certain relaying rails for use in the construction of the dam at Morris. By the terms of this agreement the defendant was to pay a monthly rental for the use of this property after it arrived at Litchfield, Conn. Due performance of the terms of the contract on the part of the plaintiff, and its breach by the defendant are alleged. The breach is alleged to have resulted from the failure of the defendant to pay the rental for the use of the plaintiff's property amounting to $402, and a neglect to return the property leased at the defendant's expense. The plaintiff under the second count of its complaint also claimed to recover $196.14 for goods, wares, and merchandise alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant. The defendant, in connection with certain special denials, set up by way of special defense and counterclaim that the locomotives leased to it were not in good condition, and not capable of performing work ordinarily required of locomotives of this character. Upon this branch of the case, the defendant claimed to recover damages largely in excess of the plaintiff's claim. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant $515.09. The reasons of appeal involve the action of the court in refusing to charge as requested, in its charge as given, and in its rulings as to the admissions of evidence.

The defendant in its requests referring to damages asked the court to instruct the jury that: " If you find it was agreed between the parties, or if you find that there was an implied agreement by the parties that the machinery was capable and fit for the purpose for which it was hired, and if you find that it was not fit for such purposes, then the defendant would be entitled to recover back from the plaintiff the cost of shipping the equipment from Roselle Park, N.J., to Litchfield, and the cost of transporting the same from Litchfield to the dam, and evidence of said cost has been introduced in this case." The court sufficiently covered this point when it stated: " You should not consider the cost to the defendant of the transportation of said equipment from New Jersey to said dam, which is made an item in the counterclaim, unless you find that in agreement Exhibit A there was an implied warranty, or that there was a subsequent express warranty by the plaintiff as to the condition when they arrived at Litchfield as to be unfitted to perform the work such locomotives were intended to perform, or find that one of them so shipped was different and inferior to the one the plaintiff agreed to furnish."

In commenting upon the plaintiff's claim that there was an implied warranty that the plaintiff's engines were in good condition and capable of performing work ordinarily required of machinery of this character, the court said " If the defendant informed the plaintiff of the purpose for which it was to use these locomotives, and trusted the plaintiff to furnish him with locomotives suitable and adequate for such purpose, and the plaintiff undertook to do this and thereupon furnished these locomotives for that purpose, there was an implied warranty by the plaintiff that the locomotives were reasonably suitable and adequate to the extent of the capacity of that class of engines for the purpose for which they were leased." The expression in this part of the charge, " and the plaintiff undertook to do this," made the instruction upon this subject rather indefinite and obscure. That, however, is not of serious consequence if the whole statement in relation to this matter, as applied to the situation before the jury expressed a pertinent principle in such a way as to furnish them a proper guide for their deliberations, and did not mislead them. It may be fairly assumed that the jury understood from this portion of the charge that if they should find that the plaintiff had been informed of the purpose for which its locomotives were to be used, and that the defendant trusted the plaintiff to furnish locomotives suitable for that purpose, there would be an implied warranty that the locomotives so furnished were suitable for the desired purpose. The law sanctions such a proposition as applicable to a situation...