Harper v. Admin. Lieutenant
| Decision Date | 24 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-11222,20-11222 |
| Parties | WILLIE LEE HARPER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATIVE LIEUTENANT, Nakenya Weatherspoon, ASSISTANT WARDEN (PROGRAMS), Joyce T. Burke, SERGEANT LYTONIA MERRITT, Florida Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-25073-KMW
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
Willie Lee Harper, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his prisoner civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Harper claims that he was terminated from his law library job after he filed a grievance against two prison guards involving an unrelated disciplinary hearing. Because Harper plausibly alleged a factual basis for his First Amendment retaliation claim and a separate conspiracy to retaliate claim, we vacate the district court's order as to those two claims and remand for further proceedings.
Harper alleges the following facts leading up to and related to his termination from his position at the prison law library. On September 10, 2016, an allegedly false disciplinary report was written against Harper. The disciplinary hearing was conducted by Nakenya Weatherspoon and Joyce T. Burke. At the hearing, Weatherspoon asked Harper how he would like to plea. When Harper asked if he could address the report first, Weatherspoon and Burke became "extremely hostile, antagonistic, and intimidating." They yelled at him that he could not say anything and demanded his plea. Weatherspoon then entered a plea of no contest, even though Harper claims that he does not remember entering such a plea. Harper states that hewas intimidated and frightened by the situation and did not feel free to argue against such a plea.
Weatherspoon proceeded to ask Harper what he wanted to say about the charge. When he began to contest the veracity of the disciplinary report, Burke again yelled at him that any information about the incident was required to be submitted in a statement before the hearing. Before Harper could respond further, Weatherspoon declared Harper guilty of the charge and issued a penalty in the form of a change in his employment from the law library to food service for thirty days. Harper appealed this decision to the Warden, explaining the actions of Weatherspoon and Burke at the hearing. On September 29, 2016, the Warden denied his appeal.1 Harper then appealed to the Office of the Secretary, who filed a grievance on November 2, 2016, on behalf of Harper based on the allegations in his appeal about Weatherspoon and Burke's conduct during the hearing.
Following his thirty days on food service duty, Harper returned to his job at the law library. On November 9, 2016, while he was working in the library, Weatherspoon and Burke entered the library and spoke with Lytonia Merritt. They discussed the grievance filed by Harper concerning the disciplinary hearing and "about what they could do to get back at [Harper]." Harper then heard Merritt statethat "I don't like him anyway, he thinks he's so smart, he loves this Law Library job, I've been looking for a way to get him out of here anyway." The three discussed the issue further and ultimately agreed to terminate Harper's employment at the law library. Following that exchange, Harper was removed from his law library position, Merritt posted a notice to fill his prior position, and Burke assigned him to inside grounds duty. About a week after he was terminated from his law library position, two guards, who are not parties in this action, passed Harper in the mess hall, smirked at him, and said "they kicked you out of the Law Library."
On December 14, 2016, Harper filed a second grievance with the Warden related to his removal from his law library job. On December 4, 2018, after waiting the requisite amount of time to exhaust his administrative remedies, and having received no response from the Warden, Harper filed a prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The magistrate judge granted Harper's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and ordered him to amend his complaint, calling the complaint a shotgun pleading that lacked sufficient factual allegations and was not provided in the correct complaint form with all the requisite information.
Harper then filed an amended complaint—this time in the correct form—that outlined the same factual allegations as in his initial complaint. The amended complaint raised the following claims: violations of the First Amendment against Weatherspoon, Burke, and Merritt for retaliating against Harper for the exercise ofhis free speech rights; violations of the Eighth Amendment against Weatherspoon and Burke for issuing a punishment not authorized by the Florida Department of Corrections; violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process against Weatherspoon and Burke; and conspiracy against Weatherspoon, Burke, and Merritt for conspiring to retaliate against Harper for the exercise of his free speech and due process rights.
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the case be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As to the due process claims, the magistrate judge concluded that the claims failed because the penalty alleged—a temporary removal from his law library position—does not constitute a deprivation of his liberty interests sufficient to invoke Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. The magistrate judge noted that, to the extent Harper argued his due process rights were violated because he was permanently removed from his job as a prison law clerk, the analysis is the same. As for the Eighth Amendment claims, the magistrate judge found that the thirty-day food service assignment did not amount to a penalty that disregarded a risk to Harper's health or safety or otherwise subjected him to inhumane conditions.
Turning to the First Amendment claims, the magistrate judge found that Harper's grievances and appeal of those grievances constituted protected speech that satisfied the first element of a First Amendment retaliation claim. But the magistratejudge held that the claims failed based on the second and third elements of a free speech retaliation claim. As to the second element, the magistrate judge concluded that the amended complaint contained no allegations explaining why a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred from exercising their free speech because they were removed from their duties as a prison law clerk. As to the third element, the magistrate judge determined that Harper failed to establish a causal link between his grievances and Merritt's alleged retaliatory actions.
Harper filed objections to the report. The district court overruled those objections, adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and dismissed with prejudice the amended complaint. This timely appeal ensued.
We review de novo a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leal v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001). When reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., 708 F.3d 1243, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards, but such pleadings must still suggest some factual basis for a claim. See Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
On appeal, Harper challenges only the dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claims and his conspiracy claim.2
Although an inmate has no constitutional right to retain a specific job within the prison, prison administrators are not permitted to grant or withhold such privileges for impermissible reasons—such as retaliating against an inmate for exercising his free speech rights. Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (11th Cir. 1986). The First Amendment forbids such retaliation. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, the inmate must allege that: "(1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the administrator's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the protected speech." Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). "The gist of a retaliation claim is that a prisoner is penalized for exercising the right of free speech." Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1242 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, Harper plausibly alleged each element of a retaliation claim against Merritt, Burke, and Weatherspoon. As the district court correctly found, the grievances filed by Harper relating to Weatherspoon and Burke's actions against him during his initial disciplinary hearing are protected speech under the First Amendment. See Smith, 532 F.3d at 1276 .
The district court erred, however, in holding that Harper's retaliation claims failed as to the second and third elements. The adverse action alleged by Harper was the loss of a job as head law clerk in the prison law library—a position which he had held since 2012 after having been a law clerk for one year, and a position where he had received high...
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