Harper v. Copperpoint Mut. Ins. Holding Co.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2022
• Docket Number: 82158
• Citation: 509 P.3d 55
• Parties: Daria HARPER, an Individual; and Daniel Wininger, an Individual, Appellants, v. COPPERPOINT MUTUAL INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY, an Arizona Corporation; Copperpoint General Insurance Company, an Arizona Corporation; Law Offices of Marshall Silberberg, P.C., a California Corporation; Kenneth Marshall Silberberg, a/k/a Marshall Silberberg, a/k/a K. Marshall Silberberg, an Individual, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

509 P.3d 55

Daria HARPER, an Individual; and Daniel Wininger, an Individual, Appellants,

v.COPPERPOINT MUTUAL INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY, an Arizona Corporation; Copperpoint General Insurance Company, an Arizona Corporation; Law Offices of Marshall Silberberg, P.C., a California Corporation; Kenneth Marshall Silberberg, a/k/a Marshall Silberberg, a/k/a K. Marshall Silberberg, an Individual, Respondents.

No. 82158

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED May 05, 2022

Blumberg Law Corporation and John P. Blumberg, Long Beach, California; Maier Gutierrez & Associates and Jason R. Maier, Las Vegas, for Appellants.

Hooks Meng & Clement and Dalton L. Hooks, Jr., and Sami N. Randolph, Las Vegas, for Respondents Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Holding Company and Copperpoint General Insurance Company.

McBride Hall and Robert C. McBride and Heather S. Hall, Las Vegas; Kjar, McKenna & Stockalper, LLP, and Robert L. McKenna, III, James J. Kjar, and Jon R. Schwalbach, El Segundo, California, for Respondents Law Offices of Marshall Silberberg, P.C., and Kenneth Marshall Silberberg.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HARDESTY, STIGLICH, and HERNDON, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HERNDON, J.:

This appeal implicates the scope of NRS 42.021, Nevada's codification of the collateral source rule as it pertains to medical malpractice lawsuits. Subsection 1 of that statute provides that "[i]n an action for injury or death against a provider of health care based upon professional negligence, if the defendant so elects, the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the injury or death" from a collateral source, such as workers’ compensation benefits. (Emphasis added.) In turn, subsection 2 provides that the payer of collateral benefits introduced pursuant to subsection 1 cannot "[r]ecover any amount against the plaintiff; or [b]e subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against a defendant."

Here, we are asked to consider whether NRS 42.021(2) ’s prohibition on a collateral source provider's right to recover extends to a medical malpractice case that was settled before proceeding to trial. We conclude that, based on NRS 42.021 ’s plain language, the statute applies only to situations in which a medical malpractice defendant "introduce[s] evidence" of a plaintiff's collateral source benefits, which necessarily does not occur when a case is settled pretrial. Nor are we persuaded that any exceptions to our plain-language analysis are applicable. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying appellant's request for a declaration that NRS 42.021 precluded respondent from recovering its workers’ compensation payments from appellant's medical malpractice settlement proceeds.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2014, appellant Daria Harper sustained a work-related injury in Arizona.¹ Respondents Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Company and Copperpoint General Insurance Company (collectively Copperpoint) are Arizona-based workers’ compensation insurers that provided coverage for Harper's injury, which included medical treatment. As part of that treatment, Harper underwent a procedure in Las Vegas in 2015 during which Harper suffered an additional severe injury resulting in quadriplegia

, as well as severe pain, suffering, and emotional distress. In 2016, Harper filed a medical malpractice action in Nevada against the doctors and hospital who performed the Las Vegas procedure. Harper was represented by respondents Kenneth Marshall Silberberg and the Law Offices of Marshall Silberberg (Silberberg) in that action.

When Copperpoint became aware of Harper's medical malpractice action, it sent a letter to Silberberg stating that, under Arizona Revised Statute section 23-1023, Copperpoint was entitled to a lien against any recovery Harper might thereafter obtain in the action. Specifically, Copperpoint claimed that it was entitled under that statute to be reimbursed for the roughly $3 million that it had paid in workers’ compensation-related benefits stemming from the initial work-related injury.² Silberberg sent a letter in response, explaining that Harper had already settled the medical malpractice action with the doctors and hospital for roughly $6 million and that under NRS 42.021(2), Copperpoint was prohibited from seeking reimbursement. Thereafter, Copperpoint sent Harper a letter notifying her that it was suspending her workers’ compensation coverage until she reimbursed Copperpoint for the $3 million it had already paid her.

This prompted Harper to file the underlying action against both Copperpoint and Silberberg. As relevant here, Harper asserted claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that NRS 42.021(2) prohibited Copperpoint from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds and seeking an injunction requiring Copperpoint to continue paying her workers’ compensation benefits.³

After filing her complaint, Harper filed a motion for partial summary judgment, making a two-step argument that (1) NRS 42.021(2) prohibited Copperpoint from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds, and (2) that statute, rather than conflicting Arizona law, was applicable to the underlying litigation. Contemporaneously, Copperpoint filed an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss wherein it essentially argued the mirror image of Harper's arguments, namely, that (1) NRS 42.021(2) does not prohibit Copperpoint from asserting a lien against Harper's medical malpractice settlement proceeds, and (2) even if NRS 42.021 does prohibit Copperpoint from doing so, conflicting Arizona law governs the reimbursement issue. In addition, Copperpoint argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Arizona's workers’ compensation system had exclusive jurisdiction over Harper's claims, which, in effect, were simply seeking continued workers’ compensation benefits.

The district court denied Harper's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Copperpoint's NRCP 12(b)(5) motion. In so doing, the district court concluded that NRS 42.021 ’s plain language applied only to actions where third-party payments were "introduce[d] [into] evidence" and did not apply to cases that settled before trial. In light of that conclusion, the district court did not definitively resolve whether NRS 42.021 should apply instead of conflicting Arizona law, nor did it resolve Copperpoint's argument that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Thereafter, the district court certified its order as final under NRCP 54(b), and Harper filed this appeal.⁴

DISCUSSION

Before considering the parties' arguments regarding NRS 42.021, we must first address Copperpoint's argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Harper's claims. We review both issues de novo. See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 667, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009) ("Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review."); see also Williams v. United Parcel Servs., 129 Nev. 386, 391, 302 P.3d 1144, 1147 (2013) (recognizing that issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo).

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Harper's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

As a threshold matter on appeal, Copperpoint reiterates its argument that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Harper's declaratory and injunctive relief claims. Copperpoint appears to be contending that Harper's claims are, in essence, simply seeking continued workers’ compensation benefits that must be pursued through Arizona's workers’ compensation system. Cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1022(A) (1984) (providing that "[t]he right to recover compensation pursuant to ... [Arizona's worker's compensation statutes] for injuries sustained by an employee ... is the exclusive remedy against the ... employer's workers’ compensation insurance carrier"). For support, Copperpoint observes that Harper has filed a claim with Arizona's workers’ compensation system that is now proceeding through Arizona ’s appellate court system. In response, Harper contends that she is not actually seeking continued workers’ compensation benefits (even though her injunctive relief claim requests precisely that), but that she instead is simply seeking a declaration that Copperpoint cannot assert a lien against her medical malpractice settlement proceeds under Nevada law. In short, Harper does not meaningfully address the significance of the Arizona litigation.

Nonetheless, having considered both parties’ arguments, we conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Harper's claims. While Harper's claims may incidentally be seeking continued workers’ compensation coverage, the gravamen of her complaint seeks a judicial declaration that, under NRS 42.021, Copperpoint is prohibited from seeking reimbursement from her medical malpractice settlement proceeds. Characterized as such, Harper's complaint seeks a judicial interpretation of a Nevada statute that affects the parties’ rights to proceeds from a medical malpractice action that was filed in Nevada and that stemmed from alleged malpractice that occurred in Nevada. Such a request for relief falls squarely within the district court's jurisdiction. See NRS 30.030 (providing that under Nevada's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, "[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed" and that "[t]he declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect"); Kress v. Corey, 65 Nev. 1, 26, 189 P.2d 352, 364 (1948) (holding that the only prerequisites for a court to grant declaratory relief are that "(1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; that is to say, a controversy in which a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the...