Harper v. Daun Ray Casuals, Inc.

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FRANK F. DROWOTA, III; BROCK
• Citation: Harper v. Daun Ray Casuals, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1980)
• Decision Date: 31 March 1980
• Parties: Mildred Marie HARPER, Appellant, v. DAUN RAY CASUALS, INC. and Royal Globe Insurance Company, Appellees. 596 S.W.2d 822

Page 822

596 S.W.2d 822

Mildred Marie HARPER, Appellant, v. DAUN RAY CASUALS, INC. and Royal Globe Insurance Company Appellees.

596 S.W.2d 822

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 31, 1980.

Henry & McCord, Edward C. Martin, Tullahoma, for appellant.

Daniel D. Finch, Finch, McBroom & Porter, Nashville, for appellees.

OPINION

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, Special Justice.

The sole issue in this worker's compensation case is whether the trial court was correct in finding that injuries sustained by appellant Mildred Marie Harper did not occur while she was using a route required or furnished by her employer and that they did not therefore arise out of and in the course of her employment.

The injury in this case took place on February 22, 1978. Ms. Harper filed her complaint on October 17, 1978, in the Coffee County Circuit Court at Manchester and trial was had on May 23, 1979. Defendant/appellees moved for a dismissal of appellant's action at the close of her proof and presented no further evidence in the case. On June 29, 1979, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order dismissing appellant's complaint. Appellant Harper appeals from this judgment.

At the time of her injury appellant was employed by appellee Daun-Ray Casuals as a sewing machine operator. On the morning of February 22, 1978, at approximately 6:30 a. m. appellant arrived at her place of employment and parked her car in the area of the lot adjoining appellee's plant which was designated for use by employees other than managerial employees. This area was to the side of appellee's building. Appellant then walked toward a door on the side of the building. There were several days' accumulations of snow and ice both in the lot and on the porch to the door appellant approached. As she stepped up onto the porch, appellant fell on her back. She subsequently discovered upon going to a doctor that she had injured her spine.

Appellant concedes that generally, under the law governing worker's compensation, employees injured while en route to or from work are not entitled to benefits, the rationale being that during these times no service is being provided for the employer, and therefore such injuries cannot be said to arise out of and in the course of employment, the test for compensable injuries under T.C.A. §§ 50-902(d) and 50-903. Appellant however argues that she falls under an exception to this general rule.

The exception to which appellant refers was articulated by this Court in the case of Woods v. Warren, 548 S.W.2d 651, 655 (Tenn.1977), as follows:

. . . in order to avoid the application of the general rule of nonliability for an injury sustained en route to or from work, the employee must show that:

a. at the time of the injury he was using a route required or furnished by the employer; and such route was on the premises of the employer, and

b. the use of the required route subjects the employee to a definite special hazard, or

c. that the risks of travel are directly incident to the employment itself.

All of this is qualified by the fact that the "premises" are that part of the property where the employee actually works or which he is required to use for ingress and egress. (Citations omitted.)

The trial court in its memorandum opinion and order referred to this standard and then went on to state:

In this case the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot recover because she has not satisfied the first part of the first requirement, i. e., she has not shown by the preponderance of the evidence that she was using a route required or furnished by the employer.

The Court is of the opinion that the credible proof in this case establishes that the entrance which the plaintiff was about to use in going to her work was not furnished or required to be used by her by the employer and as a matter of fact to the contrary the employer furnished and required that an entirely different door be used by employees.

Accordingly, it is the finding of the Court that any alleged injuries sustained by the plaintiff on February 22, 1978 did not arise out of and in the course of plaintiff's...