Harper v. James
Decision Date | 11 January 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 30710,30710 |
Citation | 246 Ind. 131,203 N.E.2d 531 |
Parties | Helen Lucille HARPER, Appellant, v. William Warren JAMES, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Buena Chaney, of Mann, Mann, Chaney & Johnson, Terre Haute, for appellant.
Thomas & Thomas, Brazil, Tennis & Cochran, Sullivan, for appellee.
The action is before this court on petition to transfer. [Sec: Harper v. James (1963 Appellate Court) 191 N.E.2d 504.]
This is an action for personal injury arising out of an automobile collision. Judgment was for the defendant-appellee.
Appellant, in Cause 1-B of her motion for new trial, assigns as error giving of the trial court's Instruction No. 10. The instruction is as follows:
[Our emphasis.]
First, appellant equates 'conjecture' with 'think.' Thus, with this interpretation appellant claims that the instruction invades the province of the jury. However, the use of the word 'conjecture' is not erroneously used in the instruction. The word is defined:
'An idea or notion founded on a probability without any demonstration of its truth; an idea or surmise inducing a slight degree of belief founded upon some possible, or perhaps probable fact of which there is no positive evidence * * * An explanation consistent with but not deducible as a reasonable inference from known facts or conditions. * * *' Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1957), p. 373.
The use of the word conjecture is consistent with numerous decisions of this court which have held that a verdict cannot be based on mere guess, conjecture, surmise, possibility or speculation. Newsom v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company (1962), 133 Ind.App. 582, 181 N.E.2d 240; 134 Ind.App. 120, 186 N.E.2d 699; Kelly v. Davidson et al. (1959), 129 Ind.App. 384, 154 N.E.2d 888; Smith, Executrix v. Strock, Executor (1945), 115 Ind.App. 518, 60 N.E.2d 157. The failure to use a particular word in an instruction is not error if the word used conveys the proper meaning. For example, see: Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co. v. Parker (1941), 110 Ind.App. 1, 34 N.E.2d 190, 37 N.E.2d 5; Brooks v. Muncie Traction Co. (1911), 176 Ind. 298, 95 N.E. 1006.
However, this instruction was erroneous because it imposed a burden upon the plaintiff-appellant of proving the absence of contributory negligence.
In King's Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters (1952), 123 Ind.App. 110, 125-126, 106 N.E.2d 713, 719-720, the problem was discussed as follows:
1
A plaintiff is not required to allege or prove freedom from contributory negligence. Acts 1959, ch. 63, Sec. 1, p. 130, being Sec. 2-1025, Burns' 1946 Repl. (1964 Supp.); Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis (1953), 232 Ind. 551, 114 N.E.2d 873; Michigan Cent. R. R. Co. v. Spindler, Admr. (1937), 211 Ind. 94, 5 N.E.2d 632, 108 A.L.R. 1307. Instruction No. 10 which imposed this burden upon appellant was erroneous. 2
Appellee contends that Instructions Nos. 4, 19, and 20 given by the court correctly state the law as to the burden of proof of contributory negligence and that these instructions cured the error, if any, in Instruction No. 10. However, the error cannot be rendered harmless by the mere giving of other instructions which state the law correctly.
As stated in Fowler v. Wallace (1892), 131 Ind. 347, 355-356, 31 N.E. 53, 55:
Judgment reversed.
This matter is here on petition to transfer. It came to the Appellate Court on appeal from a judgment of the Sullivan Circuit Court denying plaintiff-appellant relief in an action for damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision.
Appellant, in her petition to transfer, relies on the alleged erroneous mandatory instruction, being defendant's instruction No. 10 given by the court and appearing at page one of petition to transfer, majority opinion, page 532, and in appellant's brief page 164. Appellant objected to the giving of said instruction in writing as appears from page two of her petition as follows:
'Appellant, the plaintiff below, made her specific objections in writing to said instruction as follows:
'(Tr. p. 451-452; Appellant's Brief, p. 178)
'Appellant relied on said error in her motion for a new trial in cause 1b thereof which was as follows:
'(Tr. p. 531, and Appellant's Brief, p. 224)'
The phrase 'sole proximate cause' it is contended placed an undue burden on plaintiff requiring a showing she was free from contributory negligence.
It would seem that standing alone Instruction No. 10 is erroneous, but the Appellate Court disposed of the question, saying it was not reversible error because, "[a] party cannot complain of an error in an instruction when he has tendered an instruction containing the same or a similar error.' Garatoni v. Teegarden (1959), 129 Ind.App. 500, 513, 154 N.E.2d 379.' [Cited in 191 N.E.2d 506.]
In appellant's tendered instructions, which were given by the Court Nos. 3 and 6, appellant-plaintiff used the same language he now complains of.
The statement in the majority opinion '[h]owever this instruction was erroneous because it imposed a burden upon the plaintiff-appellant of proving the absence of contributory negligence' is dicta, not sustained by a reading of the instruction. If for the purpose of this argument we were to ignore the case of Garatoni v. Teegarden, supra, reversible error would still not be present in the case at bar for the reason that the instruction complained of (No. 10) was not mandatory.
A mandatory instruction is one which unequivocably charges...
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