Harper v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 December 1940
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 171.
• Citation: 240 Ala. 472,199 So. 699
• Parties: HARPER v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INS. CO. ET AL.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

199 So. 699

240 Ala. 472

HARPER v. KANSAS CITY LIFE INS. CO. ET AL.

4 Div. 171.

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 19, 1940

Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1941.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; W. L. Parks, Judge.

Bill to reform a policy of life insurance by Lula Mae Harper against the Kansas City Life Insurance Company and Emma Blanche Harper. From a decree denying relief and dismissing the bill complainant appeals.

Affirmed.

J. M Rowe, of Elba, for appellant.

J. C Fleming and Eris F. Paul, both of Elba, for appellees.

BROWN Justice.

The bill, filed by appellant, one of the beneficiaries named in an insurance policy, after the death of the insured, against the insurer and the other named beneficiary, seeks reformation of the policy as designating the complainant, the wife of the insured, as the primary beneficiary and the respondent beneficiary, the mother of insured, as a contingent beneficiary.

In brief, filed here, appellant states:

"It is the contention of the complainant, as alleged in the bill of complaint, as amended, that the insured at the time he made application for the policy herein involved on the 8th day of December, 1937, intended that his wife, the complainant, should be named therein as the sole beneficiary in case she should be living at the time the same became a death claim, and that his mother, Emma Blanche Harper, should be named in said policy as contingent beneficiary, to receive the total amount of insurance only in case his wife should die before his own death. In support of this contention it is shown [alleged] that the beneficiary was designated in the application for the policy (the application being a part of the policy) in the manner: 'Lula Mae Harper, wife, or survivor, Emma Blanche Harper, mother.'

"In the face of the policy, however, the beneficiary was designated in a different manner, viz.: 'Lula Mae Harper, wife, and Emma Blanche Harper, mother or survivor.'

"It is the contention of the complainant that, in so designating the beneficiary in the face of the policy a mistake was made such as would warrant a reformation thereof; and, also, that the Insurance Company, by designating the beneficiary in the face of the policy in a manner different from that in which the designation was made in the application for the same, committed a fraud, actual or constructive, such as would warrant a reformation."

The alleged mistake is denied by the respondent beneficiary, and the insurer sets up the manner of designation of the beneficiaries in the application signed by the insured, and the manner of designation in the policy, and says: "This respondent neither admits nor denies that a mistake was made by it in thus designating the beneficiary in the policy; it shows to the court that it is without interest in the matter except its duty to carry out the effect of the insured's instructions as contained in the application; that if the designation as contained in the policy is not proper and pursuant to the application, it is in truth and in fact due to a bona fide misapprehension on the part of this respondent as to the meaning of the language used in the application and this respondent joins with all parties to this suit in submitting to this court the determination of the question."

Much testimony was taken by deposition touching on the issue formed by the pleading and some documentary evidence was adduced, including the policy which embodied a photostatic copy of the application as a part of the contract. On submission, on pleading and proof, the circuit court denied relief and dismissed the bill. Hence the appeal.

It is well settled in this state that courts of equity, in exercising jurisdiction to reform...