Harper v. Mancos Sch. Dist. Re–6

• Decision Date: 05 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–cv–01115–WJM–CBS.
• Citation: 837 F.Supp.2d 1211,281 Ed. Law Rep. 352
• Parties: Laura L. HARPER, Plaintiff, v. MANCOS SCHOOL DISTRICT RE–6; and Brian Hanson, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

837 F.Supp.2d 1211

281 Ed. Law Rep. 352

Laura L. HARPER, Plaintiff,

v.MANCOS SCHOOL DISTRICT RE–6; and Brian Hanson, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–cv–01115–WJM–CBS.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Aug. 5, 2011.

Cathy L. Cooper, Colorado Education Association, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin Todd Figa, Michael Brent Case, Semple, Farrington & Everall, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, District Judge.

In this action, Laura L. Harper brings claims against Mancos School District and Brian Hanson arising out of the non-renewal of her employment as secondary principal and K–12 administrator. Before the Court is the District and Hanson's joint Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF No. 50.) For the reasonsset forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Laura Harper (“Plaintiff”) was employed by Defendant Mancos School District (“District”) as K–12 administrator and secondary school principal for the school years of 2007–08 and 2008–09. (Pl.'s Aff. (ECF No. 61–7) ¶ 2.) In April 2009, Superintendent Brian Hanson approached Plaintiff about the renewal of her contract for the 2009–10 school year. (Statement of Material Facts (“SOF”) ¶ 7.) He informed her that he was going to recommend that her contract be renewed, but that he was worried that the vote would not be unanimous. ( Id.) He asked Plaintiff if she would stay on if the vote was not unanimous and she replied that she would. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 4.) There is no written recording of this conversation. (SOF ¶ 9.)

On April 15, 2009, the District's School Board (“Board”) adopted Hanson's recommendation that Plaintiff's contract be renewed. (SOF ¶ 12.) The Board meeting minutes for April 15, 2009 state:

C. Approve Principal Contracts

...

2. Laura Harper

Motion by Mr. Whalen, seconded by Mr. Boyer to approve the recommendation of Laura Harper for the position of Secondary Principal for the 2009/10 school year. AYE: Mr. Boyer, Mr. Hunter, Ms. Miller, and Mr. Whalen. NO: Mr. Kloster. Motion carried 4–1.

(ECF No. 50–2 at 11.)

After the April 15 board meeting, Hanson informed Plaintiff of the Board's vote in favor of renewing her contract. (Pl.'s Dep. (ECF No. 50–3) pp. 50–51.) Plaintiff responded that she looked forward to working with Hanson in the upcoming school year and working with him to develop new programs. ( Id. at 51.)

After the Board's vote, Plaintiff and Hanson undertook the process of filling the open staff positions for the 2009–10 school year. (SOF ¶ 16.) There was an opening for a special education teacher and Plaintiff suggested to her former colleague, Doug LaMunyon, that he apply. (Pl.'s Dep. at 77.) LaMunyon applied for the position and, as part of his review of LaMunyon's application, Hanson called a number of LaMunyon's former co-workers and supervisors. Based on these references, Hanson decided that LaMunyon should not be interviewed. (SOF ¶¶ 20–21.) Hanson informed Plaintiff that she was not to interview LaMunyon for the position and declined to give her a reason for this decision. ² (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 13.)

As the dates for interviewing approached, LaMunyon contacted Plaintiff about whether he was being considered for the job. ( Id. ¶ 19.) According to Plaintiff, she told LaMunyon that Hanson had decided he would not get an interview and that she “had to abide by that decision.” ( Id.)

LaMunyon then contacted Tom Whalen, a member of the Board, and indicated that he was upset about not being offered an interview. (SOF ¶¶ 25–26.) The next day, Whalen contacted Hanson about LaMunyon's call. (SOF ¶ 28.) Whalen told Hanson that LaMunyon was upset about not being offered an interview and that Plaintiff had told LaMunyon that he was not going to be interviewed. ( Id.)

On May 1, 2009, without speaking to Plaintiff about the situation,³ Hanson contacted the Board. (SOF ¶ 30.) He informed the Board members that Plaintiff had revealed “confidential information” to LaMunyon and that he was debating how to proceed with her employment. (SOF ¶ 31.) Hanson also reached out to two other superintendents seeking their advice about how to handle the situation. (Hanson Dep. (ECF No. 61–1) pp. 145–46.) In conversations with these other superintendents, he explained that “his principal” had disclosed “confidential information” and asked what they would do. ( Id. at 147.)

After mulling it over for a week, Hanson e-mailed the Board with his opinion that it was time to “let [Plaintiff] go.” (SOF ¶ 33.) On May 13, 2009, Hanson gave Plaintiff a letter informing her that she was being placed on administrative leave with pay for the rest of the school year. (SOF ¶ 34.) Plaintiff claims that Hanson told her that she was “dismissed”. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff was paid for the rest of the school year but was not allowed to return to campus other than to pick up a few of her belongings. ( Id. ¶ 22.)

On May 21, 2009, the Board voted unanimously to adopt a resolution that rescinded its earlier approval of Hanson's recommendation that Plaintiff's contract be renewed. The resolution also stated that Plaintiff would not be re-employed for the 2009–10 school year. (ECF No. 50–2 at 21.)

Plaintiff did not look for alternate employment until after the 2008–09 school year was over. (Pl.'s Dep. at 147.) Since May 2009, she has looked for employment but has been unable to get another job in education. (Pl.'s Aff. ¶ 23.)

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 13, 2010. (ECF No. 1.) In lieu of filing an answer, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.⁴ (ECF No. 8.) Defendants argued: (1) that any oral contract for the 2009–10 school year was void pursuant to the statute of frauds; (2) the District's nonrenewal of Plaintiff's contract complied with the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”); (3) Plaintiff was not denied any property right in her employment for 2008–09 because she was placed on leave with pay; (4) Plaintiff had no property right in employment for the 2009–10 school year; (5) Plaintiff had failed to allege a liberty deprivation; (6) Hanson was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) because Plaintiff had failed to show an enforceable contract, her intentional interference with contractual relations claim failed as a matter of law; and (8) because the Board's non-renewal of Plaintiff's contract complied with TECDA, her claim for promissory estoppel failed as a matter of law. ( Id.)

The case proceeded through discovery, which closed on April 4, 2011. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on May 5, 2011. (ECF No. 50.) It raises the same arguments raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Both of these motions are currently before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because the issues raised in the two motions are the same, and the case has proceeded through discovery, the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss is essentially moot. Accordingly, the Court will consider the Defendants' arguments in the framework of the Motion for Summary Judgment.

In a case such as this where the plaintiff asserts state law claims and the federal court has jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties, “a federal court applies the substantive law of the state, but applies federal procedural law.” Herrera v. Lufkin Ind., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 683 (10th Cir.2007).

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A movant who bears the burden at trial must submit evidence to establish the essential elements of its claim or affirmative defense. In re Ribozyme Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.Supp.2d 1106, 1111 (D.Colo.2002). By contrast, if the movant “does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.” Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted).

The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); seeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.1997). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.;see McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 715 (10th Cir.2010).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings claims for: (1) breach of contract against the District; (2) violation of Plaintiff's right to due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District and Hanson in his individual capacity; (3) intentional interference with contractual relations against Hanson individually; and (4) promissory estoppel against the District. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. (ECF No. 50.) The Court will examine each claim in turn below.

A. Breach of Contract

It has long been the law in Colorado that a party attempting to recover on a claim for breach of contract must prove the following elements: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff or some justification for nonperformance; (3) failure to perform the contract by the defendant; and (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 841 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Colo.1992). Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show a trial-worthy issue as to whether she had...