Harraka v. Board of Review of Dept. of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1964
• Docket Number: No. 3139,3139
• Citation: 98 R.I. 197,200 A.2d 595
• Parties: Joseph HARRAKA v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY. Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 595

200 A.2d 595

98 R.I. 197

Joseph HARRAKA v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.

Eq. No. 3139.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 20, 1964.

Moses Kando, Pawtucket, for petitioner.

Harvey S. Reynolds, Providence, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This petition was brought in the superior court pursuant to G.L.1956, § 28-44-52, to obtain a judicial review of a decision of the board of review of the department of employment security. After hearing thereon the superior court affirmed the decision wherein the board sustained a denial by the director of the department of the petitioner's claim for unemployment benefits under the terms of the employment security act. A decree was entered by that court denying and dismissing the petition, and the petitioner has prosecuted his appeal therefrom to this court under § 28-44-55.

The record discloses that petitioner, then twenty-three years of age and unmarried, immediately after his discharge from the armed forces sought and obtained employment in the chemical industry, the duties of which required him to work directly with chemical substances. It appears that he continued in this employment for about one week, leaving it on February 22, 1963, and filing an application for compensation as an ex-serviceman on February 25, 1963.

The facts material to the issue are not in dispute. The petitioner testified that the chemicals with which he worked impregnated his clothing and caused his skin to turn yellow; that this discoloration persisted after bathing; that his bedding became discolored after use by him; and that the inclusion of his work clothes in the family laundry caused other garments included therein to become discolored. From an investigation of the claim of petitioner, it appears that the employer conceded that the chemicals used in his employment would impregnate the worker's clothing, and that it provided shower baths for its employees for the purpose of preventing discoloration of the skin, the use of these baths being permitted at the close of his working hours but on company time.

The petitioner conceded that such shower baths were available but that he made no use of them, being concerned that going outdoors in cold weather after bathing might have adverse effects upon his health. It is not disputed that petitioner discussed these matters with his foreman and asked whether he could be assigned to other work. He was advised that such was not available and then offered to continue in his employment until a replacement could be hired. Upon being advised that this was not necessary, he terminated his employment.

In denying petitioner's appeal, the board of review adopted the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of its referee and on the basis thereof sustained the decision of the director. The findings of fact are, in substance, summarized above, while the conclusions of law, in pertinent part, read: 'It would appear that claimant's one week trial of the job was not sufficient to determine whether or not it would have been suitable for him if he had given it a longer period of trial. While claimant had personal reasons for leaving the work, yet these reasons were not of a compelling nature; and it must be concluded, therefore, that claimant's separation was not with good cause under the provisions of the Employment Security Act.' The only question before us then is whether the board erred in holding that in the stated circumstances petitioner's termination of his employment was as a matter of law voluntary and without good cause and deprived him of eligibility for compensation under the statute.

Section 28-44-17 provides in part that 'an individual who leaves work voluntarily without good cause shall be ineligible for waiting period credit or benefits * * *.' The extent to which this limits eligibility for benefits is to be determined in the light of the expressed legislative policy that 'Chapters 42 to 44, inclusive, of this title shall be construed liberally in aid of their declared purpose which declared purpose is to lighten the burden which now falls on the unemployed worker and his family.' G.L. 1956, § 28-42-73. The legislature having thus declared a policy of liberal construction, this court, in construing the act, must seek to give as broad an effect to its humanitarian purpose as it reasonably may in the circumstances. Of course, compliance with the legislative policy does not warrant an extension of eligibility by this court to any person or class of persons not intended by the legislature to share in the benefits of the act; but neither does it permit this court to enlarge the exclusionary effect of expressed restrictions on eligibility under the guise of construing such provisions of the act.

There is no question, in our opinion, but that the legislature intended this statute to be applied broadly to relieve economic distress resulting from unemployment. It was intended to alleviate distress resulting from any unemployment not caused by the employee leaving his work 'voluntarily without good cause.' It is our further opinion that eligibility for...