Harran v. Foley

• Decision Date: 31 March 1885
• Citation: 22 N.W. 837,62 Wis. 584
• Parties: HARRAN v. FOLEY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

62 Wis. 584

22 N.W. 837

HARRAN

v.FOLEY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Filed March 31, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Brown county.

Hadd & Wigman, for appellant.

Vroman & Sale, for respondent.

TAYLOR, J.

This is an action of replevin, brought by the appellant to recover the possession of 10 head of cattle, which he claims to have purchased of the respondent, and which the respondent refused to deliver to him. The case was tried by a jury, and the verdict was in favor of the defendant.

The facts upon which the case turned are substantially as follows: The plaintiff claims that on the day he purchased the cattle in question the defendant had them in town for sale; that after there had been some talk between him and the defendant about the sale, they came together and the defendant first offered to sell him the 10 cattle for the sum of $163; that he declined to give that sum, and then the defendant said he might have them for $161.50; that thereupon he accepted the offer and paid the defendant $20 as part of the purchase price, and directed defendant to drive the cattle down to the place where they then were, and he would get the balance of the money from the bank and pay it to him. Plaintiff got the money and went up to the place where the cattle were, and the defendant refused to deliver them, claiming that he had sold them to him for $261.50 instead of $161.50, and immediately tendered to the plaintiff the $20 he had received from him as a part of the purchase money. The plaintiff tendered the $141.50, which defendant refused, and thereupon the plaintiff brought this action.

On the trial the plaintiff's evidence showed that the price named by the defendant, at the time of the alleged purchase by the plaintiff, was $161.50. On the part of the defendant, that the price named was $261.50; and that if he did in fact name the sum of $161.50 as the price, it was a mistake on his part; that his intention was to state the price at $261.50, and supposed that he so stated it; that, as soon as he understood that the plaintiff claimed he had bought the cattle for $161.50, he refused to go on with the contract, claiming there was a mistake as to the price, and tendered back the $20. It is claimed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the only question which should have been submitted to the jury was whether the defendant did in fact orally offer to sell the cattle for $161.50, and that if he did so offer them he could not be allowed to show that such offer was made by mistake, and contrary to his intention. We think in this the learned counsel for the appellant is in error, and if it was made to appear that the offer made by the defendant was clearly a mistake on his part, a lapsus linguœ, when he intended to make the offer at $261.50, and the plaintiff had good reason for supposing that the offer was a mistake, the defendant would not be bound by the offer, and the plaintiff could not enforce the contract founded on such mistake, and did not acquire title to the cattle under such contract. The rule is undoubtedly correctly stated by Mr. Wharton, in his work on Contracts, as follows: “That when the mistake is that of one party alone, it must be borne in mind that the general rule of law is that whatever a man's real intentions may be, if he manifest an intention to another party, so as to induce the latter to act upon it in making a contract, he will be estopped from denying that the intention as manifested was his real intention.” In other words, supposing there is no fraud or imposition, a party is estopped from denying his expressions were correct. A unilateral mistake of expression, therefore, of one party, cannot be set up by him as a ground for rescinding a contract, or resisting its enforcement, when his language was accepted by the other party in its natural sense. “But where the blunder made by the person is obvious, an acceptor will not be permitted, by catching it up, to take an unfair advantage.” 1 Whart. Cont. § 202 a; Webster v. Cecil, 30 Bev. 62; Tamplin v. James, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 221.

The case of Webster v. Cecil was a case similar in all respects to the case at bar, except that it was a contract for the sale of real estate, and the purchaser sought to enforce the contract by compelling a conveyance. The defendant made an offer to sell at much less than the real value, and his offer had been accepted; but upon receiving the acceptance of the plaintiff he discovered his mistake. The error arose from a mistake in adding up the values of the different parcels of property offered for sale, as he had estimated them on a schedule from which the offer was made. Upon discovering the mistake he immediately notified the purchaser,...