Harrell v. City of Columbia

• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: L. D. LIDE, Acting Associate Justice.
• Citation: Harrell v. City of Columbia, 216 S.C. 346, 58 S.E.2d 91 (S.C. 1950)
• Decision Date: 03 March 1950
• Docket Number: 16323.
• Parties: HARRELL et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA et al. MOORE et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA et al.

58 S.E.2d 91

216 S.C. 346

HARRELL et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA et al.

MOORE et al. v. CITY OF COLUMBIA et al.

No. 16323.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 3, 1950

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

A. W. Holman, D. McK. Winter, W. H. Jolly, all of Columbia, for appellants.

Paul A Cooper, John Sholenberger, Glenn O. Schultz, all of Columbia for respondents.

L. D. LIDE, Acting Associate Justice.

These two companion cases were heard together in the Circuit Court and before this Court. The case first above stated is sometimes referred to in the record as the Harrell case, and relates to the annexation of the area known as East Edgewood to the City of Columbia; and the second case, sometimes referred to in the record as the Moore case, relates to the annexation of the area known as West Edgewood to the City of Columbia.

The validity of the annexation of these areas, the previous elections relating to such annexation having resulted in favor thereof, has been questioned by the plaintiffs in the causes respectively, the complaints being based upon certain alleged irregularities and the proceedings are also impugned upon alleged grounds of unconstitutionality; and judgment is sought declaring the elections null and void and granting injunctive relief. Rules to show cause were duly issued on September 20, 1949, by Judge Greneker, then presiding in the Fifth Circuit, and returns to the rules and answers to the complaints were filed in due time, and the matter was heard before him on October 18, 1949, upon the testimony then taken in behalf of the respective parties. Upon due consideration Judge Greneker handed down his orders adjudging that the complaints should be dismissed and the rules to show cause dissolved; and the cases come before this Court upon the appeals of the plaintiffs.

There are nine exceptions, which we think may be summarized in four questions as follows: (1) Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the petitions were accompanied by adequate descriptions of the areas involved? (2) Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the City Council properly determined that a majority of the freeholders signed each of the petitions for the elections? (3) Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the notices of the elections constituted a sufficient compliance with the statute? (4) Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the plaintiffs were not deprived of their constitutional rights? These questions, in connection with the various exceptions, will be duly considered herein.

Preliminary, however, to such consideration we should first make reference to the underlying statute relating to the annexation of additional territory to a municipal corporation, the same being Code, Section 7230, as amended in 1948, Acts 1948, page 1974. And we should also recount the proceedings relating to the elections prior to the institution of these actions.

Our Constitution, Article VIII, stipulates that the General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization and classification of municipal corporations, but contains no reference to the extension or contraction of the corporate limits of any municipal corporation, save and except that Section 14 of this article contains certain specific amendments to the Constitution on this subject, all of which, however, relate solely to the City of Greenville, and hence have no application here.

Section 7230, as amended, provides that any town or city council shall have power to extend the corporate limits thereof in a specified manner, to wit, that a petition shall first be submitted to the council by a majority of the freeholders of the territory proposed to be annexed, accompanied by an adequate description thereof, praying that an election be ordered upon the question. And it is further provided that if the city or town council shall find that the petition has been signed by a majority of the freeholders, they shall certify that fact to the County Commissioners of Elections, who shall thereupon order an election to be held within the corporate limits of the municipality and within the territory proposed to be annexed, on the same date, on the question of annexation; and this election shall be a special election, of which the County Commissioners of Elections shall give at least ten days notice prior to the date set for the election, by posting such notice or by publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation. Only registered, qualified electors residing in the municipality and those residing within the territory proposed to be annexed shall be allowed to vote; and the votes cast in such election within the corporate limits of the municipality and the votes cast within the territory proposed to be annexed 'shall be counted separately and the results thereof declared separately'; and if a majority of the votes cast in the municipality and in the territory proposed to be annexed, 'each aggregated separately, shall be each in favor of the annexation, or if neither give a majority against annexation, then the council shall publish the result of said election and declare the annexed territory' a part of the municipality.

Purporting to act in accordance with this statute, petitions were filed with the City Council as to East Edgewood and as to West Edgewood. Each of these petitions purports to be signed by freeholders of the territory therein described; and the description of the same is set forth in detail.

After the filing of these petitions the City Council of the City of Columbia filed their certificate, dated July 20, 1949, and signed by the Mayor and the four Councilmen, certifying that the City Council had determined that a majority of the freeholders within the respective territories, descriptions of which were attached to the certificate, had by proper petitions asked that an election be held for the purpose of voting on whether or not the respective territories should be annexed to the City of Columbia. It is further stated therein that the City Council requested the Richland County Commissioners of Elections to order a special election on September 13, 1949, pursuant to the statutory law of the State and particularly Code Section 7230, as amended.

Pursuant to this section the Commissioners of Elections promptly gave notice of the elections, the notice being published in The State, a newspaper published at Columbia, on July 23, 1949, and the same stated that the elections would be held on September 13, 1949; and the territories proposed to be annexed were described as in the petitions.

The notice just referred to did not give the polling places or the names of the managers and clerks, but a later notice was given by the Commissioners setting forth the various polling places in the City of Columbia, and also the polling places in East Edgewood and West Edgewood, the latter two being as follows (omitting the names of the managers and clerks):

'East Edgewood--Edwards Service Station, 2114 Two Notch Road'.

'West Edgewood--Flakes Cleaners and Laundry, 2201 Two Notch Road'.

This notice was published in The State on September 9, 1949.

The elections were held on September 13, 1949, and the results thereof were that in East Edgewood (the Harrell case) there were 271 votes cast, of which 171 were in favor of annexation and 100 against annexation; and in West Edgewood (the Moore case) there were 90 votes cast, of which 63 were in favor of annexation and 27 against annexation.

Question (1). Did the Circuit Judge err in holding that the petitions were accompanied by adequate descriptions of the areas involved?

Code, Section 7230, as amended, very properly provides that there shall be an 'adequate' description of the territory proposed to be annexed; and the word 'adequate' would imply a correct description, in sufficient detail, to put all parties in interest on notice of what was covered thereby; and the accuracy of the descriptions before the Court is really not questioned. Indeed, it is admitted that they are adequate for the purposes of a legal document or the purposes of a surveyor; it merely being contended that the descriptions would not convey to the mind of the average petitioner or freeholder the exact area or boundaries thereof proposed to be annexed. But we do not so read the descriptions. On the contrary, they seem to us to be quite sufficient to enable a person of ordinary reason and intelligence to identify the property involved.

By way of illustration, the description of East Edgewood is in part as follows: 'Beginning at the Southeastern corner of Glenwood Road and Forest Drive and running in a Northeasterly direction along the Southern boundary of Forest Drive to the Town limits of the Town of Forest Acres'; and there follows a detailed description of the other boundary lines of the area, closing with the following words: 'tence turning and running in a Southerly direction across the Forest Drive to the Southeastern corner of the intersection of Forest Drive and Glenwood Road and the point of beginning'. The manner of the description of West Edgewood is quite similar. The references to roads, drives, highways and adjacent boundaries are so clearly expressed that we do not think the adequacy of the description may be properly impugned; and hence no error in this respect was committed by the Circuit Judge. See City of Alexandria v. Alexandria County, 117 Va. 230, 84 S.E. 630. Incidentally it may also be observed that there is no evidence that anyone was misled or prejudicially affected by the method of description.

The suggestion of counsel for the appellants that reference to a map or a plat should have been a part of the description is not warranted by the language of the statute.

Question (2). Did the Circuit Judge err in...