Harrelson v. Harper

• Citation: 170 Ala. 119,54 So. 517
• Parties: HARRELSON ET AL. v. HARPER.
• Decision Date: 09 February 1911
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

54 So. 517

170 Ala. 119

HARRELSON ET AL. v. HARPER.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 9, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Tallapoosa County; S. L. Brewer, Judge.

Ejectment by Lula Emma Harrelson and others against Harriet Harper. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Anderson J., dissenting.

The description contained in the deed from G. O. Waites and Hattie P. Waites to W. A. Harrelson, the testator of the plaintiffs, is as follows: "Certain lands situated in section 4, township 21, range 23, same being situated within the corporate limits of Dadeville: Commencing at an oak tree above the old Jones blacksmith shop place on a road leading from Dadeville to Dudleyville; thence along said road until it strikes the corner of land now owned by John McCree thence on a straight line to the tanyard spring; thence to a black gum tree, it being a line tree between said land and Mrs. Shephers' land, the old widow; thence on a straight line to the Hatcher line; thence along said Hatcher line near a house formerly occupied by Gilbert Curry; thence in a straight line to the starting point--containing 20 acres more or less, except the half acre Thomas Harper lives on and three-fifths of an acre on the southeast corner of place." The same description appeared in several other deeds in plaintiff's title. Plaintiffs offered to explain and show by parol testimony what lands were included within the said description; but, on objection by the defendant, the court declined to permit it.

James W. Strother, for appellants.

Lackey & Bridges and J. P. Oliver, for appellee.

ANDERSON J.

This court has gone the full length in admitting parol evidence to sustain the validity of deeds, assailed upon the grounds of indefiniteness in the description of the land. And as said in the case of Cottingham v. Hill, 119 Ala. 353, 24 So 552, 72 Am. St. Rep. 923: "The rule which we have adopted promotes justice, and does not open the door to fraud and perjury. In all cases the writing has been sufficient to show a bona fide sale and conveyance was intended by the parties, and, where this appears, no injustice results, if by parol evidence the precise property intended to be conveyed can be clearly identified." Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140; Homan v. Stewart, 103 Ala. 644, 16 So. 35; Webb v. Elyton Land Co., 105 Ala. 471, 18 So. 178. The description of the property conveyed must, however, possess such data as will afford a basis for the parol evidence. It must so designate the property as to enable its identification and location by parol. Griffin v. Hall, 111 Ala. 601, 20 So. 485; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 301. The deeds in question attempt to convey the land by metes and bounds as constituting a particular tract, and the sale was not by quantity. The description by metes and bounds is so indefinite and uncertain as to render it void. The point of beginning is uncertain. There may be many oak trees above the Jones blacksmith shop. Nor does it say how far above the Jones blacksmith shop. Again, the word "above," as used in this instance, is capable of many meanings. One might take it as meaning north, while another might consider it to mean an elevation of the earth, whether north, east, south, or west. Aside from this defect, and conceding that there is a definite starting point, some of the directions as to the lines to be followed are too indefinite to afford an accurate survey. It might be that, notwithstanding the particular description was void for...