Harrigan v. Caneel Bay, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-432.
• Citation: 745 F. Supp. 1122
• Parties: Joycelyn HARRIGAN, Plaintiff, v. CANEEL BAY, INC.; Rock Resorts, Inc.; Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc.; Kathy Crumpler; Randy Crumpler; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union 8244, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

745 F. Supp. 1122

Joycelyn HARRIGAN, Plaintiff, v. CANEEL BAY, INC.; Rock Resorts, Inc.; Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc.; Kathy Crumpler; Randy Crumpler; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union 8244, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-432.

United States District Court, Virgin Islands, D. St. Thomas and St. John.

August 10, 1990.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew Capdeville, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for plaintiff.

Richard E. Grunert, Grunert, Stout, Moore & Bruch, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for defendants Caneel Bay, Inc., Rock Resorts, Inc., and Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc.

John R. Coon, Christiansted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 8244.

Samuel H. Hall, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, for defendants Kathy and Randy Crumpler.

OPINION

BROTMAN, Acting Chief Judge (sitting by designation).

Currently before the court are the motions for summary judgment of defendants Caneel Bay, Inc., Rock Resorts, Inc., and Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc. ("Caneel Bay") and defendant United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 8244 ("Union"). These defendants have also moved to adjourn the trial date of August 30, 1990 until the court enters a decision on their dispositive motions. Also pending is plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. For the reasons stated herein, this court will grant the motions for summary judgment and dismiss the complaint against Caneel Bay and the Union with prejudice. In light of this outcome, the court will deny the joint motion of defendants Caneel Bay and the Union to adjourn the trial date as moot. The court will deny plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Plaintiff was employed as a maid at Caneel Bay resort on St. John and, as such, was represented by the Union and bound by its collective bargaining agreement. On June 3, 1986, Kathy and Randy Crumpler, who were guests at Caneel Bay, returned to their room at approximately 3:15 p.m. to find a maid, later identified as plaintiff, in their room. According to written statements prepared by the Crumplers, they saw plaintiff "in the closet, going through the safe, which had been opened." Plaintiff left the room with Mr. Crumpler. Later, she returned and spoke with Mrs. Crumpler and denied having gone into the safe.

Plaintiff's version of the facts differs substantially. In her complaint, she contends that, as she left the room after performing her duties, she was confronted by the Crumplers, who questioned her about the key to the safe. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Crumpler attempted to put his hands in her pockets, but that she stopped him.

Caneel Bay conducted an investigation into the incident and suspended plaintiff on June 4, 1986 pending further investigation. On June 5, Caneel Bay held a meeting with plaintiff, her supervisor, a union representative, and Caneel Bay's Director of Human Resources, Russell George. A second meeting was held on June 6, at which time George informed plaintiff that Caneel Bay would terminate her employment for dishonesty because she denied being in the Crumplers' room at the time in question. As provided in the collective bargaining agreement with plaintiff's union, George prepared a written report on plaintiff's termination and placed the report in her file.

Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Union on June 9, 1986. She also hired an attorney, who contacted Caneel Bay about reinstating plaintiff. Caneel Bay informed plaintiff's attorney that it would proceed in accordance with the Union's grievance procedures. On July 3, 1986, the Union informed Caneel Bay that it intended to take plaintiff's case to arbitration.

While these proceedings were on-going, the Union and Caneel Bay were engaged in negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement to replace the agreement set to expire in August. During these negotiations, the Union and Caneel Bay discussed pending grievances, including plaintiff's. They reached a tentative settlement on the new agreement, which included, inter alia, a provision that plaintiff would be reinstated to work the day after the contract was ratified and that her termination would be reduced to a suspension without pay. The membership, however, rejected the tentative agreement. The Union and Caneel Bay resumed negotiations and formed a new agreement on August 16, 1986. This new agreement provided that plaintiff "has been offered the opportunity to return to her former job, as a result of this agreement." This version was ratified by the Union membership. The parties do not dispute that, under the agreement, Caneel Bay would not give plaintiff back-pay.

Plaintiff did not accept the offer to return without back-pay. In September, shortly after the ratification of the agreement, she told Cephus Rogers, the union representative, that she was not interested in returning to work for Caneel Bay, but would prefer to get some money to resolve the dispute. The union representative told plaintiff that he "would make an attempt to get some money for her." The union representative testified at deposition that he had no further discussions with plaintiff after this September meeting.

The union representative sent a letter to Caneel Bay on plaintiff's behalf on October 23, 1986 indicating that plaintiff "would entertain a monetary settlement of her case in lieu of returning to work at Caneel Bay." The letter noted that Caneel Bay would save over seven thousand dollars in arbitration and legal fees by settlement and requested that Caneel Bay "make a reasonable offer." The union representative stated that, if no settlement could be achieved, the union was prepared to arbitrate the dispute immediately.

During this period, plaintiff also hired counsel who began corresponding with the union representative. This correspondence culminated in a letter dated December 15, 1986, in which an attorney associated with the law offices of plaintiff's counsel wrote:

Despite my multiple attempts to contact you, through written correspondence, the most recent dated November 13, 1986, and by telephone, on numerous occasions, up to and including the present date, I have received no response from you.

Please provide us with a response, either by letter or telephone, regarding the status of plaintiff's grievance proceedings. If we do not hear from you within ten (10) days of the date herein, we will pursue our client's legal remedies through other channels.

The parties do not dispute that the union representative did not respond to this letter.

On December 16, 1986, in a letter to the union representative, counsel for Caneel Bay rejected the union's attempt to arbitrate the dispute because (1) the matter was settled by the agreement between Caneel Bay and the Union, and (2) Caneel Bay and the Union, in the agreement, did not resolve them manner by which they would resolve grievances that involved a guest as a witness. There is no evidence that plaintiff knew of this letter. Likewise, on December 16, 1986, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service wrote Caneel Bay and the union representative submitting a panel of arbitrators. There is no evidence that plaintiff knew of this letter.

On November 27, 1987, plaintiff brought this "hybrid" action against her former employer, Caneel Bay, for wrongful discharge and breach of a collective bargaining agreement and against her union for breach of its duty of fair representation and breach of contract. She also sues Kathy and Randy Crumpler for libel and slander.

The Union has moved for summary judgment based on the six month statute of limitations.¹ The Union also claims that it is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees for defending this action because plaintiff's complaint was clearly time-barred when it was filed.

Defendant Caneel Bay has moved for summary judgment asserting that, to the extent plaintiff's complaint asserts claims for wrongful discharge and defamation, these claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978). Defendant Caneel Bay contends that, as such, the claims are time-barred by the six month statute of limitations. In the alternative, Caneel Bay argues that plaintiff's claims have been settled by its agreement with her union. Finally, Caneel Bay asserts that any communication that might give rise to plaintiff's claim for defamation is privileged; therefore, it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue.

Plaintiff concedes that her action is governed by the six month statute of limitations; however, she argues that the time period did not begin to run against Caneel Bay or the Union because the Union has not yet unequivocally announced to her that further proceedings by the Union on her behalf would be futile. She claims that, as far as she knew, the Union was still negotiating on her behalf after the Union representative failed to comply with her attorney's demand for information on the status of her case within ten days. In the alternative, plaintiff requests that this court equitably toll the running of the limitations period. Plaintiff also argues that her claim against Caneel Bay was not settled by the agreement between Caneel Bay and the Union. Finally, she contends that further discovery is needed to determine whether Caneel Bay's alleged defamatory statements are privileged.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Summary Judgment Standard

The standard for granting summary judgment is a stringent one, but it is not insurmountable. A court may grant summary judgment only when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986); Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.1983). In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact the court must view all doubt in favor of the nonmoving party....