Harrington v. Bergen Cnty., Civil Action No. 14-cv-5764 (SRC)
| Decision Date | 23 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-cv-5764 (SRC) |
| Parties | BARBARA HARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. BERGEN COUNTY, BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, JOHN MOLINELLI, in his official and individual capacities, KENNETH ARDIZZONE, in his official and individual capacities, MICHAEL TRAHEY, in his official and individual capacities, FRANK PUCCIO, in his official and individual capacities, DAVID NATHANSON, in his official and individual capacities, and PATRICIA SPEAKE-MARTIN, individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants' three motions to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes the motions. The Court has considered the parties' submissions. For the reasons expressed in this Opinion, the Court will deny Defendants' motions and permit this case to proceed.
In this case, a former public employee asserts that government officials violated her rights by forcing her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation against her will. The Court assumes thefollowing facts to be true for purposes of this motion only.
In 1980, Plaintiff began her employment at the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office ("BCPO"), where she would then work for approximately thirty years. She served most recently as a data programmer for the BCPO, and her performance evaluations were positive. During her employment, Plaintiff worked with and befriended David Martin. Mr. Martin is legally married to Defendant Speake-Martin, but the two have been separated since 2005.
In 2012, Plaintiff moved into Mr. Martin's home, where two of his and Speake-Martin's children also lived. Speake-Martin was upset that Plaintiff moved in with Mr. Martin. She expressed her displeasure to her good friend and former colleague, Defendant John Molinelli, who is also the Bergen County Prosecutor.
On September 21, 2012, what would later be referred to as "the text-message incident" took place. While waiting in line at a supermarket, Plaintiff tried to send Mr. Martin's children a text message by using the cellphone's voice-dictation feature. Plaintiff wanted to ask the children where Mr. Martin was, but the cell phone also picked up the voice of another person waiting in line. As a result, the message referred to Mr. Martin and an "accident." Plaintiff quickly sent a follow-up message to Mr. Martin's children and spoke with them by phone; she apologized and assured them that Mr. Martin was fine.
Speake-Martin read Plaintiff's message on one of her kid's phones. The next day, Plaintiff apologized to Speake-Martin for her error, explaining that it had been an accident. Speake-Martin, however, remained angry at Plaintiff, and she threatened to get her fired. Speake-Martin later spoke with Defendant Molinelli and insisted that he carry out her threat.
A few days later, on September 24th, Defendant Ardizzone, BCPO's Chief Information Officer, instructed Plaintiff and Mr. Martin to attend a meeting. Various individuals werepresent in the office conference room, including Defendants Molinelli and Ardizzone, as well as David Nathanson (the Deputy Executive Prosecutor), Frank Puccio (the Executive Assistant Prosecutor), and Michael Trahey (from the Executive Office) (collectively "Defendants"). They instructed Mr. Martin to enter the room and told Plaintiff to wait outside in the hall.
Defendants asked Mr. Martin about the text-message incident, and Mr. Martin explained what had happened. Defendants told Mr. Martin that Plaintiff was ill and potentially dangerous, and they informed him that Plaintiff was going to be taken to a psychiatric facility for seventy-two hours. Mr. Martin responded that Plaintiff did not pose any danger. Defendant Nathanson told Mr. Martin that if he defended Plaintiff, they would claim that Mr. Martin was himself delusional. Defendants soon instructed Mr. Martin to leave and send in Plaintiff. Plaintiff entered. Defendants asked Plaintiff about the text-message incident, and she explained. Defendants then told Plaintiff to leave again and have Mr. Martin return. Mr. Martin reentered the conference room, and Defendants told him to inform Plaintiff that she was to be admitted to a psychiatric facility; they said the news would be better coming from him.
Mr. Martin left and told Plaintiff about Defendants' plan; she began to cry. Detective Patricia DeSimone escorted Plaintiff to the office library. Plaintiff was not permitted to leave the library, except to use the restroom once. While Plaintiff waited, Defendants drafted a letter addressed to her, which stated that she was being suspended from work with pay, and which informed her that she was to be transported to a psychiatric facility for evaluation. Approximately one hour later, Defendant Puccio gave Plaintiff the letter. That document is entitled "Suspension with Pay," and it reads in part as follows:
The letter is dated September 24, 2012, and it is signed by Defendant Molinelli.
Detective DeSimone then drove Plaintiff to the Bergen Regional Medical Center ("the hospital"). Mr. Martin met Plaintiff there. It was at this time, shortly before 1:00PM, that Plaintiff underwent an unwanted psychiatric evaluation. At the hospital, several people interviewed Plaintiff. A doctor spoke with Plaintiff and was surprised to learn that she had been brought there apparently due to sending an accidental text message. The doctor concluded that Plaintiff was not psychotic, posed no danger, and that she should be discharged. The hospital accordingly discharged Plaintiff shortly after 4:00PM that day.
Plaintiff resigned from her employment with the BCPO effective May 1, 2013; she claims that she was forced to do so.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in September of 2014. In it, Plaintiff alleges the following six counts against Defendants: (1) unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) substantive due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) a violation of the corresponding provisions of the New Jersey Constitution under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2; (5) conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and (6) conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA.
On October 27, 2014, Defendant Bergen County moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Bergen County argues that it is not responsible for prosecutors' conduct, and that Plaintiff has stated no claim against it.
On October 28, 2014, Defendants BCPO, Ardizzone, Molinelli, Nathanson, Puccio, and Trahey ("the BCPO Defendants") moved to dismiss as well. In support of their motion, the BCPO Defendants argue that they are immune from suit because they were engaged in law-enforcement activities and were acting as an arm of the State of New Jersey. Apart from immunity, they suggest that Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts to support her claims.
On November 20, 2014, Defendant Speake-Martin also moved to dismiss. Plaintiff's sole claims against Speake-Martin are for conspiracy, and in her motion, Speake-Martin argues that she is not a state actor and thus cannot be held liable. Moreover, she asserts that even if she were a state actor, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim is inadequately pleaded.
Plaintiff opposes the motions. She argues that the BCPO Defendants are not immune from suit, as they were engaged in administrative rather than law-enforcement conduct, and because Plaintiff sued the BCPO employees in both their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff urges that Defendant Bergen County is indeed liable for the conduct of its final policy maker on personnel matters, which here is Defendant Molinelli. On the merits, Plaintiff contends that her Complaint details more than enough factual allegations to go forward.
A complaint will survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it states "sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facialplausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Following Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit has held that to prevent dismissal of a claim the complaint must show, through the facts alleged, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). In other words, the facts alleged "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]'" Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
While the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it need not accept a "legal conclusion couched as factual allegation." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007); Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 ()....
To continue reading
Request your trial