Harrington v. City of Phx. City
| Decision Date | 24 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:10-CV-1048-WKW |
| Parties | PATRICK HARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHENIX CITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
[WO]
As all parties agree, this is a police brutality case. Plaintiff Patrick Harrington brings suit alleging three law enforcement officers from two agencies used excessive force or failed to prevent the use of excessive force against him. Two of the three individual defendants in this civil action, Kirby Dollar and Timothy Watford, were also criminally convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 as a result of the incident. (Doc. # 106 at 4; Doc. # 111 at 4.) In addition to Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) claims against the individual defendants and the City of Phenix City, Plaintiff has also asserted various state law claims.
Before the court are Defendant Rachel Hauser's ("Hauser") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 105) and Defendant City of Phenix City's ("the City")Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 108).1 Supporting briefs and evidentiary submissions accompany both motions. (Docs. # 106 & 109.) Plaintiff responded in opposition to both motions and included evidentiary submissions. (Docs. # 111 & # 114.) Defendant Hauser replied to Plaintiff's response (Doc. # 117), while the City did not. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the applicable law, and the record, the court finds that Defendants' motions are due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It enjoys jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and allegations sufficiently support both. The court further addresses jurisdictional questions regarding Plaintiff's state law claims in Part IV.C. below.
To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and theinferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). The court should grant the motion if the pleadings, together with supporting materials in the record, show that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. If the movant meets its evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish - with evidence beyond the pleadings - that a genuine dispute material to each of its claims for relief exists. Id. at 324.
A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Conclusory allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact and do not preclude summary judgment.Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)).
On November 26, 2010, three bail bondsmen3 took Patrick Harrington into custody in Lee County, Alabama. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 11.) There were warrants out for Harrington's arrest, including for failure to appear in court in Russell County. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 9.)4 Plaintiff had previously evaded arrest by Defendant Kirby Dollar ("Dollar"), a deputy with the Russell County Sheriff's Department, a fact that frustrated Dollar. (Tr. Trans. Dollar at 4-5.) Dollar asked bail bondsman Joseph Williams ("Williams") to contact him if Williams ever apprehended Plaintiff. (Tr. Trans. Dollar at 4-5.)
When Williams apprehended Plaintiff on November 26, he did as asked. This was the Saturday after Thanksgiving, and Dollar had been drinking at home startingat about noon. (Tr. Trans. Dollar at 5.) He continued to drink into the evening and hosted a number of guests at his home, including his colleague from the Russell County Sheriff's Department, Deputy Tim Watford ("Watford"), and Officer Hauser of the Phenix City Police Department. (Tr. Trans. Dollar at 6-7.) All three had been drinking for several hours when, sometime after 11:00 p.m., Dollar received the call from Williams; Dollar resolved to go "get a few licks in." (Tr. Trans. Dollar at 7.)
Dollar, Watford, and Hauser piled into Dollar's unmarked law enforcement vehicle, a red Chevrolet Monte Carlo, and Dollar drove them from his home in Russell County to the garage parking lot in Lee County where Williams had Harrington in custody. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 13; Tr. Trans. Williams at 32.) Dollar activated the car's wig-wag blue lights as he pulled into the lot. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 32.) Dollar, Watford, and Hauser exited the car and greeted Williams and the others. While Williams was acquainted with Dollar and Watford, he did not know Hauser, and the men introduced Williams to Hauser for the first time. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 34; Tr. Trans. Hauser at 15-16.) At this point, Williams and his associates were all aware Hauser was a law enforcement officer.
Meanwhile, Plaintiff - who the bondsmen Tased minutes earlier while apprehending him (Tr. Trans. Williams at 22) - was lying on the ground with his hands cuffed behind his back. (Tr. Trans. Hauser at 15.) Dollar and Watfordapproached Plaintiff while Hauser went back toward the Monte Carlo and "propped [herself] up" on the car. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 36.) Dollar and Watford began to attack Harrington.5 (Doc. # 32 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff did not and could not resist. Handcuffed the entire time, he begged Dollar and Watford to stop beating him. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 41.) Plaintiff eventually lost consciousness as a result of the beating. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 20.) During the attack, Hauser stood fifteen to twenty feet away, neither intervening to stop the assault nor actively participating in it. (Tr. Trans. Hauser at 16, 28-29; Tr. Trans. Watford at 11; Aff. of Harrington at 75.)
The attack only stopped when a marked Lee County Sheriff's Department unit arrived. (Tr. Trans. Williams at 41.) After briefly speaking with the Lee County deputies, Dollar, Watford, and Hauser got back into the Monte Carlo, and Dollar drove them back to his house. Later, a Lee County ambulance arrived and transported Plaintiff to the hospital. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 25.) As a result of the incident, Plaintiff suffered full body bruising, a burst ear drum in his left ear, potentially permanent loss of sight in his right eye, loss of use of his left leg, and severe tearing to his left knee and leg. He also required stitches for deep lacerations on his body and face. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 27.)
Dollar, Watford, and Hauser were suspended from their duties as law enforcement officers and later resigned. (Doc. # 32 ¶ 32.) Deputies Dollar and Watford were sentenced to prison for federal criminal convictions arising from the incident. (Doc. # 106 at 4.) Dollar died before he was to surrender to serve his prison sentence. (Doc. # 97.) Officer Hauser was not charged criminally. (Tr. Trans. Hauser at 47.)
Plaintiff has raised federal claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 as well as a number of claims under state law against Hauser and the City. Part A resolves preliminary matters pertaining to the federal claims. Part B discusses the Section 1983 claims. Part C concludes with a discussion of the state law claims.
The elements of a cause of action under Section 1985(3) are "(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States." United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local v.Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1983).
Both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have interpreted the second element to require "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971); Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624, 628 (1992). The Eleventh Circuit later joined the majority of Courts of Appeals to hold that gender-based conspiracies are among the types of class-based animus prohibited by Section 1985(3). Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, 126 F.3d 1380, 1391 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff alleges no comparable class-based animus.
Plaintiff argues Defendants harbored animus against him because he was a fugitive. Unlike race and sex, however, being a fugitive is not "an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth." Id. at 1390 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). Animus against fugitives as a class therefore seems unlikely to be animus of the sort contemplated by the drafters of Section 1985(3). Moreover, the record evidence...
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