Harrington v. Wilber
| Decision Date | 09 November 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:03-cv-90616 RP-TJS.,4:03-cv-90616 RP-TJS. |
| Citation | 670 F.Supp.2d 958 |
| Parties | Terry HARRINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Matthew D. WILBER and Pottawattamie County, Iowa, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Stephen Dillard Davis, William H. Jones, Canel, Davis & King, Chicago, IL, Thomas P. Frerichs, Frerichs Law Office PC, Waterloo, IA, Larissa A. McCalla, J. Douglas McCalla, Mel C. Orchard, Gerry L. Spence, Spence Shockey & McCalla, Jackson, WY, Alan O. Olson, Olson Law Office PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Michael A. Sciortino, City of Council Bluffs Legal Dept., Margaret J. Reyes, Pottawattamie County Attorneys Office, Kristopher K. Madsen, Stuart Tinley Law Firm LLP, Council Bluffs, IA, Lori E. Lightfoot, Vincent J. Connelly, Zaldwaynaka Scott, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Anne F. Danaher, Kansas City, IA, pro se.
Before the Court is Defendants', Matthew Wilber ("Wilber") and Pottawattamie County, Iowa ("Pottawattamie County"), Motion for Summary Judgment on Harrington's Defamation Claim, filed August 10, 2009. Clerk's No. 128. Terry Harrington ("Plaintiff" or "Harrington") filed a Resistance to the Motion on September 25, 2009. Clerk's No. 129. Defendants filed a Reply on October 26, 2009.1 Clerk's No. 131. In his resistance, Plaintiff requests oral argument. Clerk's No. 129. The Court, however, does not believe that oral argument will substantially aid it in resolving the present motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for oral argument is denied and the matter is fully submitted.
This case has an extensive procedural background that has been articulated repeatedly by the Court in past orders. In short summary, the present case is one of numerous cases pending in this Court that all arise from the investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Harrington and Curtis McGhee ("McGhee") for the 1977 murder of John Schweer. In 2003, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated Harrington's first degree murder conviction for the failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence. Shortly thereafter, Wilber, the Pottawattamie County Attorney, launched a renewed investigation into Schweer's murder. After reviewing all the evidence, Wilber held a press conference and issued both oral and print statements indicating, amongst other things, that while he believed Harrington had murdered Schweer, there was not sufficient evidence to obtain another conviction of him.2
On November 13, 2003, Harrington filed an Amended Complaint in the present action against Wilber and Pottawattamie County, asserting that Wilber's statements at the press conference defamed him.3 On March 25, 2005 and on May 4, 2005, respectively, Harrington and McGhee filed lawsuits against law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and city and county entities, alleging various state law and civil rights violations. Case Nos. 4:05-cv-178 (); 4:05-cv-255 (). McGhee's May 4, 2005 Complaint asserted a claim for defamation against Wilber nearly identical to that filed by Harrington in 2003, i.e., McGhee claimed that Wilber's oral and print statements at the press conference defamed him.
In late 2004, Wilber moved for summary judgment on Harrington's claim of defamation, claiming, amongst other things, that as County Attorney, he was entitled to immunity from liability under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act ("IMTCA"), which provides that municipalities are statutorily immune from liability for claims based on "the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion is abused." Iowa Code § 670.4(3). In an order dated January 27, 2005, 353 F.Supp.2d 1033 (S.D.Iowa.2005), the Court denied Wilber's motion for summary judgment, concluding that while he had adequately shown that issuing statements about the Harrington and McGhee cases was a discretionary function, he had failed to demonstrate that such conduct was of the type intended to be shielded from liability by the IMTCA. See Clerk's No. 29. Specifically, the Court found that Wilber had failed to demonstrate that his "decision [to comment on the guilt or innocence of Plaintiff] was a judgment call driven by social, economic, or political concerns." Id. at 21. The Court reiterated and incorporated these findings in its February 23, 2007 ruling denying Wilber's assertion that he was entitled to a qualified privilege on McGhee's defamation claim. See Case No. 4:05-cv-178, Clerk's No. 174; Case No. 4:05-cv-255, Clerk's No. 183.
In its February 23, 2007 ruling, the Court also addressed an argument by David Richter ("Richter") and Joseph Hrvol ("Hrvol"), the prosecutors in 1977-78, that they were entitled to immunity from Harrington's and McGhee's state law claims under the Iowa Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"), Iowa Code § 669.1 et seq. See id. at 97-98. Harrington and McGhee both urged that the ITCA was inapplicable to protect any of the prosecutors in the actions, given that Wilber had previously argued he was entitled to immunity under the IMTCA. The Court rejected Harrington's and McGhee's argument in this regard, finding that "it is entirely possible that Defendants' prosecutorial duties are covered by the ITCA, but other duties and functions of the Defendants are covered instead by the IMTCA." See Case No. 4:05-cv-178, Clerk's No. 174 at 97-98.
An interlocutory appeal quickly followed the Court's February 23, 2007 Order. While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Wilber had only claimed immunity under the IMTCA before the district court, it nonetheless found that "Wilber is entitled to sovereign immunity under the ITCA." McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 547 F.3d 922, 932 (8th Cir.2008). Specifically, the Eighth Circuit found as follows:
Wilber appeals the denial of his summary judgment motion on McGhee's defamation claim based on Wilber's sovereign immunity and qualified immunity defenses under the ITCA, an argument Wilber did not make to the district court where he relied instead upon the protections afforded by the IMTCA. The district court held the IMTCA's protection only applied if Wilber's comments were "a judgment call driven by social, economic, or political concerns" and found they were not.
The ITCA defines a state employee, for purposes of the act, as including any "persons acting on behalf of the state ... in any official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service of the state of Iowa." Iowa Code § 669.2(4). Thus, for purposes of the ITCA, Wilber is a state employee when acting in his official capacity as County Attorney. We find no language within the ITCA which would restrict Wilber's immunity under the ITCA solely to prosecutorial acts. Instead, the only restriction is for acts taken in an official capacity. See id. Clearly, when Wilber held his press conference and issued his written press release he was acting in his official capacity as County Attorney discussing prosecutions by the state.
McGhee's defamation claim is governed by the ITCA which explicitly bars a claim for defamation arising out of libel or slander. See Iowa Code § 669.14(4). Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law in denying Wilber's motion for summary judgment as to McGhee's defamation claim. This claim must be dismissed.
Id. The Eighth Circuit explicitly noted that it was not reviewing the district court's denial of Wilber's summary judgment motion on Harrington's defamation claim because "Wilber did not appeal this decision." Id. at 928 n. 5.
On May 20, 2009, Chief United States Magistrate Judge Shields entered a scheduling order with regard to the filing of dispositive motions in the present case. Clerk's No. 118. After the Plaintiff was permitted to conduct limited additional discovery on the matter now raised in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties adhered to Judge Shields' scheduling order in filing the pleadings now at issue. In essence, Defendants' Motion for Summary contends that, in light of the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Wilber is protected from McGhee's defamation claim by the ITCA, this Court must find that the ITCA also protects Wilber and, by extension, Pottawattamie County, from Harrington's defamation claim.
Summary judgment has a special place in civil litigation. The device "has proven its usefulness as a means of avoiding full-dress trials in unwinnable cases, thereby freeing courts to utilize scarce judicial resources in more beneficial ways." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991). In operation, the role of summary judgment is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required. See id.; see also Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir.1990). "[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances." Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of the rule is not "`to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try,'" Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)), but to avoid "useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried." Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Bd....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs
...See Defs.' Resistance at 5 (citing McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty., 475 F.Supp.2d 862, 913 (S.D.Iowa 2007) and Harrington v. Wilber, 670 F.Supp.2d 958, 966 (S.D.Iowa 2009)). The Court made no such independent factual determination. Rather, it found that Plaintiffs had repeatedly alleged in th......