Harris Cnty. v. S.K. & Bros., Inc.
Decision Date | 05 November 2019 |
Docket Number | NO. 14-17-00984-CV,14-17-00984-CV |
Parties | HARRIS COUNTY AND THE STATE OF TEXAS ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, Appellants and Cross-Appellees v. S.K. AND BROTHERS, INC., D/B/A RIVER OAKS CLEANERS; TREY MELCHER AND YVONNE EVIE MELCHER, TRUSTEES OF THE EVIE MELCHER NON-EXEMPT TRUST; MELCHER INVESTMENTS; AND BILL E. LEWIS AND RICHARD L. KERR, JR., CO-TRUSTEES OF THE LUCILE BIRMINGHAM MELCHER MANAGEMENT TRUST AND THE LEROY MELCHER MARITAL DEDUCTION TRUST; AND FORMER CO-TRUSTEES OF THE EVIE MELCHER NON-EXEMPT TRUST, Appellees and Cross-Appellants |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas
Harris County and the State of Texas, acting by and through the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ), challenge the trial court's dismissal of their lawsuit against appellees (1) S.K. and Brothers, Inc., d/b/a River Oaks Cleaners; (2) Trey Melcher and Yvonne Evie Melcher, Trustees of the Evie Melcher Non-Exempt Trust; (3) Melcher Investments; and (4) Bill E. Lewis and Richard L. Kerr, Jr., Co-Trustees of the Lucile Birmingham Melcher Management Trust and the Leroy Melcher Marital Deduction Trust, and former Co-Trustees of the Evie Melcher Non-Exempt Trust (appellees (2), (3), and (4) are collectively the Melcher Defendants) for lack of standing. S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants, raise a cross-issue on appeal challenging the trial court's order assessing sanctions against them. Because we conclude Harris County and the State have standing to pursue their environmental claims against S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants, we reverse the trial court's dismissal order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Having reversed the trial court's dismissal order and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings, we need not address S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants' cross-issue challenging the trial court's now interlocutory sanctions order, which the trial court may, in its discretion, reconsider on remand.
The Melcher Defendants own a shopping center located in Houston. S.K. and Brothers has operated River Oaks Cleaners at the Melcher Defendants' shopping center since 1989. It is undisputed that S.K. and Brothers has continually used perchloroethylene (PCE) in its dry-cleaning operations since that date. The State considers PCE an industrial hazardous waste and a municipal hazardous waste.
Harris County filed suit against S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants in 2011, alleging that the dry-cleaning business had caused groundwater contamination with PCE, had failed to timely submit complete and correct Annual Waste Summaries, and also that neither S.K. and Brothers nor the Melcher Defendants have taken any actions to contain, control, or remediate the contamination. See Tex. Water Code § 7.351(a) ( ). Harris County also alleged that neither S.K. and Brothers nor the Melcher Defendants have filed an application to the TCEQ's Dry Cleaner Remediation Program. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 374.001-.253. Harris County sought civil penalties and injunctive relief pursuant to the Texas Water Code, the Texas Health and Safety Code, and various rules and regulations enacted pursuant to those statutes. Harris County also joined TCEQ as a necessary and indispensable party as required by the Water Code.
The case went to trial before a jury in 2013, but the trial court declared a mistrial. The trial court then assessed sanctions, jointly and severally, against most of the defendants and their trial counsel.1 Following the mistrial, additional discovery and environmental testing was performed during 2014 and 2015. S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants then filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss arguing that neither Harris County nor TCEQ have standing to bring the claims alleged in this lawsuit because the Dry Cleaner RemediationProgram provides the exclusive remedy for addressing environmental issues related to retail dry cleaners. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. The trial court vacated all orders previously signed in the case, except the order assessing sanctions. Harris County and TCEQ filed this appeal soon thereafter.
In a single issue on appeal, Harris County argues that the trial court erred when it granted S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants' plea to the jurisdiction because the Water Code gives it standing to sue for alleged violations of Texas environmental laws. TCEQ raises two issues on appeal. In its first issue, TCEQ argues that the Dry Cleaner Remediation Program is not the exclusive avenue for the State of Texas, or local governments, to pursue the clean-up of contaminated retail dry-cleaner sites. In its second issue, TCEQ asserts that Harris County has standing to bring a civil suit, and TCEQ has standing as an indispensable party, when the suit is for violations of laws, and regulations promulgated thereunder, found in section 7.351 of the Texas Water Code. We address these issues together.
Standing, a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining suit. Tex. Ass'n. of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993); Concerned Cmty. Involved Dev., Inc. v. City of Houston, 209 S.W.3d 666, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). A party's standing to pursue and maintain a cause of action is a question of law that we review de novo. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). In statutory standing cases, such as the present case, we apply statutory-interpretationprinciples to determine whether the plaintiff asserting the claim under review falls within the category of parties upon whom standing has been conferred by the Legislature. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. Our task in construing statutes is to effectuate the Legislature's expressed intent, not to second-guess the policy choices it made, or to weigh the effectiveness of their results. Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 866 (Tex. 2014). We focus on the words of the statute, which best reveal legislative intent. Id. We presume that every word of a statute was used for a purpose, and every omitted word was purposefully not chosen. Texas Law Shield, LLP v. Crowley, 513 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). In determining the plain meaning of a statute, we construe the language according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id. "As a general principle, we eschew constructions of a statute that render any statutory language meaningless or superfluous." City of Dallas v. TCI West End, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. 2015).
When reviewing the question of standing, we take the allegations in the plaintiff's petition as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 155. In addition to the pleadings, we also consider relevant evidence offered by the parties. Id.
Harris County filed suit against S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants pursuant to section 7.351(a) of the Texas Water Code. This section provides:
Subject to Section 7.3511, if it appears that a violation or threat of violation of Chapter 16, 26, or 28 of this code, Chapter 361, 371, 372, or 382, Health and Safety Code, a provision of Chapter 401, Health and Safety Code, under the commission's jurisdiction, or Chapter1903, Occupations Code, or a rule adopted or an order or a permit issued under those chapters or provisions has occurred or is occurring in the jurisdiction of a local government, the local government or, in the case of a violation of Chapter 401, Health and Safety Code, a person affected as defined in that chapter, may institute a civil suit under Subchapter D [of Health and Safety Code sections 401.01-.119] in the same manner as the commission in a district court by its own attorney for the injunctive relief or civil penalty, or both, as authorized by this chapter against the person who committed, is committing, or is threatening to commit the violation.
Tex. Water Code § 7.351(a) (footnote omitted).
Harris County alleged, among other things, that S.K. and Brothers and the Melcher Defendants were continually violating Chapter 26 of the Texas Water Code and the Texas Administrative Code by discharging hazardous waste, specifically PCE, into the State's water. See Tex. Water Code § 26.121(a)(1) ( ); 30 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 335.2, 335.4 ( ). In addition, Harris County alleged that S.K. and Brothers failed to timely submit complete and correct Annual Waste Summaries as required by the Texas Administrative Code. See 30 Tex. Admin. Code § 335.9 ( ). Finally, Harris County alleged that the Melcher Defendants, as S.K. and Brothers's landlord, were liable for violating this requirement because they allowed S.K. and Brothers to continue occupying the...
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