Harris County, Tex. v. Gist
| Citation | 976 F.Supp. 601 |
| Decision Date | 13 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. H-96-3515. |
| Parties | HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, Plaintiff, v. Nancy E. GIST, Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, and The City of Houston, Texas, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas |
Bruce Stephen Powers, Office of Harris County Attorney, Houston, TX, for Harris County, Tex.
Vincent M. Garvey, Lisa A. Olson, Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for Nancy Gist.
Deborah Anne Verbil, Office of Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Dan Morales.
Hope Elizabeth Hammill-Reh, Houston, TX, for City of Houston.
Plaintiff Harris County ("County") has applied for a preliminary injunction, enjoining distribution of federal block grants to the City of Houston and to Harris County for local law enforcement pending the Court's interpretation of a 1996 federal appropriations statute. See Application for Temporary [sic] Injunction [Doc. # 1]. The County has named three defendants: Nancy E. Gist, Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance ("BJA") of the Department of Justice; Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas ("Morales"); and the City of Houston ("City"). Also pending before the Court are Defendant BJA's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 11], Defendant Morales' Motion to Dismiss on grounds of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim against him [Doc. # 10], and Defendant City's Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment [Doc. # 13].
By way of overview, the County contends that negotiations between the City and the County must take place to produce a joint application for funds before any of the block grant funds can be distributed by the BJA to either entity. The BJA and the City disagree with the County's position and contend that no joint application is required in the circumstances presented because either Attorney General Morales has not made either of the certifications that may trigger a joint application requirement or, if he has made one of the certifications, that certification alone does not require submission of a joint application. Morales has not taken a definitive position on these matters.
The Court has considered Plaintiff's Application, Defendant BJA's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Morales' Motion to Dismiss, the responses and replies, all other matters of record in this case, and the relevant authorities. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Application [Doc. # 1] is now GRANTED IN PART, Defendant BJA's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 11] is DENIED, and Defendant Morales' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. # 10] is DENIED.
This opinion reflects the Court's conclusions as to the proper interpretation of the statute in issue. The Court, in summary, holds that the statute is not ambiguous and therefore must be read literally. This ruling differs from the interpretation expounded by the BJA, the federal agency charged with the statute's implementation, to the extent that the BJA contends that the law is ambiguous as applied to the circumstances presented. If Congress intended what the BJA has advocated, it has failed to express its intent and it should amend the statute to clarify its meaning.
This opinion thus addresses all statutory construction issues raised by the County in its declaratory judgment action and by the BJA in its Motion for Summary Judgment. This opinion, however, does not fully resolve all the County's contentions (because BJA's interpretation of Morales' actions is not clear) nor does it resolve the issues underlying the City's due process claim raised in its Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment. To date, none of the parties has briefed or fully argued the City's due process issue. In addition, the Court is uncertain of its authority to address the City's due process claim. See infra notes 15 and 18. If the City intends to pursue its Counterclaim, it must submit a memorandum of legal authorities supporting its argument by December 31, 1996.
The Court does not perceive any need for further factfinding or litigation on the interpretation of the statute in issue and is prepared to grant summary judgment to the County. However, because the County has not yet moved for summary judgment, the Court will allow the parties until December 31, 1996, to brief any further issues they would like considered in light of this opinion or that require resolution before the Court enters final judgment for the County and against BJA and the City, as discussed herein.
In April 1996, as part of a federal appropriations bill, Congress established the Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Program to be administered by the BJA. See H.R. 728, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (hereinafter "H.R. 728"), incorporated in part into the Omnibus Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-12.1 Under the program local governments receive federal funds to supplement their law enforcement budgets and have broad control over the decision how to use the funds. The program establishes a formula by which each unit of local government2 receives a grant amount proportional to the average number of violent crimes that unit of government has reported to the FBI in the last three years. See H.R. 728 § 104(b)(3).
Congress recognized,3 however, that the statutory formula might be unfair in some situations in which geographically overlapping units of local government, such as cities and counties, share responsibility for law enforcement in a certain area, but in which one or more of the government units make arrests and report crimes for which another unit administers justice after the arrests are made. Thus, in these situations, one or more units of local government may receive disproportionately large shares of funds for reporting crimes that another government unit prosecutes or for which another unit bears the costs of incarceration.
To address this potential disparity, the House passed an amendment to H.R. 728 which specifies conditions under which such overlapping units must decide together how to divide and spend their aggregate funds. Under the amendment, § 104(b)(9), if these conditions are met, the government units must submit a joint spending plan application to the BJA in order to receive their grants. It is the interpretation of the conditions that gives rise to this litigation. The text of § 104(b)(9)(A) is as follows:
then in order to qualify for payment under this title, the unit of local government certified pursuant to clause (i), together with any such specified geographically constituent units of local government described in clause (ii), shall submit to the Director a joint application for the aggregate of funds allocated to such units of local government. Such application shall specify the amount of such finds that are to be distributed to each of the units of local government and the purposes for which such funds are to be used. The units of local government involved may establish a joint local advisory board for the purposes of carrying out this paragraph.
H.R. 728 § 104(b)(9)(A) (emphasis added).
In this action, Plaintiff Harris County contends that the relationship between it and the City of Houston satisfies the conditions of § 104(b)(9) and thus the provision requires the City to submit a joint funding application with the County. Specifically, the County argues that Subsection (i) is satisfied because the County bears more than 50 percent of the costs of prosecution or incarceration that arise with respect to part 1 violent crimes reported by the City and that Subsection (ii) is satisfied because, pursuant to Subsection (ii)(I) (the "single city provision"), the amount of funds allocated under the statutory formula to the City exceeds 200 percent of the amount of funds allocated to the County.6
Upon initial consideration of the issue, Defendant Texas Attorney General Morales agreed with the County's position. In a letter dated September 19, 1996, Morales certified that, with respect to Harris County and the City of Houston as well as a number of other overlapping counties and cities in the State, the conditions of § 104(b)(9) had been met. See "Certification Letter," Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Application for Temporary Injunction [Doc. # 8] ("Application").7 However, the following week, Morales reconsidered the issue and, in a letter dated September 27, 1996, withdrew the certifications. See "Withdrawal Letter," Exhibit D to Application.
In his Withdrawal Letter, Morales explained that, although he could certify the satisfaction of the § 104(b)(9)(A)(i) statistical condition (that the County bears more than 50% of the relevant costs), he did not have authority under Texas state law to certify the satisfaction of the § 104(b)(9)(A)(ii) condition italicized in...
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