Harris Farms, LLC v. Madison Twp. Trs.

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ABELE, J.
• Citation: Harris Farms, LLC v. Madison Twp. Trs., 2018 Ohio 4123, Case No. 17CA3817 (Ohio App. Oct 03, 2018)
• Decision Date: 03 October 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 17CA3817
• Parties: HARRIS FARMS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MADISON TOWNSHIP TRUSTEES, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

2018 Ohio 4123

HARRIS FARMS, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MADISON TOWNSHIP TRUSTEES, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 17CA3817

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT SCIOTO COUNTY

October 3, 2018

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

APPEARANCES:

Jeffrey C. Turner, Dawn M. Frick, and Katherine L. Epling, Dayton, Ohio, and Margaret Miller, Portsmouth, Ohio for appellants.

Stephen C. Rodeheffer, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellee.

CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

ABELE, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court judgment that denied a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Madison Township Trustees, Trustee Donald Lambert, Trustee James Preston, and Trustee Christopher Rase, defendants below and appellants herein. Appellants assign the following errors for review:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE DRAINAGE DITCH IS A PROPRIETARY FUNCTION AND, THEREBY, THE MADISON

TOWNSHIP TRUSTEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY UNDER R.C. 2744.01"

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THAT THE DEFENSE SET FORTH IN R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) APPLIED TO REINSTATE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY TO THE MADISON TOWNSHIP TRUSTEES, DONALD LAMBERT, TRUSTEE, JAMES PRESTON, TRUSTEE, AND CHRISTOPHER RASE, TRUSTEE, BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT ESTABLISHED THAT THE DEFENDANTS [SIC] ACTIONS RESULTED FROM THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT OR DISCRETION IN WHETHER TO ACQUIRE, OR HOW TO USE, EQUIPMENT, SUPPLIES, MATERIALS, PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND OTHER RESOURCES UNLESS THE JUDGMENT OR DISCRETION WAS EXERCISED WITH MALICIOUS PURPOSE, IN BAD FAITH, OR IN A WANTON OR RECKLESS MANNER."

{¶ 2} On March 1, 2017, appellee filed a complaint and alleged that approximately ten years earlier, appellants excavated part of the roadway in front of appellee's property in order to perform maintenance on a drainage ditch that lies between the roadway and appellee's property. Appellee asserted that the excavation "diminished or removed the lateral support that the roadway was supplying to" appellee's property and, that as a result, appellee's "property began slipping towards" the roadway. Appellee complained about the slippage, and appellants attempted to alleviate the problem. However, the attempted correction did not work and appellee's property continues to slip.

{¶ 3} Appellee asserted that appellants "are charged with the responsibility of maintaining" the road and possess a "duty * * * to maintain lateral support for [appellee]'s contiguous land." Appellee claimed that appellants refused to remedy the problem and thus (1) requested damages, and (2) requested the court to issue a mandatory injunction to order appellants to "renovate [the road] to eliminate any further slippage."

{¶ 4} Appellants answered and denied liability. Shortly thereafter, appellants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that claimed, in part, that appellants are entitled to statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744.¹

{¶ 5} Appellee, however, asserted that R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) removes the general grant of immunity to which appellants are entitled. Appellee contends that (1) the maintenance of a drainage ditch constitutes a propriety function, and (2) the R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) discretionary defense does not apply.

{¶ 6} Appellants responded that the maintenance of the drainage ditch is not a propriety function and, that even if it were, appellee's complaint does not allege that any of appellants' employees were negligent. Appellants further disputed appellee's assertion that the discretionary defense does not apply to appellants' decision regarding the drainage ditch.

{¶ 7} On November 14, 2017, the trial court denied appellants' motion. The court determined that "the negligent maintenance of the storm water drainage system that resulted in flooding is a proprietary function." This appeal followed.²

{¶ 8} Appellants' two assignments of error assert that the trial court erred by denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings. For ease of discussion, we consider them together.

{¶ 9} In its first assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by concluding that the maintenance of the drainage ditch is a propriety function. Appellants contend that according to R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(e) and (r), the maintenance of a drainage ditch constitutes a governmental function for which liability cannot attach. Appellants claim that the maintenance of a drainage ditch relates to road maintenance and flood control measures and that the drainage ditch is not part of a sewer system. Appellants additionally argue that appellee failed to plead that any employee of the political subdivision was negligent. Appellants observe that appellee's complaint alleges that appellants "contracted with an individual to alleviate the slippage."

{¶ 10} In its second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred by determining that the discretionary defense set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) does not reinstate its immunity. Appellants argue that the decision to hire an independent contractor to alleviate the slippage required the exercise of judgment as to how to use resources.

{¶ 11} Appellee counters, however, that appellants failed to establish that appellee cannot prove a set of facts that would entitle it to relief. Appellee points out that its complaint does not conclusively reveal the nature of the drainage ditch at issue. Appellee thus contends that the pleadings fail to show, beyond doubt, that appellee cannot prove a set of facts that would remove appellants' general grant of immunity.

ASTANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 12} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of trial court decisions concerning a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. E.g., State ex rel. Mancino v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 151 Ohio St.3d 35, 2017-Ohio-7528, 85 N.E.3d 713, ¶ 8. Thus, appellate courts independently review trial court decisions regarding a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rayess v. Educational Comm. for Foreign Med. Graduates, 134 Ohio St.3d 509, 2012-Ohio-5676, 983 N.E.2d 1267, ¶ 18 ("Because the review of a decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) presents only questions of law, * * * our review is de novo.").

B

CIV.R. 12(C)

{¶ 13} Civ.R. 12(C) provides: "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." A court that is considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings "must construe the material allegations in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true." Ohio Manufacturers' Assn. v. Ohioans for Drug Price Relief Act, 147 Ohio St.3d 42, 2016-Ohio-3038, 59 N.E.3d 1274, ¶ 10 (citation omitted); accord State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, — Ohio St.3d —, 2018-Ohio-3361, — N.E.3d ---, ¶ 13. A court may enter judgment on the pleadings "only if it appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief." Ohio Manufacturers' Assn. at ¶ 10; accord Maynard v. Norfolk S. Ry., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3267, 2009-Ohio-3143, ¶ 12; Dolan v. Glouster, 173 Ohio App.3d 617, 2007-Ohio-6275, 879 N.E.2d 838, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). "'Thus, Civ.R. 12(C) requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Rayess at ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). "Consequently, 'as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion * * * [for judgment on the pleadings].'" Kerr v. Logan Elm School Dist., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 14CA6, 2014-Ohio-5838, 2014 WL 7477955, ¶ 12, quoting York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).

{¶ 14} We further note that under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief." Civ.R. 8(A)(1). Civ.R. 8(E) further directs that averments contained in a pleading be simple, concise, and direct. Accordingly, "Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity." Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 29. We observe, however, that "'[i]n a few carefully circumscribed cases,'" a plaintiff must "'plead operative facts with particularity.'" State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 109, 647 N.E.2d 799 (1995), quoting York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145, citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988) (employee's intentional tort claim against employer) and Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991) (negligent hiring claim against religious institution); see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(1) (complaints in original actions filed in the Supreme Court); Civ.R. 9(B) (claims of fraud or mistake).

{¶ 15} Moreover, a plaintiff is not required to plead the legal theory of the case at the pleading stage and need only give reasonable notice of the claim. State ex rel. Harris v. Toledo, 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 656 N.E.2d 334 (1995); see York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145 (stating that complaint need not contain more than "brief and sketchy allegations of fact to survive a motion to dismiss under the notice pleading rule"). Thus, "a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage." York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145; accord Leneghan at ¶ 16 (citing York and noting that party "not required to prove her case at the pleading stage").

{¶ 16} The foregoing "simplified notice-pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary-judgment motions to define disputed facts and to dispose of...