Harris v. Alabama

• Decision Date: 22 February 1995
• Docket Number: 937659
• Parties: Louise HARRIS, Petitioner, v. ALABAMA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

513 U.S. 504

115 S.Ct. 1031

130 L.Ed.2d 1004

Louise HARRIS, Petitioner,

v ALABAMA.

No. 93-7659.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Dec. 5, 1994.

Decided Feb. 22, 1995.

Syllabus ^*

Alabama law vests capital sentencing authority in the trial judge, but requires the judge to "consider" an advisory jury verdict. After convicting petitioner Harris of capital murder, the jury recommended that she be imprisoned for life without parole, but the trial judge sentenced her to death upon concluding that the statutory aggravating circumstance found and considered outweighed all of the mitigating circumstances. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting Harris' argument that the capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify the weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation and thus permits the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: The Eighth Amendment does not require the State to define the weight the sentencing judge must give to an advisory jury verdict. Pp. __.

(a) Because the Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence, see, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, it is not offended when a State further requires the judge to consider a jury recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight. Alabama's capital sentencing scheme is much like Florida's, except that a Florida sentencing judge is required to give the jury's recommendations "great weight," see Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.), while an Alabama judge is not. Although this Court has spoken favorably of the so-called Tedder standard, see, e.g., Spaziano, supra, at 465, 104 S.Ct., at 3165, it has also made clear that the hallmark of the analysis is not the particular weight a State chooses to place upon the jury's advice, but whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results, see, e.g., ibid. To impose the Tedder standard here would offend established principles governing the criteria to be considered by the sentencer, see, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2330, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 and would place within constitutional ambit micromanagement tasks that properly rest within the State's discretion to administer its criminal justice system. Pp. __.

(b) Harris' arguments for requiring that "great weight" be given to the jury's advice are unpersuasive. First, Alabama cases reversing death sentences for prejudicial errors committed before the advisory jury do not demonstrate that the jury's role is in fact determinative, but simply that a sentence imposed by the judge is invalid if the recommendation on which it partially rests was rendered erroneously. Second, although statistics demonstrate that there have been only 5 cases in which an Alabama judge rejected an advisory verdict of death, compared to 47 instances where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life, these numbers do not tell the whole story because they do not indicate, for example, how many cases in which a jury recommendation of life was adopted would have ended differently had the judge not been required to consider the jury's advice. Moreover, the statistics say little about whether the Alabama scheme is constitutional, a question which turns not solely on numerical tabulations of sentences, but rather on whether the penalties imposed are the product of properly guided discretion and not of arbitrary whim. Finally, apparent disparities in the weight given to jury verdicts in specific Alabama cases do not indicate that the judges have divergent understandings of the statutory requirement that such verdicts be considered; they simply reflect the fact that, in the subjective weighing process, the emphasis given to each decisional criterion must of necessity vary to account for the particular circumstances in each case. In any event, Harris does not show how these disparities affect her case. Pp. __.

632 So.2d 543 (Ala.1993), affirmed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Ruth Friedman, Montgomery, AL, for petitioner.

P. David Bjurberg, Montgomery, AL, for respondent.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Alabama law vests capital sentencing authority in the trial judge, but requires the judge to consider an advisory jury verdict. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's argument that Alabama's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional because it does not specify the weight the judge must give to the jury's recommendation and thus permits arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.

I

A defendant convicted of capital murder in Alabama is entitled to a sentencing hearing before the trial jury, Ala.Code § 13A-5-46 (1994), unless jury participation is waived by both parties and approved by the court, § 13A-5-44. The State must prove statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and must disprove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any mitigating circumstance the defendant may proffer. § 13A-5-45(g). The jury then renders an advisory verdict. If it finds that aggravating factors, if any, outweigh mitigating circumstances, then the jury recommends death; otherwise, the verdict is life imprisonment without parole. § 13A-5-46(e). The jury may recommend death only if 10 jurors so agree, while a verdict of life imprisonment requires a simple majority. § 13A-5-46(f). The recommendation and vote tally are reported to the judge.

The judge then must consider all available evidence and file a written statement detailing the defendant's crime, listing specific aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposing a sentence. Alabama Code § 13A-5-47(e) provides:

"In deciding upon the sentence, the trial court shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances it finds to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist, and in doing so the trial court shall consider the recommendation of the jury contained in its advisory verdict, unless such verdict has been waived pursuant to Section 13A-5-46(a) or 13A-5-46(g). While the jury's recommendation concerning sentence shall be given consideration, it is not binding upon the court."

If the defendant is sentenced to death, his conviction and sentence are automatically reviewed by an appellate court and, if affirmed, a writ of certiorari is granted by the Alabama Supreme Court as a matter of right. In addition to reviewing the record for errors, the appellate courts must independently weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine whether the death penalty is disproportionate to sentences rendered in comparable cases. § 13A-5-53(b).

Petitioner Louise Harris was married to the victim, a deputy sheriff, and was also having an affair with Lorenzo McCarter. She asked McCarter to find someone to kill her husband, and McCarter to that end approached a co-worker, who refused and reported the solicitation to his supervisor. McCarter then found willing accomplices in Michael Sockwell and Alex Hood, who were paid $100 and given a vague promise of more money upon performance. On the appointed night, as her husband left for work on the nightshift, Harris called McCarter on his beeper to alert him. McCarter and Hood sat in a car parked on a nearby street, and Sockwell hid in the bushes next to a stop sign. As the victim stopped his car at the intersection, Sockwell sprang forth and shot him, point blank, with a shotgun. Harris was arrested after questioning, and McCarter agreed to bear witness to the conspiracy in exchange for the prosecutor's promise not to seek the death penalty. McCarter testified that Harris had asked him to kill her husband so they could share in his death benefits, which totaled about $250,000.

The jury convicted Harris of capital murder. At the sentencing hearing, a number of witnesses attested to her good background and strong character. She was rearing seven children, held three jobs simultaneously, and participated actively in her church. The jury recommended, by a 7 to 5 vote, that she be imprisoned for life without parole. The trial judge then considered her sentence, finding the existence of one aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and one statutory mitigator, that Harris had no prior criminal record. The trial judge also found as nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that Harris was a hardworking, respected member of her church and community. Noting that Harris had planned the crime and financed its commission and stood to benefit the most from her husband's murder, the judge concluded that "the one statutory aggravating circumstance found and considered far outweighs all of the non-statutory mitigating circumstances, and that the sentence ought to be death." App. 7. In separate proceedings, all the conspirators were convicted of capital murder. McCarter and Hood received prison terms of life without parole; Sockwell, the triggerman, was sentenced to death after the trial judge rejected a jury recommendation, again by a 7 to 5 vote, of life imprisonment.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Harris' conviction and sentence. 632 So.2d 503 (1992). It noted that Alabama's death penalty statute is based on Florida's sentencing scheme, which we have held to be constitutional, see Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457-467, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3160-3166, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.). One difference is that jury recommendations are to be given "great weight" by the sentencing judge in Florida, see Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d...