Harris v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 24 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-20097,99-20097
• Citation: 209 F.3d 413
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) PAMELA ANN HARRIS, on behalf of Dominisha S. Harris, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 413

209 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2000)

PAMELA ANN HARRIS, on behalf of Dominisha S. Harris, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-20097

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

April 24, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

Before POLITZ, JOLLY, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

Pamela Ann Harris, on behalf of her minor daughter Dominisha S. Harris, appeals the judgment affirming a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In October 1991, Harris filed, on behalf of Dominisha, an application for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, asserting that Dominisha was disabled as a result of hyperactivity, poor vision, herpes simplex, and asthma. The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Harris then filed a second application for SSI benefits which also was denied initially and on reconsideration.

Harris sought and secured a hearing before an administrative law judge which resulted in a finding that Dominisha was not disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Harris sought review of that decision by the Appeals Council which found no basis for review. The findings of the ALJ thus became the final decision of the Commissioner.

Acting pro se, Harris invoked 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's ruling, alleging that the ALJ erred in concluding that Dominisha was not disabled under 1382c.

The Commissioner moved for summary judgment, contending that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the determination that Dominisha is not disabled. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be granted. Harris filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, attaching medical records which she claims were neither presented to, nor considered by, the ALJ.

The district court concluded that the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the evidence attached to Harris' cross-motion did not alter its conclusion. The court granted the Commissioner's motion and denied the cross-motion by Harris. Harris timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Harris contends that the ALJ failed to evaluate Dominisha's claim under the proper standard and failed to obtain additional medical records pertaining to her daughter's treatment, as he promised to do. The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ's conclusion on Dominisha's lack of disability is proper and supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner also claims, for the first time, that Harris cannot maintain a pro se action on behalf of her daughter in federal court.

The ability of Harris to sustain the present action must be first addressed. We begin our analysis by examining whether a non-attorney parent can appear pro se on behalf of a minor child in a social security case, an issue not previously directly considered by this court.

I.

In support of his contention that Harris lacks the requisite ability herein, the Commissioner relies on two Second Circuit opinions holding that a non-attorney parent may not appear pro se on behalf of a child. ¹ The Commissioner notes that the Second Circuit has concluded that courts have a duty to enforce this rule sua sponte, as it is designed to protect the legal interests of children.²

The Commissioner does not discuss the reasoning that led to these two decisions and somewhat similar decisions by other courts.³

The right to proceed pro se in civil actions in federal court is guaranteed by 28 U.S.C. 1654, which provides: "[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." ⁴ Our colleagues in the Second Circuit noted that "the choice to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors who under state law . . . cannot determine their own legal actions." ⁵ Because there is no individual choice to proceed pro se, they concluded that "the sole policy at stake concerns the exclusion of non-licensed persons to appear as attorneys on behalf of others." ⁶ Our colleagues conclude that it is not in the interests of minors to be represented by non-attorneys; rather, minors are entitled to trained legal assistance to fully protect their rights. ⁷ As a consequence, they held that a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel to sustain an action on behalf of a child in a racial discrimination case ⁸ and in a case alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and Rehabilitation Act.⁹

As noted, the present appeal seeks review of an administrative decision that Dominisha is not disabled within the meaning of 1382c. Section 406(a)(1) authorizes the Commissioner to draft rules and regulations allowing non-attorneys to represent claimants in administrative proceedings. The only circuit decision of which we are aware addressing whether a non-attorney representative may proceed pro se in federal court in the context of a social security case is Innaccone v. Law, ¹⁰ wherein the court held that a non-attorney representative of a decedent's estate may not appear pro se in federal court on behalf of the estate unless the representative was litigating claims or interests in which he, as opposed to the estate, had a personal stake. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the lack of a provision parallel to 406(a)(1), authorizing non-attorney representation of claimants in federal court, evinced Congress' intent that non-attorneys would be permitted to represent claimants only inadministrative proceedings before the Commissioner. Further, the court commented that 405(g) does not address the specific procedural issue whether a claimant may proceed pro se but, rather, grants the claimant the right to appeal a final decision of the Commissioner. ¹¹ Because the non-attorney plaintiff in Innaccone was purporting to represent the estate in litigating an interest specific to the estate, rather than claims that were personal to him, the court concluded that he could not maintain his pro se federal court action on behalf of the estate.

In Maldonando v. Apfel, ¹² the district court concluded that non-attorney parents may appear pro se on behalf of their minor children in SSI cases. The court opined that the Second Circuit's general rule prohibiting non-attorney parents from representing their children in litigation is inapplicable in the context of appeals from administrative denials of SSI benefits because the reasons for the general rule do not apply to such appeals. First, in SSI cases, a minor child living in a low-income family usually cannot exercise the right to appeal except through a parent or guardian. Second, the minor's rights can be fully protected in SSI cases without legal counsel, as the reviewing court must examine the record to determine if "all of the relevant facts [were] sufficiently developed and considered." ¹³ Third, SSI appeals are not subject to abuse because the proceeding only involves the appeal from the denial of monetary benefits and the review of an administrative record. Thus, the court concluded these proceedings "do not involve the subjective criteria and range of fact-finding that are characteristic of the . . . cases that led to the rule discussed in Wenger and Cheung." ¹⁴ Additionally, the statute requires payment to the parent or guardian, "the very person who seeks to sue." ¹⁵ The court further factually distinguished SSI cases from the previous circuit decisions.

The Maldonando court also found that important legal and policy considerations existed which justified allowing parents to represent their children in SSI cases, including:

(1) the parents represented their children throughout the administrative proceedings and they should be permitted to do so on appeal; (2) an appeal from the denial of SSI benefits is a common and fairly simple proceeding that is often prosecuted without the assistance of counsel; (3) plaintiffs in these cases are often unable to obtain counsel; and (4) child SSI benefits are intended to aid disabled children while they are children and therefore those rights must be vindicated in a timely manner.¹⁶

The court noted that "the Second Circuit as well as district courts within this circuit have routinely permitted parents in SSI cases to represent minor claimants without an attorney. . . . The interests of justice require that the courts be permitted to continue doing so."¹⁷

Unlike the representative of the decedent's estate in Innaccone, we find that the appellant in the present case has a personal stake in the litigation. As Dominisha's custodial parent, Harris is responsible for expenses associated with the minor's maintenance. Should Dominisha be found disabled within the meaning of 1382c, Harris likely would serve as the representative payee of SSI benefits. ¹⁸ As a representative payee, Harris could use the SSI payments for Dominisha's "current maintenance."¹⁹ Absent SSI benefits, however, Harris must pay for such expenses. Harris obviously has a personal financial stake in the present action.

We find persuasive the district court's analysis in Maldonado. We agree that the rights of minors in SSI appeals can be adequately protected without legal counsel -- the proceedings essentially involve the review of an administrative record. We are persuaded that prohibiting non-attorney parents from proceeding pro se in appeals from administrative SSI decisions, on behalf of a minor child, would jeopardize seriously the child's statutory right to judicial review under 405(g). We conclude that policy considerations, such as those articulated in Maldonado, compel our holding that a non-attorney parent be permitted to sustain a pro se...