Harris v. Arthur
Decision Date | 23 October 1912 |
Docket Number | Case Number: 2277 |
Citation | 1912 OK 679,127 P. 695,36 Okla. 33 |
Parties | HARRIS et ux. v. ARTHUR. |
Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-- Operation of Statute--Part Performance. Relief against the operation of the statute of frauds, sometimes granted by the court on account of a partial performance of a contract, invalid under the statute, proceeds through the doctrine of an equitable estoppel.
2. SAME. Where suit is brought on a parol contract for the sale of an interest in land, proof that the owner executed a deed thereto and notified the purchaser thereof is not sufficient to take the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds.
3. SAME. H. was in possession of certain school lands as a lessee of the state. A. verbally agreed to give her a sum of money if she would relinquish her right to the land in his favor as permitted by the law, so that he could lease same. H. executed her relinquishment, conditioned that the same land be leased to A., and filed such conditional relinquishment in the land office. A. never received the lease, nor took any steps to acquire same. Nothing was paid nor was possession given. H. sued A. for the sum he had agreed to give for her interest in the land. Held, that the contract is invalid and unenforceable under the statute of frauds. Section 1089, Comp. Laws 1909.
4. SAME. Acts done under a parol contract for the sale of an interest in land most frequently held as such part performance as to take the same out of the statute of frauds, are: (a) The delivery of possession to, or the assumption of exclusive and notorious possession by, the vendee under the verbal contract of sale, and with the knowledge of the vendor, accompanied by part payment of the consideration; (b) or the expenditure of money by the vendee in making improvements, permanently beneficial to the estate, with the knowledge of the vendor, and in pursuance of such parol agreement of sale; (c) or where the parties have so acted under the parol agreement as to alter their position so that a restoration to the former position is impractical or impossible; (d) or where the parties have so acted under the agreement that to allow the defendant to take shelter under the statute, would be to inflict an unjust and unconscientious injury or loss upon the other party.
Gilbert & Bond, for plaintiffs in error.
Jas. L. Brown, for defendant in error.
¶1 The plaintiffs in error, as plaintiffs below, instituted this suit on January 17, 1910, in the district court of Oklahoma county by original petition. After a demurrer had been sustained thereto and an amended petition filed, a general demurrer to the amended petition was again sustained by the court, to which action plaintiffs excepted, refused to plead further, and bring this case here on transcript for a review of the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer. The petition alleges, in substance, that the plaintiff Z. D. Harris was in possession of and holding as lessee lots 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, in block 9, being a part of the W. I/2 of the N.W. I/4 of section 27, township 14 N., range 1 E., in Oklahoma county. A copy of her lease from the officials of the State Land Department is attached, showing those lots to be a part of an addition to the town site of Luther. That the defendant, Arthur, made a verbal agreement with plaintiffs; that upon her relinquishment of her leasehold interest so that he could procure a lease thereon from the Land Department; that he would pay her the sum of $ 1,000. That, in pursuance of such verbal agreement, the plaintiff executed such relinquishment of her leasehold interest and filed same with the Land Department. The relinquishment is attached as an exhibit to the petition, and is as follows:
¶2 That plaintiff, Z. D. Harris, has paid all rentals and assessments due or to become due within six months, thus qualifying herself to relinquish her interest, with preference right to lease the land upon the part of defendant; that, upon the filing of said relinquishment, the Land Commissioners thereupon notified defendant of his right to secure a lease thereon under the law; that all of said acts were done by plaintiffs in pursuance of the oral contract with defendant; that thereupon plaintiffs became entitled to the immediate payment of the $ 1,000 agreed upon, but, although demand had been made therefor, defendant failed to pay to plaintiffs any part of said sum, to their damage in that amount. The court sustained a general demurrer to the petition on the ground that it was a verbal contract for the sale of an interest in lands, and therefore fell within the statute of frauds and was void and unenforceable. The determination of this question settles the case without a consideration of certain other points raised by the defendant in erorr. The statute of frauds involved here is as follows (section 1089, Comp. Laws 1909):
¶3 The plaintiffs in error do not challenge the proposition that the sale herein involves an interest in land, but claim that the case is taken out of the statute on the ground of "part performance." To quote plaintiffs' brief, "the plaintiffs fulfilled their portion of the contract, and nothing remained to be completed but the payment of the money by defendant," and to support the contention cite Logan v. Brown, 20 Okla. 334, 95 P. 441, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 298, Riggles v. Erney et al., 154 U.S. 244, 14 S. Ct. 1083, 38 L. Ed. 976, and Williams v. Morris, 95 U.S. 444, 24 L. Ed. 360. We have examined the cases relied upon by plaintiffs in error, and think it plain that the doctrine they announce is not applicable here. In Logan v. Brown, supra, the defendant, Logan, took plaintiff's property by deed for the purpose of selling it for plaintiff, Brown, which he did, and, when he refused to turn over to her the money in his hands derived from a sale of her own property, he was sued, and a recovery sustained in this court, for the money which he failed to turn over. The whole of the doctrine of that case is summed up by the court as follows:
"It will be seen that the law as declared in the foregoing authorities is that, where one takes title to real property under a parol agreement to hold the same and sell it as agent for the grantor, after having sold it and received the proceeds, he is liable for the proceeds thereof to the grantor."
¶4 That is all that case decided in so far as the statute here involved is concerned, and has no bearing on this case. Riggles v. Erney et al., supra, is likewise not in point. In that case the father devised two separate parcels of land to certain heirs mentioned, and on certain conditions. The heirs, being all of full age, met together, and by verbal agreement sold one of the parcels of land and divided the proceeds among themselves according to the terms of the verbal agreement. The defendant accepted her share in the division. Later the question arose as to how the other parcel of land should be disposed of; the defendant claiming it should be distributed according to the terms of the will, which would result in her receiving a much larger share than if disposed of under the verbal agreement under which the rest of the estate had been distributed. To sustain this contention she set up the statute of frauds. But the court held that, having taken and retained the benefits arising out of the sale under the parol agreement of a large portion of the estate, thus altering the relation of the parties so as to prevent their restoration to their former condition, she could not interpose the statute of frauds as a defense against the performance of the parts of the parol agreement remaining to be performed. Neither does the case of Williams v. Morris, supra, help the plaintiffs here. In that case the statute of frauds was held to be a good defense against the claims of part performance, etc., and in that case much stronger reasons are urged for taking the contract out of the statute than in the one at bar. The claim of "part performance" relied upon to take a case out of the statute of frauds is addressed to the...
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...good faith, of the premises, with the knowledge and consent of the owner, and has made permanent improvements thereon. Harris et ux. v. Arthur, 36 Okla. 33, 127 P. 695; Sutherland v. Taintor, 17 Okla. 427, 87 P. 900. But the mere acceptance of the purchase price is not of itself sufficient.......
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