Harris v. Barber

• Decision Date: 28 January 1889
• Citation: 32 L.Ed. 697,9 S.Ct. 314,129 U.S. 366
• Parties: HARRIS v. BARBER
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

9 S.Ct. 314

129 U.S. 366

32 L.Ed. 697

HARRIS v. BARBER.

January 28, 1889.

This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment quashing a writ of certiorari to a justice of the peace.

On December 17, 1887, John H. Harris filed in the supreme court of the District of Columbia a petition, verified by his oath, and alleging 'that he is in possession of the house and premises known as the 'Harris House,' Nos. 1327-1329 E street north-west, in the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, under a lease to him from Mary A. Matteson, dated May 3, 1883, and modified April 20, 1885, for a term ending October 1, 1889, at a rent of $3,000 per annum, with the privilege of extension for a further term of four years at a rent of $4,000 per annum; that under the terms of said lease he expended about $15,000 in permanent improvements and betterments to said building, put it in tenantable condition, and paid the taxes assessed thereon until the sale hereinafter mentioned, besides expending upwards of $20,000 in furniture and appliances for its use as a hotel; that he did this upon the faith and expectation of enjoying his full term as tenant of said premises; that on May 4, 1886, the said land and premises were sold under a deed of trust prior in date to the lease of your petitioner, and of which your petitioner was in actual ignorance at the time of said lease, and were purchased by one Amaziah D. Barber, who, a few days after said sale, notified your petitioner to quit said premises, and on July 31, 1886, instituted a proceeding, under the act of congress regulating proceedings in cases between landlord and tenant in the District of Columbia, before WILLIAM HELMICK, justice of the peace for said District of Columbia, and on August 14, 1886, said justice of the peace rendered judgment against your petitioner for the possession of said premises.' The petition asserted that the proceedings before the justice were void for want of jurisdiction; because the oath to the complaint was not taken before the justice, but before a notary public in the county of Oneida and state of New York; and because 'the relation of landlord and tenant did not exist between said Barber and your petitioner by convention, and, said Barber relying upon the absence of such relation for his right to possession, his only remedy was by an action of ejectment.'

The petition prayed for a writ of certiorari, commanding the justice to certify and send up the record of his proceedings. A writ of certiorari was issued accordingly, and in obedience to it the justice returned his record, by which it appeared that the complaint to him was subscribed and sworn to by the complainant before a notary public in the county of Oneida and state of New York, and that the whole complaint, except the address and the prayer for process, was as follows: 'Your complainant, Amaziah D. Barber, respectfully represents that he is entitled to the possession of the tenement and premises known as the 'Harris House,' situate on lot five, in square No. 254, in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, and that the same is detained from him and held without right by John H. Harris, tenant thereof by sufferance of this complainant, and whose tenancy and estate therein has been determined by the service of a due notice to quit, of thirty days, in writing.' The supreme court of the District of Columbia, in special term, upon the motion of Barber, rendered judgment quashing the writ of certiorari, and that judgment was affirmed in general term. 6 Mackey, 586. Harris sued out this writ of error. Barber now filed a motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, as well as a motion to affirm the judgment.

A. C. Bradley, for plaintiff in error.

Jas. S. Edwards and Job Barnard, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The grounds relied on in support of the motion to dismiss this writ of error are, in substance, that the granting or refusing of a writ of certiorari is a matter of discretion, and not the subject of review; that there is no sufficient pecuniary value in dispute to support the jurisdiction of this court; and that the proceedings of a justice of the peace under the landlord and tenant act of the District of Columbia cannot be reviewed except by appeal. The writ of error before us is not upon the judgment of the justice in the landlord and tenant process, but upon the judgment of the supreme court of the District of Columbia quashing the writ of certiorari to the justicie. The last ground assigned for the motion to dismiss is untenable, because it affects the correctness of the judgment quashing the writ of certiorari, and not the jurisdiction of this court to review that judgment.

The other grounds for the motion to dismiss, though more plausible, appear, upon examination, to be also insufficient. A writ of certiorari, when its object is not to remove a case before trial, or to supply defects in a record, but to bring up after judgment the proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal, whose procedure is not according to the course of the common law, is in the nature of a writ of error. Although the granting of the writ of certiorari rests in the discretion of the court, yet after the writ has been granted, and the record certified in obedience to it, the questions arising upon that record must be determined according to fixed rules of law, and their determination is reviewable on error. People v. Assessors, 39 N. Y. 81; ...