Harris v. Bd. of Trs. Univ. of Ala.

• Decision Date: 27 February 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11–CV–2446–VEH.
• Citation: 282 Ed. Law Rep. 367,846 F.Supp.2d 1223
• Parties: Elaine HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, UAB Health System, and UAB Hospital/Center for Psychiatric Medicine, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

846 F.Supp.2d 1223

282 Ed. Law Rep. 367

Elaine HARRIS, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF TRUSTEES UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, UAB Health System, and UAB Hospital/Center for Psychiatric Medicine, Defendants.

Case No. 2:11–CV–2446–VEH.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Feb. 27, 2012.

Ronald B. Hatcher, Law Firm of Ronald B. Hatcher, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Lisa Huggins, University of Alabama System Office of Counsel, Anne R. Yuengert, Summer A. Davis, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, District Judge.

This employment discrimination action is before the court on the Motion To Dismiss or For Summary Judgment ¹ (the “Motion”) (doc. 13) filed by Defendant Board of Trustees University of Alabama (“Board of Trustees” or “Defendant”). The Motion presents several jurisdictional challenges and requests dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff Elaine Harris (“Ms. Harris” or “Plaintiff”) has responded to the Motion with a response (doc. 17), two supplemental responses (docs. 19 and 25), and the Board of Trustees filed its reply ² (doc. 22). Accordingly, the Motion is under submission and ripe for the court's decision.

For the reasons that follow, the court finds that the Motion is due to be GRANTED and, accordingly, the Board of Trustees is due to be dismissed from this case.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is an African–American female over the age of 40 who avers that she was “jointly and severally” employed by the three Defendants named in this action.³ (Complt. ¶¶ 6, 11). At all times relevant to her Complaint, Plaintiff was working in various positions as a licensed practical nurse at UAB Hospital/Center for Psychiatric Medicine. (Complt. ¶ 10).

On February 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge against her employers with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging racial discrimination and retaliation, sex discrimination, age discrimination, and equal pay discrimination.⁴ (Complt. ¶ 4; Doc. 17–1). Plaintiff's EEOC charge (Charge No. 420–2010–01057) was investigated, and Plaintiff received a Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter dated April 7, 2011, which indicated the EEOC's intent to close the file without making any affirmative findings and authorized Plaintiff to file a lawsuit in federal or state court within 90 days. (Complt. Ex. 1).

Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on July 5, 2011, within 90 days of receiving her Notice of Rights letter. In shotgun fashion,⁵she asserts the claims in her Complaint generally against all three Defendants, without designating specific claims against each Defendant. Although not numbered, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants essentially constitute eight different counts:

(1) Race discrimination (based on unequal pay, hostile work environment, and disparate impact) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) (Comlt. ¶¶ 26–58);

(2) Retaliation under Title VII (Complt. ¶¶ 59–64);

(3) Retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, brought by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complt. ¶¶ 59–64);

(4) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, brought by and through § 1983 (Complt. ¶¶ 65–72);

(5) Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Complt. ¶¶ 73–82);

(6) Breach of contract under state law (Complt. ¶¶ 83–90);

(7) Quantum Meruit under state law (Complt. ¶¶ 91–95); and

(8) Attorneys Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Thus, Plaintiff alleges claims under the federal constitution and three different federal statutes (Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA) in addition to her state law claims. Plaintiff asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and original jurisdiction based on her civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person ... [t]o recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.”). (Complt. ¶ 2).

The Board of Trustees filed its Motion To Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Board of Trustees fashions four main arguments for dismissal: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies on her Title VII and ADEA claims (doc. 13 ¶¶ 1–4); (2) sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity bar Plaintiff's claims “under [all] federal statutes other than Title VII” ( id. at 5); (3) governmental immunity under the Alabama Constitution bars “[a]ny state law claims” against the Board of Trustees ( id. ¶¶ 6–7); and (4) generally, that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against the Board of Trustees because Plaintiff has not shown that it is her “employer” ( id. ¶ 1; doc. 22 at 2–4). Accordingly, the Board of Trustees asks the court to dismiss all claims against it “for lack of jurisdiction.” (Doc. 13 at 3).

The Motion, however, fails to designate which of its arguments for dismissal are brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) versus Rule 12(b)(6). Generally, jurisdictional challenges are addressed under Rule 12(b)(1), whereas Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure of a party to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001) (stating that where “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir.1977)).⁶In this case, immunity is the only issue the Board of Trustees raises that is arguably subject to the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional standard.⁷

Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity defense “partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar” sufficient that it may be raised for the first time on appeal); McClendon v. Georgia Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.2001) (“Because the Eleventh Amendment represents a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” (citation omitted)). However,

... [t]he jurisdictional bar embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is a “rather peculiar kind of ‘jurisdictional’ issue.” United States v. SCS Bus. & Tech. Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 892 (D.C.Cir.1999). Unlike most subject matter jurisdiction issues, which cannot be waived by the parties and must be raised by a court on its own initiative, the Eleventh Amendment does not automatically deprive a court of original jurisdiction. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389, 118 S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998); see Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1694, 1697 n. 2, 140 L.Ed.2d 970 (1998) (“While the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicial power, ... we have recognized that it is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III.”). “Rather,” the Supreme Court has explained, “the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so.” Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389, 118 S.Ct. at 2052. This understanding of the Eleventh Amendment as a volitional defense is manifest in decisions allowing it to be waived by the state, see, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146–47, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), or ignored by the court if not raised, see, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2567, n. 19, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982). Thus, unlike other jurisdictional bars, federal courts are required to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment strips them of jurisdiction only if the state defendant insists that it does.

McClendon, 261 F.3d at 1257. As a result, courts have treated immunity issues under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Compare Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.2000) (reviewing district court's dismissal based on the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), with Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir.2011) (“The [district] court dismissed the claims against the Board of Regents, the Members, and the University Officials, who were sued in their official capacities, under Rule 12(b)(1) on the Eleventh Amendment immunity ground.”).

The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, recently indicated that Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis is more appropriately conducted under 12(b)(1) where it does not implicate the merits. See Thomas v. U.S. Postal Service, 364 Fed.Appx. 600, 601 (11th Cir.2010) (“[A] dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds should be pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because no subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” (citing Bennett v. United States, 102 F.3d 486, 488 n. 1 (11th Cir.1996)); Bennett, 102 F.3d at 488 (“Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a vehicle for the dismissal of actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless, where—as here—the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is inextricably intertwined with material facts affecting the merits of the claim, a district court must be guided by the standard for summary judgment motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). Because, the analysis of this Defendant's immunity...