Harris v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: Before LIACOS; LIACOS
• Citation: Harris v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 542 N.E.2d 261, 405 Mass. 515 (Mass. 1989)
• Decision Date: 08 August 1989
• Parties: , 55 Ed. Law Rep. 247 Erwin D. HARRIS v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE COLLEGES et al. 1

Page 261

542 N.E.2d 261

405 Mass. 515, 55 Ed. Law Rep. 247

Erwin D. HARRIS v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF STATE COLLEGES et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 8, 1989.

Decided Aug. 8, 1989.

Larry Engelstein, for plaintiff.

Morris M. Goldings (Richard S. Jacobs, Boston, with him), for defendants.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, a tenured professor at Bridgewater State College, brought a complaint alleging that the defendants dismissed him in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law and to free speech. He alleged further that his employment as a tenured professor at a public institution was terminated without just cause, and in violation of his employment contract. A judge of the Superior Court dismissed all but the plaintiff's contract claim. The plaintiff appealed and we transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

We summarize the relevant procedural history. On May 27, 1976, the plaintiff, a physics professor on the Bridgewater State College faculty, received a letter notifying him of certain charges against him. ² The letter informed him that on June 8, 1976, a hearing would be held before the faculty status committee (FSC) of the college to determine whether the plaintiff should be dismissed as a faculty member. ³

Prior to June 8, 1976, the plaintiff requested a continuance so that he could have more time to prepare a defense and because the attorney of his choice was not available. This request was denied. The FSC, composed of tenured professors from the faculty and representatives of the college administration, held the hearing on June 8 and 9, 1976. The plaintiff was present. The college presented fifteen witnesses. The plaintiff declined to cross-examine any of them or present his own evidence. The twelve-member FSC unanimously voted on June 9 to recommend that the plaintiff be removed from his tenured position. On June 10, 1976, with the FSC recommendation before it, but without transcripts or findings, the board of trustees of the State Colleges of the Commonwealth (board) voted to accept the recommendations of the FSC. The board notified the plaintiff on that date that he could appeal the decision to the personnel committee of the board, which would hold a full hearing at the plaintiff's request. The committee, composed of members of the board, held eight days of hearings from August 17, 1976, to June 24, 1977. This proceeding was treated as an appeal, and the burden of proof was placed on the plaintiff, who, with the benefit of counsel, presented forty-five witnesses and four affiants. The college did not call any witnesses, but put in evidence the transcript and exhibits from the FSC hearing. The personnel committee recommended to the board that the appeal be denied, which recommendation the board accepted.

The plaintiff commenced this action for declaratory relief on December 5, 1977, claiming a violation of due process. On January 31, 1980, the plaintiff amended his complaint, adding claims for violations of free speech and due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a claim for breach of contract. On March 1, 1984, the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment, both of which were denied. The plaintiff moved for a trial or evidentiary hearing. ⁴ In November, 1986, the judge entered judgment for the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim (see note 7, infra ) and dismissed the plaintiff's constitutional claims.

1. Standard of Review.

The judge treated the plaintiff's entire cause of action as a request for review under G.L. c. 30A (1988 ed.), the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), citing § 14 of the APA as authority allowing for a review of the plaintiff's constitutional claims.

Although the judge's review of the State law claims under G.L. c. 30A was proper, his reformulation of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims into a c. 30A review request was erroneous. As to the § 1983 claims, if the plaintiff had brought his cause of action in a Federal court, he would have been entitled to de novo consideration of his Federal claims. Holley v. Seminole County School Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1501-1502 (11th Cir.1985). The plaintiff's decision to sue in State court does not deprive him of the Federal law which governs § 1983 actions. While State courts have concurrent jurisdiction in § 1983 actions, Federal law applies. Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 374 Mass. 475, 484-485 n. 8, 373 N.E.2d 1128 (1978). Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2507-2508 n. 12, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980).

Despite the judge's error as to the § 1983 claims, we may resolve the questions of law which are presented by the case. The plaintiff submitted to the judge a statement of material facts for trial and an offer of proof. We view the proposed evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, in order to determine whether a reasonable fact finder could find for the plaintiff. See von Henneberg v. Generazio, 403 Mass. 519, 520, 531 N.E.2d 563 (1988). See also Alholm v. Wareham, 371 Mass. 621, 623, 358 N.E.2d 788 (1976); P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 14, 46 (1981 & 1985 Supp.).

2. Due Process Claims.

The plaintiff claims that the procedure utilized by the college deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree.

As an initial matter, we observe that the college's grant of tenure to the plaintiff, which included in its terms that he could be dismissed only for "just cause," created a constitutionally protected property right in his continued employment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-539, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-1492, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-578, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2708-2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The plaintiff contends that neither the pretermination nor posttermination proceedings satisfied the requirements of due process.

a. Pretermination.

The Supreme Court, in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, supra 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, set forth the minimum due process required prior to the termination of a tenured public employee: "The essential requirements of due process ... are notice and an opportunity to respond.... The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story." This process can be " 'something less' than a full evidentiary hearing" and it "need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions...." Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The Court based its holding on the assumption that postdeprivation hearings would be available to the individual whose employment had been terminated. Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.

The hearing before the FSC satisfied the requirements of Loudermill. The notice given to the plaintiff provided him with an adequate opportunity to respond. The plaintiff was made aware of the charges against him, was given details as to the factual basis of the charges, and was given an opportunity to respond to the charges and to cross-examination witnesses. The FSC acted within its discretion in refusing to grant the plaintiff's request for a continuance. ⁵ We conclude that the full hearing before the FSC provided the plaintiff with all of the pretermination process to which he was entitled. See Riggins v. Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 790 F.2d 707, 710-711 (8th Cir.1986). Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 836 (1st Cir.1985). ⁶

b. Posttermination.

The plaintiff also challenges the posttermination process which he received. ⁷ While the required process may vary according to the nature of each case, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), a number of Federal circuit courts have agreed on certain safeguards that together ensure due process in cases involving the termination of a tenured individual's employment. They are "(1) clear and actual notice of the reasons for termination in sufficient detail to enable him or her to present evidence relating to them; (2) notice of both the names of those who have made allegations against the teacher and the specific nature and factual basis for the charges; (3) a reasonable time and opportunity to present testimony in his or her own defense; and (4) a hearing before an impartial board or tribunal." Riggins v. Regents of the Univ. of Neb., supra at 712. See Rosewitz v. Latting, supra at 177; Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir.1970).

The plaintiff, at the time of the posttermination hearing before the personnel committee of the board, had been apprised of the details behind the charges against him, of the witnesses against him, and had been given a reasonable time and opportunity to present his own defense.

The plaintiff claims that the personnel committee was not impartial because it was reviewing its own previous decision to dismiss the plaintiff. A similar claim of bias was rejected in Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 780 n. 12 (9th Cir.1982). See Brasslett v. Cota, supra at 837. There has been no additional showing of actual bias to support a claim of lack of impartiality. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 491-494, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 2313-2314, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 54-55, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 1468, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); Brasslett v. Cota, supra.

Additionally, it was not constitutionally improper to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff at his appeal before the personnel committee. See Vanelli v. Reynolds School Dist. No. 7, supra. See also Chung v....