Harris v. Chicago Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 09 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1-90-2146,1-90-2146
• Citation: 176 Ill.Dec. 313,235 Ill.App.3d 276,601 N.E.2d 1011
• Parties: , 176 Ill.Dec. 313 Dennis HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, A Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1011

601 N.E.2d 1011

235 Ill.App.3d 276, 176 Ill.Dec. 313

Dennis HARRIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, A Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-90-2146.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Third Division.

Sept. 9, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 1992.

Steven B. Salk, Steven B. Salk & Assos., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago (H. Patrick Morris, Robert M. Burke, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Justice TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

This case addresses the scope and application of the "fireman's rule" in Illinois. Plaintiff, Dennis Harris, filed a one-count complaint against defendant, the Chicago Housing Authority, for personal injuries sustained while responding to a fire at a building owned and operated by the defendant. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that the cause of action was barred by the "fireman's rule." Plaintiff appeals the dismissal on the premise that the fireman's rule does not encompass the specific circumstances which caused his injuries.

Plaintiff, Dennis Harris, is a Chicago firefighter. On January 31, 1989, Harris suffered severe and permanent injuries while responding to a fire at the Robert Taylor Homes, a high-rise housing project, owned and operated by defendant. The fire occurred on the fourth- floor level of the building. When plaintiff and other firemen attempted to connect fire hoses to standpipes on the fourth floor, no water pressure was to be found. Similar attempts on other floors also proved to be futile. None of the standpipes functioned properly, so as to produce any water.

Plaintiff alleged in his original complaint that defendant failed to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition by failing to provide functional standpipes and failing to inspect such standpipes. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating how the lack of functional standpipes directly caused plaintiff's injuries. In response, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint which explained how, as a result of the dysfunctional standpipes, a continuous buildup of heat and gasses produced an explosion, which injured plaintiff where he was working on the fourth floor. The amended complaint also alleged wilful conduct by defendant in failing to provide working standpipes and in violating city ordinances requiring appropriate fire safety equipment.

In its motion to dismiss, defendant also argued that the "fireman's rule" barred any cause of action by the plaintiff fireman. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial judge, the Honorable Dean J. Sodaro, relying upon the case of Washington v. Atlantic Richfield (1977), 66 Ill.2d 103, 5 Ill.Dec. 143, 361 N.E.2d 282, granted defendant's motion and dismissed the amended complaint. The trial court reasoned that under the "fireman's rule" a fireman can only recover where his injuries are caused by an act of negligence which is independent of the negligence which caused the fire itself. Judge Sodaro stated that the "explosion" was a "natural consequence of the fire itself" and not the result of an independent act of negligence. Judge Sodaro hypothesized that plaintiff would have had a cause of action, if, for example, a wall or stairwell had collapsed on plaintiff during the fire or if the standpipes had fallen on plaintiff because they had been negligently maintained by the property owner.

Plaintiff appeals this decision, arguing that the failure of defendant to maintain operable standpipes, was an act of negligence, independent of whatever negligence caused the fire. Further, plaintiff argues that this independent act of negligence produced an explosion and since it was this explosion which injured plaintiff, as opposed to the fire itself, defendant may be held liable.

In considering the trial court's dismissal of a complaint, the standard of review is de novo. We must determine whether the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, alleges facts sufficient to establish a cause of action for which relief may be granted and all well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. Walker v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill.2d 543, 3 Ill.Dec. 703, 359 N.E.2d 113.

The seminal Illinois Supreme Court case on this issue is Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881. In Dini, a fireman was injured in a hotel fire, wherein there were multiple municipal code violations, including the absence of fire extinguishers and fire doors. In addition, a stairway, which collapsed on the plaintiff, was found to be negligently constructed. Benzene was later found stored in close proximity to the stairwell, which may have also caused the stairwell to collapse on the plaintiff. The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant hotel, notwithstanding the jury's verdict awarding damages to the fireman. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding that there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant had violated fire equipment ordinances and that these violations proximately caused the injuries of the plaintiff fireman. The court quoted from another case:

"We have in this case a direct violation of ordinances which were enacted for the benefit of fireman as well as guests in the hotel; at least firemen entering into the premises had a right to assume that the law in this particular had been complied with." Dini, 170 N.E.2d at 887, quoting from Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp. (1937), 274 N.Y. 106, 8 N.E.2d 296.

The Illinois Supreme Court reexamined and more precisely defined the "fireman's rule" 17 years later in Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1977), 66 Ill.2d 103, 5 Ill.Dec. 143, 361 N.E.2d 282, wherein the court stated:

"We therefore hold that while a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to maintain his property so as to prevent injury occurring to a fireman from a cause independent of the fire, he is not liable for negligence in causing the fire itself." Washington, 5 Ill.Dec. at 146, 361 N.E.2d at 285.

Both Justices Clark and Dooley dissented from the majority opinion,...