Harris v. City of Balch Springs

• Decision Date: 28 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–2307–L.
• Citation: 9 F.Supp.3d 690
• Parties: Charla HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF BALCH SPRINGS, William Edward Morris, Verlyn Z. Smith, Julie B. Greer, Charlene Rushing, and Karen E. Gray, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

9 F.Supp.3d 690

Charla HARRIS, Plaintiff

v.CITY OF BALCH SPRINGS, William Edward Morris, Verlyn Z. Smith, Julie B. Greer, Charlene Rushing, and Karen E. Gray, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–2307–L.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed March 28, 2014.

John Henry Crouch, IV, Theodore Carl Anderson, III, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Thomas P. Brandt, John D. Husted, Joshua A. Skinner, Fanning Harper Martinson Brandt & Kutchin PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SAM A. LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, filed November 5, 2012. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, supplements, hearing and applicable law, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.

I. Background

Charla Harris (“Plaintiff” or “Harris”) filed this action originally in the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, on August 11, 2011, against the City of Balch Springs (“Balch Springs” or the “City”); City Manager William Edward Morris (“Morris”); and Balch Springs City Council Members Verlyn Smith, Julie B. Greer, Charlene Rushing, and Karen E. Gray (collectively, the “Council Members”), all of whom are collectively referred to as “Defendants.” As a result of motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Smith, Greer, Rushing, Gray, and Morris, the court on September 30, 2012, 2012 WL 4512490, dismissed some of Plaintiff's claims and directed her to replead claims that did not meet the federal pleading standard. Harris filed Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) on October 19, 2012.

In her first claim, Harris brings suit for the alleged breach of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”). Harris contends that Balch Springs breached the Agreement by: (1) allowing Morris to retaliate against her after she had filed an EEOC charge; (2) allowing Morris to fire her without authorization from the City Council; (3) failing to create a clear and effective line of communication between the City Manager's Office and the Balch Springs Recreation Center; (4) failing to restore full management authority of the Balch Springs Recreation Center to her; (5) failing to participate in good faith in the implementation of a job growth plan between her and Sam Allen; (6) failing to publish a written policy dealing with the handling of cash transactions for all City departments; and (7) firing her and removing her from management of the Recreation Center. Finally, with respect to this claim, Harris contends that the City, by refusing to allow an appeal of Morris's actions, ratified his conduct.

In her second claim, Harris contends that all Defendants deprived her of a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because she was not provided a name-clearing hearing regarding allegedly stigmatizing statements that were made in conjunction or connection with her termination from the City. At times, Plaintiff appears to suggest that she was procedurally and substantively deprived of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court, however, explicitly held previously in its Memorandum Opinion and Order of September 30, 2012, that Plaintiff was not deprived of any procedural or substantive due process rights regarding an alleged property interest. Accordingly, notwithstanding the allegations of the Complaint, the court will not address any purported claims of a procedural or substantive due process violation regarding any alleged property interest, as these claims have been definitively decided. Likewise, to the extent that the Complaint asserts, or attempts to assert, that Morris did not have the authority to terminate Harris, such issue has been previously resolved by the court and will not be revisited.

Plaintiff's third claim is a statutory claim of discrimination. Harris contends that the City, Morris, and Rushing deprived her of her rights and discriminated against her on account of her race (black) in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. In this claim, Harris contends that these “Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of her right to make, enforce, perform and terminate contracts and to full and equal benefits of regulations and of all laws and proceedings of the security of Plaintiff's employment because of Plaintiff's race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 18, ¶ 7.02.

Harris's fourth claim is an association discrimination claim against Morris and the City brought under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this claim, Harris contends that the City and Morris deprived her of her right to associate freely and exercise her political rights during her private time while not on duty for the City. From what the court can ascertain, this claim appears to find its origin in Harris's belief that Morris and the City were opposed to her working on former Mayor Cedric Davis's reelection campaign. According to Plaintiff, Morris was opposed to the re-election of Davis because he believed Davis would seek to have him removed as City Manager.

Plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims are for race discrimination and retaliation. Her fifth claim is brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Harris contends that her discharge from the City was based on her race and that the City retaliated against her for having filed an earlier EEOC charge of discrimination. Harris's sixth and final claim is brought under state law, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), and closely parallels her Title VII claim. Plaintiff's fifth and sixth claims are brought only against the City.

In their motion for partial dismissal, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's stigma-plus claim should be dismissed with prejudice as to all of them because Harris has failed to plead a sufficient factual basis for her conclusory claim that stigmatizing statements were published in connection with her termination. The Individual Defendants contend that they are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's stigma-plus claim because (1) none of them was Plaintiff's employer and (2) she has failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut their entitlement to qualified immunity.

With respect to Plaintiff's section 1981 claim, Defendants Morris and Rushing contend that it should be dismissed against them because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Likewise, Morris contends that Plaintiff's First Amendment association discrimination claim brought pursuant to section 1983 should be dismissed against him because he is entitled to qualified immunity. The City contends that Plaintiff's section 1983 association discrimination claim against it should be dismissed because she has not alleged that any alleged actions taken against her based on her alleged political associations were the result of a policy, custom, or practice of the City.

Finally, the City contends that Plaintiff's request for punitive or exemplary damages against it should be dismissed because punitive damages, as a matter of law, are not recoverable against a governmental entity. The City also contends that Plaintiff's “official capacity” claims should be dismissed because they are redundant or duplicative of her claims against the City.

Harris counters that she has properly pleaded her claims in the Complaint and that the motion for partial dismissal should be denied so that discovery in this case can finally proceed. Plaintiff contends that her amended pleading offers details of racist behavior and conscious indifference to her efforts to clear her name, that she has set forth facts to show that the Individual Defendants violated clearly established constitutional and statutory rights, and that the Individual Defendants are therefore not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Further, Plaintiff contends that she has offered sufficient factual details to support her claim of First Amendment association discrimination. Plaintiff requests the court to deny the motion for partial dismissal, require the Defendants to answer the Complaint, and allow the parties to proceed with discovery.

II. Standards

A. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure to State a Claim

To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir.2008) ; Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.2007). A claim meets the plausibility test “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). The “[f]actual allegations of [a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). When the allegations of the pleading do not allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of wrongdoing, they fall short of showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iq...