Harris v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 14 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 07-cv-3982. |
| Parties | Donnell HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Anthony F. Fata, Dominic J. Rizzi, Jennifer Winter Sprengel, Cafferty Faucher LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Valerie Depies Harper, Jennifer C. Addison, Marcela D. Sanchez, City of Chicago, Law Department, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
Plaintiff, Donnell Harris ("Plaintiff" or "Harris"), was discharged from his employment with the Defendant City of Chicago ("Defendant" or "City"), purportedly for violating the City's Personnel Rules and Ethics Ordinance. On November 6, 2008, Plaintiff filed an eighteen-count second amended complaint [113] based on the City's investigation of Plaintiff and its resulting decision to terminate of his employment. Plaintiff alleges retaliatory discharge in violation of the First Amendment, the Illinois Constitution, and public policy (Counts I and XIII); violations of due process (Counts II-IV); violation of his equal protection rights (Count V); conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") (Count VI); race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (Count VII); various breaches of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the City and State and Municipal Chauffeurs and Helpers Union Local 726 (Counts VIII-X); breach of contract (Count XII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count XIV); negligence and gross negligence (Counts XV-XVI); and violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") (Count XVIII).1 Plaintiff also seeks a declaratory judgment that the City violated the CBA (Count XI) and a common law writ of certiorari review of the Human Resources Board's decision upholding Plaintiffs termination (Count XVII).
This matter is before the Court on the City's motion for summary judgment [143]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Counts VI, VII, and the Section 1983 claims set forth in Counts I through V of Plaintiff's second amended complaint. In view of that disposition, which results in the dismissal of all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, Plaintiff's state law claims—the state constitutional claims set forth in Counts I through V and Counts VIII through XVII of his second amended complaint—are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the "usual practice" in the Seventh Circuit when "all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial." Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir.1999).2
On December 12, 2006, the City terminated Plaintiff's employment as a street sweeper for the City's Department of Streets and Sanitation ("DSS"). Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against the City of Chicago on February 16, 2007, alleging that his discharge constituted race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff also appealed his discharge to the Human Resources Board of the City of Chicago (the "HR Board"). On August 21, 2007, after holding a hearing on the matter, the HR Board upheld Plaintiff's termination.
On July 16, 2007, Plaintiff initiated the instant suit by filing a pro se complaint against the City. Two months later, on September 6, 2007, Plaintiff filed an action for a writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Cook County, challenging the decision of HR Board upholding his termination. With the assistance of appointed counsel, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 8, 2008. The City moved to dismiss Plaintiff's first amended complaint. On June 30, 2008, 2008 WL 2622830, this Court granted in part and denied in part the City's motion, dismissing Plaintiff's ADEA claim for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies [77]. This Court also denied Plaintiff's subsequent motion for leave to retain the ADEA claim [111].
On April 14, 2008, Plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint to add his common law writ of certiorari claim; the Court granted that motion on May 21, 2008. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on November 6, 2008 [113]. The City's motion for summary judgment is directed against that complaint.
The Court takes the relevant facts primarily from the parties' Local Rule ("L.R.") 56.1 statements3: Defendant's Statement of Facts ("Def. SOF") [145] Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's L.R. 56.1 Statement and Statement of Additional Facts ("Pl. SOF") [161], and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Facts ("Def. Resp.") [170].4
Plaintiff first was employed by the City as a seasonal motor truck driver in 1996. Def. SOF ¶ 2. In June 1998, the City hired Plaintiff as a full-time motor truck driver for the Department of Streets and Sanitation ("DSS"). Def. SOF ¶ 2. While he was employed by the City, Plaintiff was a member of the State & Municipal Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union Local 726, which has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City of Chicago. Def. SOF ¶ 67.
The City of Chicago has promulgated various Personnel Rules. Personnel Rule XVIII governs disciplinary actions and procedures for career service employees. Section 1 of Personnel Rule XVIII provides that certain conduct, "when engaged in by an employee, will result in disciplinary action which may include discharge." Def. SOF ¶ 10. The prohibited conduct includes: "(6) Failing to disclose any information requested or providing a false or misleading answer to any question in any application, questionnaire, information form or other document provided by the City"; "(8) Making false, inaccurate or deliberately incomplete statements in an official inquiry, investigation or other official proceeding"; "(15) Engaging in any act or conduct prohibited by the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago, the Illinois Compiled Statutes, applicable laws of other states, or federal statutes"; "(31) Using the office, work site, work locations, work vehicle, work tools or work materials and supplies to conduct a secondary business, trade or occupation"; "(43) Failure to comply with the requirements of secondary employment as delineated in Personnel Rule XX, Section 3"; "(45) Any act or conduct in violation of, or failing to perform any duty required by, the Ethics Ordinance, Chapter 2-156 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, as amended"; and "(50) Conduct unbecoming any officer or public employee." Def. SOF ¶ 10.
Personnel Rule XX, Section 3 relates to outside employment, which is defined as "any paid employment performed by an employee in addition to his or her employment with the City." The rule also requires "[a]ny employee desiring to perform outside employment [to] first file a request in writing with her or his department head for permission to engage in outside employment."
The Ethics Ordinance, which appears at Section 2-156-110 of the Chicago Municipal Code, provides, in relevant part, that: "no elected official or employee shall have a financial interest in his own name or in the name of any other person in any contract, work or business of the city." See Def. SOF ¶ 8; Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 2-156-110. The Municipal Code expressly excludes from the definition of "financial interest" "any interest of the spouse or domestic partner of an official or employee which interest is related to the spouse's or domestic partner's independent occupation, profession or employment." Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 2-156-010(l).
In mid 2000, Plaintiff's wife, Gloria Harris, started a trucking company, Dean Trucking. Pl. SOF ¶ A3. Mrs. Harris was the president, sole shareholder, and sole director of Dean Trucking. Pl. SOF ¶ A3. Between 2001 and 2004, Dean Trucking did business with the City pursuant to contracts known as the Hired Truck Program. Ex. 21 to [162] at 26 (3/14/07 HR Board Tr.).
In March 2004, Dean Trucking was suspended from the Hired Trucking Program. Ex. 17 to [162] at 67. Dean Trucking was notified of the suspension by letter and signed by Bob Benson ("Benson"), Hired Truck Program Manager. Id. Some time after the suspension, Mario Esquivel ("Esquivel"), a Field Analyst in the City's Office of Budget and Management, and Benson exchanged a number of e-mails regarding Dean Trucking. Def. SOF ¶ 17-18; Pl. SOF ¶ A21, A27.5 In that e-mail chain, Esquivel referred to Plaintiff's wife as "the mother trucker," and Benson joking asked whether Plaintiff and his wife were dead. Id.
Dean Trucking stopped doing business in 2004. Pl. SOF ¶ A25.
In late March 2005, the Chicago Sun-Times published articles referencing Plaintiff and his alleged connections to Dean Trucking. Def. SOF ¶ 14. One of those articles indicated that the City Inspector General was investigating Plaintiff. Pl. SOF ¶ A30. At the time that the articles were published, Lisa Schrader held the position of public information officer in the Office of Budget and Management. Schrader Dep. at 6. At her deposition, Schrader testified that she spoke to Chicago Sun-Times reporters prior to March 2005, but that she did not recall speaking to reporters regarding Plaintiff or Dean Trucking. Schrader Dep. at 54-55.
Shortly thereafter, in April 2005, Kristopher Collins Brown ("Brown"), an investigator with the City's Inspector General's Office, was assigned to investigate Plaintiff and Dean Trucking. Def. SOF ¶ 14. The Inspector General's Office investigates the performance of governmental officers, employees, functions and programs, either in response to complaint or...
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