Harris v. Clark, No. 49948

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: THORNTON; All Justices concur, except PETERSON
• Citation: 103 N.W.2d 215,251 Iowa 807
• Decision Date: 03 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 49948
• Parties: Harry HARRIS, Appellee, v. Audrey B. CLARK, Appellant.

Page 215

103 N.W.2d 215 251 Iowa 807 Harry HARRIS, Appellee,
v.
Audrey B. CLARK, Appellant. No. 49948. Supreme Court of Iowa. May 3, 1960.

[251 Iowa 808]

Page 216

Clyde Putnam, Jr., Des Moines, and J.W. Ritchie, Indianola, for appellant.

Richard F. Stageman and Raymond E. Pogge, Council Bluffs, for appellee.

THORNTON, Justice.

This is a rear end collision case. Defendant Audrey B. Clark, driving a 1957 Ford station wagon struck the rear of the 1959 Buick owned and driven by Harry C. Harris as plaintiff stopped to allow an automobile preceding him to turn right into a private driveway. The accident occurred about 90 feet west of the west curb line of East Desmont Drive on West Pleasant Street in Knoxville about 6:30 p. m. on May 10, 1958. The street was dry and the day clear.

I. The trial court submitted Instruction No. 14 embodying sudden emergency as confronting the defendant to the jury. Plaintiff excepted to the instruction and after a verdict for the defendant moved for new trial on the grounds, among others, the emergency, if any, was of defendant's own making and such issue was not supported in the evidence. The trial court sustained the motion.

As we read its order, in part as follows, '* * * After carefully studying this case the Court has come to the conclusion that Instruction No. 14 could be prejudicial to the plaintiff, and that in the furtherance of justice a new trial should be granted.' there is no indication the court considered anything other than Instruction No. 14 as warranting a new trial. This ruling is not as clear as the ruling in Kessel v. Hunt, 215 Iowa 117, 123, 244 N.W. 714, but it presents solely a question of law. It is our duty to review the order as we would any other alleged error and to reverse if erroneous. Kessel v. Hunt, supra, and citations; In re Estate of Murray, 238 Iowa 112, 114, 26 N.W.2d 58; Thompson v. Butler, 223 Iowa 1085, 1091, 274 N.W. 110, and Piper v. Brickley, 220 Iowa 1090, 1092, 264 N.W. 29.

Plaintiff does not attempt to save the ruling by showing other grounds of the motion were good. Brandt v. Schucha, 250 Iowa ----, 96 N.W.2d 179, 181.

II. Defendant urges here for reversal there was ample evidence both of the existence of an emergency and it was not of defendant's own making.

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Striking the rear of plaintiff's car is evidence of negligence on the part of defendant. However, this does not prevent her from showing the circumstances surrounding the occurrence and if such entitles her to an instruction that she was confronted [251 Iowa 810] with a sudden emergency not of her own making it is the court's duty to instruct thereon. Miller v. Griffith, 246 Iowa 476, 482, 66 N.W.2d 505; Sanford v. Nesbit, 234 Iowa 14, 19, 11 N.W.2d 695, and Merchants Motor Freight v. Downing, 8 Cir., 227 F.2d 247.

In Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911, 916, 243 N.W. 552, 554, we said: 'By the term 'legal excuse' is meant: * * * 3. Where the driver of the car is confronted by an emergency not of his own making, and by reason thereof he fails to obey the statute. * * *'

In Young v. Hendricks, 226 Iowa 211, 215, 283 N.W. 895, 898, we said: 'An emergency has been variously defined as (1) an unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action; (2) a perplexing contingency or complication of circumstances; (3) a sudden or unexpected occasion for action; exigency; pressing necessity.'

In Mongar v. Barnard, 248 Iowa 899, 905, 82 N.W.2d 765, 769, is this statement: '* * * if defendant stopped suddenly in plaintiff's path without giving a proper signal the jury might find plaintiff was thereby confronted by an emergency not of his own making, which constituted a legal excuse for his violation of any statute defendant has invoked.'

In Cunningham v. Court, 248 Iowa 654, 664, 82 N.W.2d 292, wherein plaintiff made a left turn ahead of defendant and a collision resulted we held on conflicting testimony as to giving of signal, speed, and distance between the vehicles, the issue as to whether there was an emergency and whether defendant had met his burden to prove such existed, independent of his own fault, was for the jury.

The general rule is stated in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 252, page 1134, as follows: 'Emergency. The questions whether an emergency existed, and whether a person who was confronted with a sudden emergency exercised such care as an ordinarily prudent man would have exercised, when confronted with a like emergency ordinarily are questions of fact for the jury. The question whether one was without fault in bringing about an emergency generally is for the jury.'

[251 Iowa 811] That is the rule in this jurisdiction. Kisling v. Thierman, supra; Young v. Hendricks, supra; Mongar v. Barnard, supra; Cunningham v. Court, supra; Merchants Motor Freight v. Downing, 8 Cir., 227 F.2d 247, 252-254; Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co., 159 Iowa 52, 62-63, 140 N.W. 225; Luppes v. Harrison, 239 Iowa 880, 886, 887, 32 N.W.2d 809, and Leinen v. Boettger, 241 Iowa 910, 924-926, 44 N.W.2d 73, 81, 82.

III. The evidence is, plaintiff was following a car driven by Mrs. Shumaker and that she gave a signal of intention to make a right turn both by directional turn light and with her left arm. Plaintiff says he saw only the light signal. He says she started giving the signal with the directional turn light as she cleared the intersection. This distance was shown by measurement testimony to be 90 feet. Plaintiff testified it was 50 feet. He says his speed was 20 to 25 mph reduced to 10 mph before he stopped, and he testified, both, that he was a car length and a half maybe two car lengths, and approximately a car length behind the Shumaker car. Mrs. Shumaker says he was less than a car length or a car length and a half behind her. Plaintiff testified he started to bring his car to a slower speed when he saw the turn signal and he was giving a signal with his brake light for 30 to 35 feet. After plaintiff entered the intersection to the time he stopped he did not know where defendant's car was. Mrs. Shumaker testified the turn in her drive was difficult and it is necessary to come to a near stop.

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Defendant testified, '* * * he just suddenly stopped in front of me. I immediately applied my brakes. * * * I almost had my car stopped when the front end of my car hit the back end of his car.' She also testified, 'Q. What is the fact as to whether or not you observed Mr. Harris flashing his lights on or off for any distance before he stopped suddenly? A. I did not see it. Q. About how...