Harris v. Clinton

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Citation: Harris v. Clinton, 142 Conn. 204, 112 A.2d 885 (Conn. 1955)
• Decision Date: 22 March 1955
• Parties: William H. HARRIS et al. v. Samuel W. CLINTON et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 885

112 A.2d 885

142 Conn. 204

William H. HARRIS et al. v. Samuel W. CLINTON et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 22, 1955.

Ralph J. Lockwood, Bridgeport, and Constance B. Motley, New York City, with whom were Peter Marcuse, Waterbury, and, on the brief, Thurgood Marshall, New York City, for appellants (plaintiffs).

T. Holmes Bracken, New Haven, for appellees (defendants).

Before BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ., and BORDON, Superior Court Judge.

BORDON, Superior Court Judge.

The plaintiffs brought this action for specific performance as assignees of a written contract whereby the defendants agreed to convey a building lot in West Haven to Peter Horbick, the plaintiffs' assignor. The defendants pleaded by way of special defense that the written contract failed to state the true intent of the parties because, as an inducing consideration, Horbick had agreed orally (1) not to assign his interest in the contract to any party without securing the defendants' consent, (2) to use the stone upon the lot in question to erect a dwelling house for himself and his family, and (3) to commence construction of the house within a reasonable period of time and before title was conveyed to him. The defendants also claimed that they reduced the price of the lot in consideration of this oral agreement and that Horbick violated it and therefore forfeited his right to a conveyance.

Under a counterclaim incorporating all of the foregoing allegations of the special defense, the defendants sought reformation of the contract to make it conform to the alleged oral agreement and a rescission of it, as thus reformed, conditioned upon the return to Horbick or the plaintiffs of the $100 paid to the defendants. The cause was thereafter heard, and the court submitted several interrogatories to the jury. The court accepted the answers to the interrogatories as a verdict, denied the plaintiffs' motion to set it aside, and ordered judgment entered in accordance with the requirements of the answers to the interrogatories. The plaintiffs have appealed.

Although the assignments of error are many and varied, the deficiencies in the record make possible a consideration of but two main assignments. There are that the court erred, first, in denying the motion to set aside the answers to the interrogatories (that is, the motion to set aside the verdict) on the ground that the answers were against the law and the evidence, and, secondly, in refusing specific performance of the contract.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts: The defendants owned a real estate development in West Haven called Forest Ridge. Several substantial houses had already been built in it. In the fall of 1948, Horbick negotiated with the defendants for the purchase of a lot, designated as No. 52. It was high and rocky. Horbick, who was a sculptor and stonemason, engaged in the business of manufacturing monuments, saw the possibility of using, in the construction of a house, the stone on the lot and other stone which he could bring from his monument works. The defendants were anxious to have a house built on this lot because the area in which it was located was undeveloped and a house there would facilitate the construction of a road and help in the sale of the development. It was also important to them to have the rocky bank on the lot cut down. Horbick entered into a written contract with the defendants to buy the lot. The contract, in the form of a bond for a deed, acknowledged a down payment of $50 and contained the defendants' promise to deliver a warranty deed to the purchaser on or before December 31, 1950, upon the payment of the balance of $250. The contract contained a provision that it would not be recorded on the land records. Nevertheless, Horbick subsequently recorded it. Contemporaneously with the execution of the bond for a deed and in consideration of a reduction in the price of the lot to the $300 specified therein, Horbick orally agreed that he would use the rock on the property to build his house, that he would start construction before he received the deed for the lot, and that, until he had the deed, he would not transfer the lot to anybody without the defendants' approval. The written provision that the bond for a deed would not be recorded was to prevent Horbick from conveying the lot until he had fulfilled the oral agreement. During May, 1949, Horbick decided not to build, and on June 8 he entered into a contract with the plaintiffs, who are well-educated and cultured Negroes, to sell the lot for $600. On June 15, upon the payment of a balance of $500, Horbick quitclaimed to the plaintiffs the lot and his rights under the bond for a deed and sent a certified check to the defendants for the balance due on his agreement with them. This check was refused by the defendants, who then tendered to Horbick the $100 he had already paid on account, which he refused to accept.

At the trial, the questions of the existence of a contemporaneous oral agreement, its terms, and the reason for the defendants' refusal to convey to the plaintiffs were submitted to the jury upon interrogatories agreed upon by counsel for both parties. These interrogatories and the answers are set forth in a footnote. ¹ The jury found that there was a contemporaneous agreement as claimed by the defendants and that their refusal to convey to the plaintiffs was not due solely to the fact that the plaintiffs were Negroes. The plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict because the answers to the interrogatories were against the law and the evidence. The trial court denied their motion and granted the defendants' motion to enter judgment on the verdict. The correctness of this ruling is decisive of the appeal.

In an appeal claiming error in the denial of a motion to set aside a verdict it must be assumed, unless questioned, that the charge was correct in law and adequate. Efland v. Guyott Construction Co., 138 Conn. 183, 186, 82 A.2d 925. A verdict of a jury prevails unless unsupported by the evidence; Dupuis v. Dupuis, 100 Conn. 96, 99, 122 A. 904; or unless it is so palpably against the evidence as to indicate prejudice, partiality, corruption, confusion or lack of understanding of the issues by the jury. Orsillo v. Russo, 113 Conn. 727, 729, 156 A. 862; Levy v. Bromberg, 108 Conn. 202, 204, 142 A. 836; State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 704, 139 A. 91. The conclusion of a jury on issues of fact, if it is one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently could arrive reasonably, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial court and this court might be that a different result should have been reached. The credibility of each witness and the weight to be accorded to his testimony is for the jury, and the evidence must be given the most favorable construction of which it is reasonably capable. Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 464, 11 A.2d 846; Lisa v. Yale University, 122 Conn. 646, 648, 191 A. 346; Toth v. Perry, 120 Conn. 680, 681, 182 A. 464; Anderson v. Colucci, 119 Conn. 241, 244, 175 A. 681. Moreover, the decision of the trial court in refusing to set the verdict aside is entitled to great weight. Scarcello v. Town Greenwich, 127 Conn. 464, 467, 17 A.2d 523; Amellin v. Leone, 114 Conn. 478, 479, 159 A. 293.

At the first trial of this case, a single issue was submitted to the jury upon an interrogatory approved by counsel for both the plaintiffs and the defendants. Harris v. Clinton, 138 Conn. 657, 660, 88 A.2d 542. The issue was whether there was between the parties an oral agreement in addition to a bond for a deed. By their special verdict on that occasion the jury answered Yes. Upon appeal to this court, we held (p. 661) that the lack of any statement in the interrogatory as to the time when the understanding referred to therein wa reached rendered the jury's answer valueless and of no significance in the determination of the case.

It is a well-established principle that when parties have merged all prior negotiations and agreements in a writing, intending to make that the repository of their final understanding, evidence of such prior negotiations and agreements will not be received to vary or add to the writing. If, however, it appears that a collateral agreement not contained in the written agreement was entered into contemporaneously therewith, it may be proved by parol. The admission of parol evidence in such a case does not contravene the parol evidence rule. The fundamental question is one of the intent of the parties. If they intended the writing to be the repository of their final agreement, parol evidence is not admissible. If, however, it appears that the parties...