Harris v. Cmich
| Decision Date | 02 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-3314,85-3314 |
| Citation | 798 F.2d 1414 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Geraldine HARRIS, Willie G. Harris, Bernadette Harris, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Stanley CMICH, et al., Defendants, City of Canton Ohio, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before LIVELY, MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges.
The City of Canton appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict finding the City liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for causing Geraldine Harris to be denied medical care while incarcerated.
Mrs. Harris, a fifty-two-year-old black woman, was driving her teenage daughter to school when she was stopped by a Canton police officer for speeding. The police officer ultimately arrested her because, as he claimed, she became uncontrollably upset and uncooperative. Mrs. Harris was put into a patrol wagon by two officers who arrived to transport her to the police station. She testified that she was pushed and thrown about violently, and jabbed in her ribs. The officers said a minimal amount of force was used and that Mrs. Harris was lifted and placed in the vehicle because she could not or would not walk on her own.
When the vehicle's door was opened at the station, the shift commander, Captain Maxson, was present. He had been notified by the officers of a possible need for his presence. He testified that Mrs. Harris "was just lying there," which was unusual because "I don't know of anybody that rides in a wagon on the floor." Captain Maxson thought Mrs. Harris might need medical attention, and asked her if she needed a doctor or medication. She did not respond to the question, but asked incoherently about a person named "Ronnie." No medical care was ordered.
During booking, Mrs. Harris was standing against a wall when she suddenly slumped to the floor. Officers helped her into a chair, but Harris slumped to the floor again. She was put back in the chair, but again fell. Captain Maxson testified that Mrs. Harris was left on the floor for a short time, up to ten minutes, to avoid further falls. He explained that emotional behavior is common upon incarceration, and that he and officer John Daianu believed that Mrs. Harris was merely excited and would calm down if left alone and permitted to see her family, as most arrestees do. The City argued at trial that she chose to slump each time and was fully conscious and aware of her actions.
Captain Maxson testified that after a few minutes in Booking, Mrs. Harris was taken to a cell. She testified that while she was incarcerated, she was twice taken from her cell for searches of her person. After bond procedures were completed, Mrs. Harris was released at about 9:00 a.m., having been at the city jail for about 30 to 40 minutes. A little more than an hour had elapsed since she was stopped while driving.
Mrs. Harris's family had her taken to Timken Mercy Hospital by ambulance from the jail. Mrs. Harris was hospitalized for one week. She was diagnosed as suffering from gross stress reaction, anxiety and depression, with symptoms including immobility and respiratory difficulty. Psychiatric therapy was necessary periodically for more than a year.
Mrs. Harris, together with her husband and daughter, brought a civil action against the police officers, city officials and the City of Canton under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983, 1985-86, and the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. She claimed the following constitutional violations: unlawful seizure, cruel and unusual punishment, deprivation of liberty and physical well-being without due process, failure to provide equal protection of the law due to race, and unlawful search. In addition to these federal constitutional violations, Mrs. Harris claimed false imprisonment, assault and battery under state law. The complaint also charged the police with assaulting and battering the teenage daughter who was a passenger in the car with her.
Damages were based on physical and emotional injuries, pain and suffering, treatment expenses, loss of services to Mr. Harris, exemplary damages, and legal costs and fees. Compensatory damages of one million dollars and exemplary damages of two million were sought. In addition, plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief in regard to the police policies and practices. The suit was dismissed due to untimely filing under the applicable Ohio statute of limitations, but on appeal the Harrises prevailed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Harris v. City of Canton, 725 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1984).
A jury trial was held. In addition to the testimony described above, there WAR evidence presented as to the policies of the Canton police department in regard to medical treatment for prisoners. Section 334.7 of the Canton Police Regulations provides as follows:
He [the jailer] shall, when a prisoner is found unconscious or semi-conscious, or when he or she is unable to explain his or her condition, or who complains of being ill, have such person taken to a hospital for medical treatment, with permission of his supervisor before admitting the person to the City Jail.
Former police Chief Wyatt testified to the department's usual practice for implementing section 334.7. He stated that shift commanders are authorized to make medical decisions under section 334.7 in their sole discretion based on personal observations. In the face of this grant of discretion, there was no evidence offered that the City provided.any training or instructions to shift commanders, other than minimal first aid instruction, to prepare them for making such determinations.
At the close of the evidence, the court denied the defendants' motion for directed verdict. The jury rejected aH the Harrises' claims except one: the jury found that Mrs. Harris was unreasonably denied medical attention while incarcerated at the city jail, and it awarded her $200,000 against the City of Canton. The court denied the city's motion for remittitur, new trial, or judgment n.o.v., and this appeal followed.
The City raises numerous issues, including the insufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence to raise a jury question on her claim of deprivation of medical attention, and improper instructions to the jury on Harris's theories of municipal liability.
In regard to her claim of an unconstitutional deprivation of medical care, see Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir.1976), Mrs. Harris contended that given her obvious signs of anxiety, hyperventilation and loss of ambulatory function, the officers should have referred her for medical care. She said that Maxson never even took her pulse in order to determine whether she needed care. Furthermore, she testified that the officers laughed at her and ridiculed her. Harris based municipal liability for the deprivation of medical care on two theories:(1) inadequate training by the City of its police officers, which proximately caused the deprivation; and (2) the participation of supervisory personnel in the deprivation.
Where a municipality has wholly failed to train or has been grossly negligent in training its police force, it may be concluded that there was a municipal custom that allowed or condoned certain violations of constitutional rights by police. E.g., Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir.1985), vacated, 105 S.Ct. 3518 (1985), reinstated on remand, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir.1985); 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982). To succeed in a claim that a municipality is liable for failure to train its police force, the plaintiff must prove that the municipality acted recklessly, intentionally, or with gross negligence. See Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d at 872 (6th Cir. 1982) (). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality's inadequate training of its officers was causally connected to the deprivation, which means proving that the lack of training was so reckless or grossly negligent that deprivations of persons' constitutional rights were substantially certain to result. Rymer, 754 F.2d at 201.
Harris's theory of grossly inadequate training was based on the fact that the police had an established policy of allowing shift commanders unfettered discretion under rule 334.7 to make the decision to refer a prisoner to the hospital based on their personal judgment and perceptions, coupled with the fact that these commanders were given no training or guidelines for making this decision. The former police chief testified to the discretion in decision-making, and the city could not show any evidence of adequate training. Mrs. Harris's evidence on these two facts thus raised a valid jury issue of municipality liability under Rymers and Hays for grossly negligent failure to train. The...
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