Harris v. Com., Secretary of Educ.
| Decision Date | 25 April 1977 |
| Citation | 372 A.2d 953,29 Pa.Cmwlth. 625 |
| Parties | Orville HARRIS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, Appellee, School District of Philadelphia, Intervening Appellee. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Argued Dec. 9, 1976.
Robert M. Rowlands, Havertown, for appellant.
Edward A. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Ed., Harrisburg, for appellee.
Robert T. Lear, Philadelphia, for intervening appellee.
Before CRUMLISH, Jr., and MENCER and BLATT JJ.
Orville Harris (Appellant) appeals from a decision of the Secretary of Education which affirmed his dismissal as a professional employee of the School District of Philadelphia (Philadelphia) by its Board of Public Education (Board).
Appellant instituted this appeal pursuant to Section 1132 of the Public School Code of 1949 (Code), Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30 As amended, 24 P.S. § 11--1132. Appeal was taken prior to the amendment of Section 1132 which now places appeals under the Administrtive Agency Law. [1] Pursuant to the Code then in effect, Appellant had the right to request a trial de novo before this Court and, upon his request, the trial was held on October 20, 1975.
Although the record of the proceedings before the Board and Secretary of Education was received into evidence by this Court, the following findings of fact are based solely upon the testimony, evidence and documents presented to this Court on October 20, 1975. [2] Based on the foregoing we enter the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
1. At all times relevant hereto Appellant was a tenured professional employee of Philadelphia within the meaning of Section 1101 et seq. of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11--1101 et seq.
2. At all times relevant hereto, Philadelphia had a valid regulation forbidding teachers to administer corporal punishment to students.
3. Appellant had actual knowledge of the regulations of Philadelphia forbidding teachers' use of corporal punishment.
4. In September of 1970, while teaching at the M. H. Stanton School, Appellant administered corporal punishment to one Gregory Davis, a fourth grader.
5. In October of 1970, Appellant administered corporal punishment to one Derek Burnside, a sixth grader, a student at the M. H Stanton School.
6. As a direct result of these incidents, Appellant was transferred to the McKinley School. At a conference with supervisory personnel prior to transfer, Appellant was specifically warned that any further administration of corporal punishment would result in his dismissal.
7. In September, 1971, Appellant was accused by a parent of administering corporal punishment to his child, one Sammy Vargas, a student at the McKinley School. We cannot find that Appellant administered corporal punishment to Sammy Vargas.
8. When the parent of Sammy Vargas attempted to discuss this matter with Appellant, he sought to have the parent arrested.
9. At all times relevant hereto, Philadelphia had a policy forbidding the punishment of students through isolation without supervision.
10. Appellant isolated two or three students of the McKinley School in a storage room without proper supervision. Appellant was involved in an altercation with a faculty member who discovered these students isolated in the storage room.
11. As a result of the events set forth in Findings 7, 8 and 10, Appellant was suspended on September 17, 1971.
12. On March 21, 1972, Appellant was formally informed of the commencement of proceedings for his dismissal. The Board alleged the events listed above, together with other incidents, and concluded:
13. The Board held hearings on April 4, 1972, April 12, 1972, May 18, 1972, and on June 27, 1972. On September 11, 1972, the Board voted unanimously to dismiss Appellant from his job with Philadelphia.
14. Following a hearing, on December 31, 1973, the Secretary of Education sustained the dismissal of Appellant on the grounds of persistent and willful violation of the school laws.
1. The administration of corporal punishment to Gregory Davis and Derek Burnside was a violation of the regulations of Philadelphia.
2. The isolation of two or three students without proper supervision was a violation of the regulations of Philadelphia.
3. The violations of the regulations of Philadelphia were persistent and willful violations of the school laws of the Commonwealth as they are defined in Section 1122 of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11--1122.
4. Pursuant to Section 1122 of the Code, 24 P.S. § 11--1122, Appellant is dismissed as a professional employee of the School District of Philadelphia.
Based upon the above findings of fact, this Court finds that the events set forth in Findings 4, 5 and 10 above were persistent and willful violations of the school laws [3] and affirms the dismissal of Appellant from his job as a professional employee of the School District of Philadelphia.
Philadelphia has had a long standing rule forbidding a teacher to administer corporal punishment. In 1955 Philadelphia promulgated 'Administrative Bulletin 22, 22A and 22B' (Bulletin) signed by the then-superintendent of school entitled 'Discipline for Constructive Citizenship'. Bulletin 22A, directed at teachers, stated at III A 4(e): . Administrative Bulletin 22B reserves the right to school principals to inflict corporal punishment. This rule is periodically brought to the attention of teachers and there can be no doubt that Appellant was aware of it. Although no evidence was produced before this Court to show that this resolution was ever adopted by the Board, minutes were introduced showing that it had been put before the Board. The Board regards the Bulletin as a validly promulgated regulation, as is demonstrated by its proposal to amend the Bulletin in March of 1971.
Appellant claims that the Bulletin was overruled by the Board on March 29, 1971, when it adopted certain 'Recommendations on Violence and Discipline'. This is plainly not the case. The 'Recommendation on Violence and Discipline' stated that a new code was to be prepared by the administration. Testimony heard by this Court revealed that a new code was, in fact, never drawn, and that the old regulations remained in effect. Moreover, the two most serious incidents of corporal punishment took place prior to the March 29 meeting.
Appellant further contends that Section 1317 [4] of the Code, 24 P.S. § 13--1317, gives a teacher an absolute right to inflict corporal punishment in spite of rules of the local school board to the contrary. There can be no doubt of the absolute right of the School Board to regulate student discipline. Section 510 of the Code [5] provides:
'Rules and regulations; safety patrols; (school police)
The Board of school directors in any school district may adopt and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations as it may deem necessary and proper, regarding the management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment of all superintendents, teachers, and other appointees or employes during the time they are engaged in their duties to the district, as well as regarding the conduct and department of all pupils attending the public schools in the district, during such time as they are under the supervision of the board of school directors and teachers, including the time necessarily spent in coming to and returning from school.'
See also Girard School District v. Pittenger, 29 Pa.Cmwlth. 176, 370 A.2d 420 (1977). Although Section 1317 of the Code has been interpreted to permit corporal punishment, it does not mandate it. It is up to each school district to determine how, if at all, corporal punishment will be administered.
There can be no doubt that Appellant actually inflicted punishment upon students contrary to the rules in the Bulletin. Appellant was accused of four acts of misconduct. They were the administration of corporal punishment to Gregory Davis, Derek Burnside, Sammy Vargas, and isolating two or three students in an unsupervised storage room. We shall discuss each incident individually.
Appellant admitted before this Court that he slapped Gregory Davis. On cross-examination, the following testimony before the Board was read to and adopted by him.
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