Harris v. Commonwealth

• Citation: 142 S.E. 354
• Parties: HARRIS. v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Decision Date: 22 March 1928
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

142 S.E. 354

HARRIS.

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 22, 1928.

Error to Circuit Court, York County.

William Harris was convicted of unlawfully wounding, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill, and he brings error. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Channing M. Hall, of Williamsburg, for plaintiff in error.

John R. Saunders, Atty. Gen., and Leon M. Bazile and Edwin H. Gibson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

PRENTIS, P. William Harris was indicted under the Maiming Act (Code, § 4402), the charge being that he "did make an assault and him, the said L. E. Collins, feloniously and maliciously did strike and wound, with intent him, the said L. E. Collins, then and there to maim, disfigure, disable, and kill. * * *"

This is a summary of the evidence: Collins was a foreman for the Henrico Lumber Company, in charge of laborers who were engaged in loading railroad ties on a lighter or barge, and, after an absence, returned to the lighter upon which the accused with other laborers were supposed to be at work. Finding these workmen idle because of one car being out of place, Collins reprimanded them for their idleness, and the accused replied that, if he could not get along without cursing him, he (the accused) would leave, and to pay him his money. Collins then told Harris to leave the lighter, go to the office, and he would be paid off; and Collins testified that the accused, for no reason, struck him with a stick which he had been using for the purpose of carrying railroad ties, such ties being carried by three men, two in front with a stick under the tie, and the third carrying the rear end of it. The only injury claimed to have been suffered by Collins was a slight bruise over, or near, the collar bone, and all of the witnesses testified that the skin was not broken. Harris testified that at thetime he struck the blow, Collins was advancing toward him with his hands in his pockets, and that he thought from his manner that Collins was going to shoot or cut him, and that he struck the blow in self-defense.

The accused was convicted of unlawful wounding with intent as charged, and sentenced to one year's confinement in the penitentiary.

There are five assignments of error, but they raise a single question, and that is whether, under the Maiming Act, it is necessary, in order to constitute a wounding and support a conviction for such wounding, the skin must be broken or cut. As has been indicated, it is clear from the evidence that the injury inflicted in this case was a bruise, and that the skin was not broken.

Our act is closely modeled after the English statute (9 George IV, c. 31, § 12[a]), which provides, among other things, that if one "shall unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut, or wound any person, with intent, in any of the cases aforesaid, to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm to such person, " he shall be guilty of a felony. Our act provides that "if any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person, or by any means cause him bodily injury, with intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he shall" be guilty of a felony, the punishment being fixed at not less than one nor more than ten years confinement in the penitentiary. If such act is done unlawfully but not maliciously with the same intent, the punishment is reduced to not less than one nor more than five years confinement in the penitentiary, or confinement in jail not exceeding twelve months and a fine not exceeding $500.

At an early date, the word "wound" in this statute was construed to mean that there must be a breaking of the skin, so that the breaking of one's collar bone and bruising him was held not to be a wounding within the meaning of the English statute. Rex v. Wood, 6 Bingh., 4 Carr. & Payne, 19 Eng. Com. L. Rep. 430.

In Minor's Synopsis of Criminal Law (1894) page 67, the definition is thus given:

"Wounding is often defined as 'the breaking of the true skin, whether with a sharp or blunt instrument, ' but not bruising; nor breaking bones; nor biting off the nose or a finger, the law contemplating the use of an instrument other than the teeth. The medical definition of a wound, however, which the law now adopts, is, 'a recent solution of continuity in the soft parts' " (citing the English cases and 2 Beck's Med. Jurisp. 282).

In Bishop on Statutory Crimes (2d Ed.) § 314, p. 290, in discussing the...