Harris v. County of Calhoun
| Decision Date | 12 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:00-CV-143.,4:00-CV-143. |
| Citation | 127 F.Supp.2d 871 |
| Parties | Melvin Leroy HARRIS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF CALHOUN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Melvin Leroy Harris, Albion, MI, plaintiff pro se.
Michael S. Bogren, Plunkett & Cooney, PC, Kalamazoo, MI, for City of Albion, County of Calhoun, Officer MacQueen, Officer Young, Al. J. McKeown, Mark Robison, defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants', Officer MacQueen, Officer Young, Police Chief McKeown, the City of Albion, and City Attorney Mark Robison ("Defendants"), Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), and Plaintiff's, Melvin Leroy Harris, Jr., Motion for Default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. The Court will grant Defendants' Motion, deny Plaintiff's Motion, and deny Defendants' request for attorney's fees.
Plaintiff's Complaint, as pointed out by Defendants, is one in a series of complaints by like minded persons who mistakenly act under the impression that they are sovereigns onto themselves and need not abide by the duly enacted laws of the United States or the State of Michigan. The Court will not take part in Plaintiff's flight from reality.
On October 31, 1999, Defendant MacQueen executed a traffic stop of Plaintiff's vehicle for allegedly speeding and because the vehicle had no discernable registration plate. Defendant MacQueen approached the vehicle and requested Plaintiff's driver's license. Plaintiff instead provided Defendant MacQueen with a work identification card and stated that he had no driver's license. Defendant MacQueen then inquired about Plaintiff's registration and proof of insurance. Plaintiff stated that he was not required to have a driver's license, license plates, registration, or proof of insurance because he was not using his vehicle for commercial purposes but just drove the vehicle to and from work.
At this point, Defendant MacQueen informed Plaintiff that the vehicle was being impounded and that he should remove any property in the vehicle. Defendant MacQueen then issued Plaintiff a citation for violating Michigan's traffic code regarding lack of an operator's license and lack of proper registration. Defendant MacQueen then advised Plaintiff that he needed to appear at court on November 17, 1999. Plaintiff's vehicle was subsequently impounded and towed for storage pending registration and proof of insurance by Plaintiff.
On August 10, 2000, Plaintiff filed four documents with the Court entitled (1) Justice is Demanded Petition Verified Criminal Complaint in regard to Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Further Relief under Declaratory Judgement for Damages, (2) Brief In Regard To Criminal Complaint In Regard To Actions Of Agents In Fraud, (3) Verified Complaint In regard to true actions of agents Criminal Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demand fore [sic] Further Relief under Declaratory Judgement for Damages, and (4) Memorandum Of Law On Arrest Without Warrant. All of Plaintiff's documents contain a distorted and convoluted form of legalese making them difficult to follow and understand. In liberally construing Plaintiff's pro se Complaint, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir.2000), the Court interpreted Plaintiff's pleadings as a civil Complaint that alleges damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and issued an Order to that effect on August 28, 2000. Harris v. City of Albion, No. 1:00 CR 168 (W.D.Mich. filed Aug. 28, 2000).
On August 30, 2000, Defendants, the City of Albion, City Attorney Mark Robinson, Police Chief McKeown, and Officers MacQueen and Young, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Plaintiff attempted to file a Response to Defendants' Motion on September 21, 2000, but the Magistrate Judge rejected this filing pursuant to Local Civil Rule 10.4 because no duplicate was filed. Plaintiff properly re-filed his Response on October 23, 2000. On November 15, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.
Defendants have made a Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact does not exist "where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Administrative Comm., Sea Ray Employees' Stock Ownership, Profit Sharing Plan v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 981, 985 (6th Cir.1999). The movant has the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
If the movant meets the initial burden, the non-movant "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn from it, are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Specific facts must constitute "sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient...." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Administrative Comm., 164 F.3d at 985.
Plaintiff's Complaint appears to put forth the following claims: (1) that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants violated his First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when Defendants, by and through their agents, impounded his car and issued him a citation for lack of a driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance; and (2) violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, conspiracy against rights, and deprivation of rights under color of law, respectively, due to the Defendants' same course of conduct. Distilled to its essence, Plaintiff's Complaint really alleges that he was arrested without a warrant or the requisite probable cause, that he was detained without a prompt probable cause hearing, and that his vehicle was impounded without due process of law.
Probable cause determinations are "based upon `factual and practical considerations of everyday life [that] could lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a probability that an illegal act has occurred or is about to occur.'" United States v. Reed, 220 F.3d 476, 478 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.1998)). "Where probable cause exists, `[a] police officer is permitted to make an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.'" Reed, 220 F.3d, at 478 (quoting United States v. Smith, 73 F.3d 1414, 1416 (6th Cir.1996)).
Neither side disputes the facts. Defendant MacQueen executed a traffic stop after he noticed Plaintiff driving his vehicle without a vehicle registration plate. Plaintiff admitted to Defendant MacQueen at that time to having no license, no vehicle registration, and no vehicle insurance. Defendant MacQueen issued Plaintiff a misdemeanor citation as a result. As indicated by Defendants, Michigan law requires that motor vehicles be registered with the state, that they be operated with a valid registration plate, and that a person must have a valid driver's license to operate a motor vehicle on state roads and highways. Mich.Comp.Laws §§ 257.255(1), (2), (3), and 257.301(1). Based on the visual observations of Defendant MacQueen and the admissions of Plaintiff at the time, Defendant MacQueen had probable cause to issue Plaintiff the misdemeanor citation without a warrant.1
Plaintiff also appears to allege that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), because he was not brought promptly before a judge for a probable cause hearing. Plaintiff is again mistaken. Collectively, Gerstein and McLaughlin hold that after a warrantless arrest, a pre-trial detainee must be brought before a judge within "48 hours," Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, for a determination of probable cause "as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty following arrest." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114, 95 S.Ct. 854. Plaintiff was never taken into custody, nor held in jail for any period of time. These simple facts make Gerstein and Riverside inapplicable. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim that his constitutional rights were violated because he did not get a prompt probable cause hearing fails.
Plaintiff also seems to indicate that his Right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when Defendants impounded his vehicle without his first receiving notice and a hearing. Plaintiff is again mistaken.
"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the ... Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Under the ...
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