Harris v. DC DEPT. OF EMPLOYMENT SERV.
| Decision Date | 20 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-AA-657.,90-AA-657. |
| Citation | 648 A.2d 672 |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Eugene M. HARRIS, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent, C & P Telephone Company, Intervenor. |
Before FERREN and SCHWELB,* Associate Judges, and KERN, Senior Judge.
On consideration of this court's order of April 2, 1993, directing that the petition for rehearing filed by intervenor be held in abeyance pending the hearing on the merits, and that the record on review be supplemented to include "petitioner's Exhibit 1B," and the Department of Employment Services compensation order of May 20, 1994, it is
ORDERED that rehearing is granted. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed as moot. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the decision of the court entered on June 7, 1991, and reported at 592 A.2d 1014, is vacated.
Statement of Senior Judge KERN, with whom Associate Judge SCHWELB joins, on granting the rehearing, dismissing the appeal, and vacating the opinion:
In Harris v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 592 A.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C.1991), we held that "unless the employer sent a copy of the injury report it was mandated to make to the Department of Employment Services ("DOES") to the employee, the limitations period did not begin to run" under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act. D.C.Code §§ 36-301 to -345 (Repl.1993). We reversed the determination by respondent (DOES) that because petitioner's complaint was filed in 1988, more than one year after his employer's filing of its report in 1986, petitioner's claim was necessarily barred by the Act's one-year statute of limitations, § 36-332(f). We remanded the case for further findings as to when petitioner received notice that his employer had filed its report with DOES and whether the limitations period had been tolled due to delay of that notification.
Petitioner then filed a motion to supplement the record on review and to dismiss summarily the appeal and remand the case for a hearing on the merits. On May 19, 1992, we ordered that the motion to supplement the record on review be granted for petitioner's Exhibit 1B. Exhibit 1B is Employee's Notice of Accidental Injury or Occupational Disease filed by petitioner with the Office of Workers' Compensation on May 8, 1986. We further ordered that petitioner's motion was granted to the extent that this appeal was remanded to the DOES for a hearing on the merits of petitioner's claim.
The admission of Exhibit 1B into the record on review essentially mooted the court's original opinion directing DOES to determine on remand when petitioner was informed that his employer filed the report with DOES. Exhibit 1B reveals that petitioner filed a claim prior to the employer filing its report. Therefore, the inquiry as to whether petitioner was notified of his employer's subsequent filing was rendered inconsequential. In essence, Exhibit 1B made this court's opinion of June 7, 1991, unnecessary. The panel then clarified its May 19, 1992, order with an order on April 2, 1993, directing that on remand DOES should also determine whether the documents filed in this Court, including Exhibit 1B, constitute a timely filed claim. In addition, we ordered that the petition for rehearing filed by intervenor be held in abeyance.
On May 20, 1994, a Hearing and Appeals Examiner denied petitioner's claim for relief, concluding that the Act did not apply to this case. The examiner found that petitioner's August 1983 injury was a recurrence of an injury sustained on March 22, 1977, and, therefore, was not amenable to adjudication under the Act which became effective on July 26, 1982.1 In his finding of facts the examiner found that the parties stipulated that the claim was filed in a timely manner. Thus, the parties accepted Exhibit 1B as conclusively establishing that petitioner had indeed filed a claim in a timely manner.
Given this court's prior acceptance into the record of Exhibit 1B and the...
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Bryan v. US
...agree with my colleagues and the parties that vacatur is an appropriate equitable remedy. Cf. Harris v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 648 A.2d 672, 674 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (vacating earlier opinion "since it is advisory and resolves an issue that, in light of new info......
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Harris v. Office of Worker's Compensation
...for the 1983 injury until March 1985. In 1986, he filed a notice of accidental injury with the Office of Workers' Compensation. Harris II, 648 A.2d at 673. In 1988, he filed a claim for benefits with DOES. Harris I, 592 A.2d at 1016. There was extensive litigation before the agency and in t......
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Bryan v. United States, No. 03-CO-819 (D.C. 11/26/2003)
...agree with my colleagues and the parties that vacatur is an appropriate equitable remedy. Cf. Harris v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 648 A.2d 672, 674 (D.C. 1994) (per curiam) (vacating earlier opinion "since it is advisory and resolves an issue that, in light of new inf......
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West v. US
...had issued in the ordinary course. Id. That, we said, marked the end of appellate jurisdiction. Id. In Harris v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 648 A.2d 672 (D.C.1994), an appeal in a civil case in which a petition for rehearing remained pending while further proceedings t......