Harris v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.
| Decision Date | 30 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13–61243–CIV. |
| Citation | 18 F.Supp.3d 1349 |
| Parties | Raymond Nicholas HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Carolina Armendi Collado, George E. Crimarco, PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff.
Lori B. Warlick, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [D.E. 27].
The Court has reviewed the Motion, all supporting and opposing filings, and the record in this case and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Court now grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Raymond Harris brings an action against Defendants United States of America, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Janet Napolitano, Alejandro Mayorkas, Linda Swacina, and Eric H. Holder, Jr. ECF No. 19 at 1–2, ¶¶ 2–5. Harris seeks a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Count I) and review of an adverse agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 703 (Count II). Id. at 7–9, ¶¶ 34–43. In addition, Harris brings a claim for violation of his right to equal protection under the law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count III). Id. at 9–10, ¶¶ 44–48. Ultimately, Harris asks this Court to overturn USCIS's decision denying him citizenship. Id.
Harris was born out of wedlock in Kingston, Jamaica, on June 6, 1996, to Winsome Mullings and Winston Harris. ECF No. 19 at 3, ¶ 12. On August 14, 2008, when Harris was twelve years old, his father became a naturalized United States citizen. Id. at 3, ¶ 14. After filing the appropriate forms and interviewing at the United States Embassy and Consulate in Kingston, Harris was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on August 1, 2010, under the custody of his father. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 15–17. Harris then sought to become a United States citizen under the provisions of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1431 et seq. (“CCA”).1 Id. at 4, ¶ 18. In furtherance of this goal, on September 26, 2011, Harris filed a form N–600, Application for Certificate of Citizenship, with the United States Department of State. Id.
The Field Office Director denied Harris's application because, although Harris technically met the requirements under the CCA at 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a), he did not qualify as a “child” as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (“INA”). Id. at 4, ¶ 20. The denial clarified that Harris purportedly had not been “legitimated” by his unmarried parents and, therefore, did not meet the definition of a “child” under the INA.2 Id. at ¶ 28.
On August 23, 2012, Harris filed a form I–290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a Motion to Reopen and a Motion to Reconsider. Id. at 4, ¶ 21. The Deputy Field Office Director issued a decision on October 16, 2012, denying Harris's motion to reopen his N–600 application. Id. at 4, ¶ 22. Harris continues to reside in Broward County in the custody of his father. Id. at 1, ¶ 1.
Harris maintains that because all conditions precedent to acquiring United States citizenship through his father have occurred, his N–600 application was improperly denied. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 31, 32. Harris further contends that he has been denied rights and privileges claimed as a United States citizen within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1503 and seeks a declaration that he is indeed a United States citizen. Id. at 7, ¶¶ 35, 37. In addition, Harris asserts that the denial of his N–600 application was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (“APA”), and that his equal-protection rights have been violated. Id. at 8, 10, ¶¶ 43, 47.
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Harris's 8 U.S.C. § 1503 claim because Harris has not exhausted his administrative remedies in that he failed to appeal his N–600 denial to USCIS's Administrative Appeals Office (“AAO”).3 ECF No. 27 at 5–7. With regard to Harris's declaratory-judgment claim, Defendants assert that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and may not be waived. As for the equal-protection claim, Defendants contend that the doctrine of prudential exhaustion should require Harris to first pursue his claim with the AAO. Id. at 7. Finally, Defendants assert that Harris has failed to state a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act.4 Id. at 9.
Harris's first count seeks a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that he is a United States citizen within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). ECF No. 19 at 7–8, ¶¶ 34–41. Section 1503(a) specifically provides that a person denied a declaration of United States nationality may initiate a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
The Declaratory Judgment Act “does not, of itself, confer jurisdiction upon the courts; a suit brought under the Act must state some independent source of jurisdiction, such as the existence of diversity or the presentation of a federal question.” Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.1989) (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876, 94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950) ). Thus, an independent basis for jurisdiction must exist for the Court to review Harris's claim for declaratory judgment.
8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added). Because such an action may be instituted only within five years of a final administrative denial, the question then becomes whether the denial of Harris's I–290B Motion to Reopen or Reconsider the denial of his N–600 application constitutes a “final administrative denial.” The Court finds that it does not.
The Code of Federal Regulations provides that certain unfavorable decisions on applications for citizenship, petitions, and other types of cases may be appealed. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii). In addition to an appeal, an aggrieved party may exercise other avenues of redress, such as the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider.5 See id. § 103.5(a)(1)(i). Harris contends that the denial of his Motion to Reopen or Reconsider amounted to a final administrative denial in his case. But contrary to Harris's contention, the denial of a motion for reopening or reconsideration does not render the administrative decision final.
The governing regulations clearly contemplate that an appeal to the AAO may be taken upon the denial of such a motion when the original motion is itself appealable. See id. § 103.5(a)(6). In this regard, the regulations state, “A field office decision made as a result of a motion [to reopen or reconsider] may be applied [sic] to the AAO only if the original decision was appealable to the AAO.” Id. Harris has pointed to no reason that the original decision on his N–600 application or the decision on his Motion to Reopen or Reconsider is not appealable to the AAO. Nor is this Court aware of any such reason. Therefore, Harris's Motion to Reopen or Reconsider cannot constitute a “final administrative denial” under § 1503(a) because the denial of the Motion is appealable. Cf. Russell v. INS, 1999 WL 675255 (N.D.Ill.1999) (). As a result, Harris must first file an appeal with the AAO in order to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Courts have identified several “[k]ey reasons” for the exhaustion requirement: “1) to permit the exercise of agency discretion and expertise on issues requiring these characteristics; 2) to allow the full development of technical issues and a factual record prior to court review; 3) to prevent deliberate disregard and circumvention of agency procedures established by Congress; and 4) to avoid unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the agency the first opportunity to correct any error.” N.B. by D.G. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Alabama v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th Cir.1987) ).
The requirement that a plaintiff first exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking redress in federal court may be either jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. See Mahon v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 485 F.3d 1247, 1262 n. 13 (11th Cir.2007) ; Alexander v. Hawk, 159...
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