Harris v. Dep't. of Transp.
| Docket Number | 1:22-cv-2383 (TNM),1:22-cv-3154 (TNM) |
| Decision Date | 13 March 2023 |
| Parties | ABRAM J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Defendants. ABRAM J. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. STEPHANIE JOHNSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
The owner of a trucking company hired a woman who also worked for a federal agency that oversees trucking companies. The owner's relationship with his new employee soon soured. His relationship with the federal agency did too. The owner sees those two incidents as connected; in his view, the woman used her role at the agency to go after his company. So he sued the agency for fraud, abuse of process, and a host of statutory violations.
During litigation, the owner also became convinced that the agency's lawyer had lied about him online. So he added the lawyer to his lawsuit against the agency. And he later filed a second lawsuit against that lawyer based on the same alleged lie.
The Court lacks jurisdiction over many of the owner's claims. And the owner fails to state claims for the rest. So the Court will dismiss both Complaints.
Abram J. Harris has been involved in long-distance trucking for decades. See Compl. at 3 (Johnson Compl.) (22-cv-3154), ECF No. 1. In 2019, his business ran into trouble with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). See Compl. ¶ 1 (DOT Compl.) (22-cv-2383), ECF No. 1-2. According to him, he had hired a woman who was also working for that agency. When things went south with her, the woman turned FMSCA against him. Mot. to Seal, Exh. A at 7, ECF No. 32-1. So he sued FMSCA's parent agency, the Department of Transportation, for “[f]raud” and “[a]buse of process.” DOT Compl. ¶ 1. And he invokes many statutes and ethics rules as well. See Surreply at 2-4 (DOT Surreply) ECF No. 25.
Harris then amended his Complaint to add claims against Assistant United States Attorney Stephanie Johnson, who had been representing DOT. See Am. Compl. (DOT Am. Compl.) ECF No. 5. In his view, she had spread lies about him online. Id. at 4-5.
Months later, Harris filed a second, separate lawsuit against AUSA Johnson for the same reason. See generally Johnson Compl. In this Complaint, Harris says that AUSA Johnson was negligent, defamed him, and used “insulting words.” Id. at 6-11.
The Government moved to dismiss both cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Mot. to Dismiss (DOT MTD), ECF No. 15; Mot. to Dismiss (Johnson MTD), ECF No. 7. The Court agrees and will dismiss both Complaints for lack of jurisdiction and a failure to state any claim.
To defeat the motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Harris must show that the Court has jurisdiction. See Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984). When deciding 12(b)(1) motions, the Court presumes that it lacks jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). And the Court takes as true all Harris's factual allegations and may also consider other undisputed facts in the record. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
To defeat the motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Harris must state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That means he must plead facts “that allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court takes those facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Harris's favor. L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643, 649 (D.C. Cir. 2017). But the Court cannot credit legal conclusions dressed up as factual claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Harris represents himself, so the Court holds his Complaints to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). For the same reason, the Court considers all Harris's factual claims, including those in his other filings. Moini v. LeBlanc, 456 F.Supp.3d 34, 40 (D.D.C. 2020).
All Harris's claims must be dismissed.
Start with Harris's common-law claims against DOT. In his first Complaint, Harris alleges fraud and abuse of process, and he appears to also claim that DOT is liable for “negligence, misrepresentation, interference with business relationships,” and “unfair trade practices.” DOT Compl. at 2, 44. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). And Harris states no plausible claims either. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). So they all must be dismissed.
The United States is immune from suit unless it has waived its sovereign immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). So to sue a federal agency, like DOT, Harris must point to a waiver of sovereign immunity. See id. He never does. Instead, he objects to the Government raising sovereign immunity as a defense: “Defendant must be on some type of mind-altering drug if the Defendant thinks that the Federal Government . . . can defraud you . . . and then yell Sovereign Immunity.” DOT Surreply at 5. That failure to point to a waiver is fatal. See Georgiades, 729 F.2d at 833 n.4 (); see also Gill v. DOJ, 875 F.3d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ().
But even if he had highlighted a waiver, his common-law claims would still fail. The United States has waived its sovereign immunity for some torts under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). But to bring claims under the FTCA, Harris must have exhausted them first. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (). And he never says that he did so. So the Court doubly lacks jurisdiction.
True, Harris may have presented his claims to DOT when he filed a complaint with DOT'S Inspector General. See Mot. to Seal, Exh. A at 1-3. But that is only half the exhaustion battle. Before Harris could sue, he also needed to either (1) have those claims “finally denied by the agency in writing” or (2) wait six months. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). There is no evidence that he meets either requirement. He never says that DOT denied his claims in writing. And he waited less than six months to sue. See Mot. to Seal, Exh. A at 1 (complaint to DOT Inspector General on March 3, 2022); DOT Compl. at 2 (lawsuit filed on May 3, 2022).
And even if Harris had cleared those hurdles, his claims would still fail. Most are barred by the FTCA's intentional tort exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). For example, the FTCA expressly bars “abuse of process” and “misrepresentation” claims. Id. And it bars fraud claims too. Maxberry v. Dep't of the Army, Bd. of Correction of Military Records, 952 F.Supp.2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2013); Williams v. Wilkie, 320 F.Supp.3d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2018). Likewise, the FTCA bars his claim for interference with business relationships. See Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985). So the Court lacks jurisdiction over these claims.
And neither those claims, nor the rest, are pled with enough clarity to state a plausible claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For instance, Harris says that DOT “was so negligent” when it included “another company's information along with his information” in its mail to him. DOT Compl. at 22. But the Court fails to see how that counts as a breach of any duty to Harris, much less how that harmed him. So the Court will dismiss all his claims against the agency.
Harris also presses claims against AUSA Johnson in both cases. He insists that she made a “false filing,” defamed him, used “insulting words,” and that she was negligent. DOT Am. Compl. at 4; Johnson Compl. at 6-11. In support, Harris points to an entry from a court-tracking website that says, “HARRIS filed an Other lawsuit against U S DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FMSCA.” DOT Am. Compl., Exh. A at 1, ECF No. 5-1. Harris believes that AUSA Johnson wrote that about him. And he protests that the statement is false. But the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). So it must dismiss them.
Under the Westfall Act, federal employees have “absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties.” Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Once the Government certifies that an employee “was acting within the scope of [her] office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose,” then the United States is substituted in as a defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). If that happens, then the claims “are governed by the FTCA.” Jacobs v. Vrobel, 724 F.3d 217, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Such is the case here. The Government has certified that AUSA Johnson “was acting within the scope of her employment . . . at the time of the alleged incidents” and thus the United States is substituted as a defendant in her stead. See Johnson MTD, Westfall Certification, ECF No. 7-1; 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). As a result, Harris's claims must satisfy the FTCA. Vrobel, 724 F.3d at 220. They do not. And the Court thus lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
First, Harris failed to exhaust these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). He never says that he presented them to “the appropriate Federal agency” (here, the Department of Justice). Id. Nor does he say that DOJ denied the claims or that he waited six months. Id. So he is barred from bringing them.
Second even if he had exhausted his claims, t...
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