Harris v. Dunn
Decision Date | 09 August 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 5342,5342 |
Parties | , 27 A.L.R.2d 1277 HARRIS et al. v. DUNN et al. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Frank L. Horan, Perry S. Key, Albuquerque, for appellants.
Rueckhaus & Watkins, Albuquerque, for appellees.
The question for decision is whether 1941 Comp. Sec. 75-143, L.1949, c. 19, declaring void, unless in writing, all agreements made subsequent to July 1, 1949, employing an agent to purchase or sell real estate for a commission or compensation bars equitable relief against one agreeing to purchase certain land for another but in violation of his promise and understanding purchases it for himself, taking title in the name of others in an effort to conceal the fraudulent breach of his agreement.
The defendants, appellees here, being J. R. Dunn, doing business as Dunn Realty, and Wilburn G. Moore and Ingeborg Moore, in whose names title to the real estate involved had fraudulently been taken in consummation of the fraud, as alleged in the amended complaint, although answering by way of general denial, all joined in a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging facts as set forth in the first paragraph hereof. The grounds of the motion were that the defendant, Dunn, being a duly licensed real estate broker, the provisions of the act in question, cited above, were applicable and required that any employment of him, to purchase lands for the plaintiffs, must be evidenced by a written instrument.
The motion was duly argued before the trial court and at the conclusion of the argument it was sustained and the complaint dismissed. The plaintiffs prosecute this appeal for the revision and correction of such judgment. Although numerous errors are assigned, all will be resolved by a determination of the single question whether the trial court correctly held the relief here sought was properly denied under the act in question, viz., 1941 Comp. Sec. 75-143, L.1949, c. 19, Sec. 1.
This act so far as material reads, as follows:
In our opinion this case is ruled by our decision in Mitchell v. Allison, 51 N.M. 315, 183 P.2d 847, 848. See, also, same case reported on second appeal under title, Mitchell v. Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231, and Rice v. First National Bank, 50 N.M. 99, 171 P.2d 318. The facts in Mitchell v. Allison are almost on all fours with the facts of this case and after exhaustive research and thorough consideration of the first appeal, we held:
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'The theory of the rule we follow is that such agreements create a relation of trust and confidence to which the statute of frauds does not apply.
'The cases on the question, pro and con, are so numerous (see Annotations in A.L.R. cited) that we content ourselves with citing the following which support the rule adopted: Harrop v. Cole, 85 N.J.Eq. 32, 95 A. 378, affirmed in 86 N.J.Eq. 250, 98 A. 1085; Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 54 A.L.R. 1173; Lamb v. Sandall, 135 Neb. 300, 281 N.W. 37.'
The defendants seek to deny Mitchell v. Allison force as a precedent by pointing out that at the time it was decided and, hence, at the time of the events out of which the suit arose, the statute here involved and relied upon by them had not been enacted. The attempted distinction is not persuasive. True enough, the events adjudged in Mitchell v. Allison took place before the statute was adopted while those here before us occurred subsequently. But after admitting this, the distinction between the two cases ends and the analogy begins. Both deal with the effect of a statute calling for a writing, the one relied on in Mitchell v. Allison being the Statute of Frauds, whereas that here involved is the so-called Real Estate Brokers' Act, dealing with agreements for compensation or commission on the sale or purchase of real estate procured through an agent. Just why the Statute of Frauds should be less effective to void a contract in the one case than the Brokers' Statute in the other, counsel for defendants have been unable to point out. And, yet, the former statute was held not to bar the remedy sought in Mitchell v. Allison. There are no valid grounds of distinction between the two cases.
Indeed, the Act relied upon by defendants does not purport to render void every agreement respecting the sale or purchase of real estate in which an agent has had a part, unless in writing. It seems clear enough that what the legislature intended to nullify was oral agreements to pay a commission. As said by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Krzysko v. Gaudynski, 207 Wis. 608, 242 N.W. 186, 189, in dealing with a statute of that state similar to ours:
See also Stephenson v. Golden, 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849, and cases cited in annotations of subject generally in 42 A.L.R. 10; 54 A.L.R. 1195 and 135 A.L.R. 232.
Counsel for defendants place great reliance on the case of Carkonen v. Alberts, 196 Wash. 575, 83 P.2d 899, 917, 135 A.L.R. 209. There, in construing a statute like ours, the court declined to hold an agent was a constructive trustee who purchased for himself real property he was commissioned to purchase for his principal. It is a sufficient answer to say that the division of authority pointed out by us in Mitchell v. Allison and treated at length in the A.L.R. annotations there cited places Washington on the side of the fundamental question at issue which we deliberately declined to follow in that case. See, Annotation in 42 A.L.R. 10(29). In other words, if we had been persuaded to adopt the line of authority defendants urge upon us, citing Carkonen v. Alberts as an example, we would have decided Mitchell v. Allison the other way. The Washington court sees in actions of an agent such as those here disclosed and present in the case before it in Carkonen v. Alberts only moral wrong, not legal fraud. So viewing the matter, it reached the conclusions announced touching the effect of a statute similar to ours. In a strong dissent Chief Justice Steinert said of the majority view:
'My consideration of the majority opinion, in its entirety, convinces me that it is wrong. I think that the case falls squarely within the principle expressed by the majority in the following language:
It is suggested that certain California cases, namely, Heyn v. Philips, 37 Cal. 529, and McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 299, one decided before and the other after enactment of Cal.Civ.Code, Sec. 1624(5), similar to the statute before us, are precedents against the conclusion we have reached. The Heyn case merely holds that a contract employing an agent to sell certain land of the owner at an...
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