Harris v. General Motors Corp., No. 99-3092

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: FEIKENS
• Citation: 201 F.3d 800
• Parties: (6th Cir. 2000) Ruby Harris, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Argued:
• Decision Date: 15 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-3092

Page 800

201 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2000) Ruby Harris, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
General Motors Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. No. 99-3092 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Argued: December 15, 1999
Decided and Filed: January 31, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo, No. 97-07171--James G. Carr, District Judge.

Page 801

Edward A. Van Gunten, EDWARD VAN GUNTEN & COMPANY, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant.

Francis J. Grey, Jr., LAVIN, COLEMAN, O'NEIL, RICCI, FINANELLI & GRAY, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Ray A. Farris, Fuller & Henry, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: RYAN and NORRIS, Circuit Judges; FEIKENS, District Judge.^*

OPINION

FEIKENS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from a decision granting summary judgment to defendant General Motors Corporation ("General Motors"). Ruby Harris ("Harris") appeals the grant, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's grant and remand the case for trial.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 10, 1996, 76 year-old Harris was driving her 1991 Chevrolet Corsica in Toledo, Ohio. Harris attempted to turn left into a parking lot, accidentally turning into the path of an on-coming vehicle. A nearly

Page 802

head-on but relatively low-speed collision resulted. Harris, who was wearing her seatbelt, was uninjured in the initial crash. She testified in her deposition that immediately after the crash, when she reached with her right hand to turn off the ignition, the airbag in the Corsica deployed, hitting her in the face, wrapping itself around her right arm and breaking that arm. Harris' sole passenger, Michele Packer ("Packer"), confirmed that the airbag did not deploy until after the accident. Based on these facts, Harris filed suit, contending that the airbag had been defective in deploying after the accident and had caused her injuries.

After discovery, General Motors moved for summary judgment. In support of that motion, General Motors submitted the affidavits of two proposed experts. In response, plaintiff submitted her deposition testimony and that of her passenger, maintaining that the airbag had not deployed until after the accident. The district court granted General Motors' motion, accepting the testimony of defendant's expert witnesses and expressly rejecting plaintiff's testimony.

III. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as did the district court. See Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 84 F.3d 803, 806 (6th Cir. 1996). Courts properly grant summary judgment where the moving party establishes through pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 137 F.3d 398, 401 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Under Rule 56(c), defendant bears an initial burden of demonstrating that an essential element of the non-moving party's case is lacking. Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 171 F.3d 1065, 1068 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must show the court that there is in fact a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The nonmoving party must identify specific facts, supported by evidence, and may not rely on mere allegations contained in the pleadings. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the factual evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass'n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 402-03 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)).

In this case, the parties presented two conflicting versions of events. Harris submitted evidence which, if believed, may support her theory of liability; General Motors submitted contrary evidence which, if admitted and believed, may negate a finding of liability. Viewing all factual evidence in the light most favorable to Harris, General Motors was not entitled to summary judgment.

The district court ruled otherwise, relying on the "physical facts rule" as explained by the Ohio Supreme Court in McDonald v. Ford Motor Co., 42 Ohio St. 2d 8 (1975):

Ordinarily, where testimony conflicts, the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the jury. However, in certain instances testimony cannot be considered credible. Where a witness testifies that he looked and listened at a railroad crossing, but neither saw nor heard a train approaching, and the only reasonable conclusion upon the evidence is that there is no doubt that had he looked he must have seen the train, the witness's

Page 803

testimony cannot be considered credible. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton Rd. Co. v. Rohrs 114 Ohio St. 493 (1926); See, also, Zuments v. B. & O. Rd. Co. 27 Ohio St.2d 71 (1972).

The 'railroad crossing' cases are a single example of the broad range of cases in which...