Harris v. Halverson

• Decision Date: 07 December 1926
• Citation: 211 N.W. 295,192 Wis. 71
• Parties: HARRIS ET UX. v. HALVERSON ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

192 Wis. 71

211 N.W. 295

HARRIS ET UX.

v.HALVERSON ET AL.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Dec. 7, 1926.

Appeal from Lafayette County Court; S. E. Smalley, Judge.

Action for specific performance and for reformation brought by George O. Harris and wife against Carrie Halverson and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Affirmed in part and in part reversed and remanded.--[By Editorial Staff.]

The action is brought to enforce specific performance of a land contract, and for reformation of such contract, the prayer for reformation in the complaint being based on mutual mistake in the description of the property.

On the 5th of April, 1919, George Harris, one of the plaintiffs, being the owner of certain real estate situated in the county of Lafayette, executed a land contract in writing (in which his wife joined) to one Ole Halverson, for the sale of said real estate for the sum of $30,000, accepting as a down payment the note of Halverson for $4,000, which matured on March 1, 1920. Ole Halverson died intestate on December 6, 1919, leaving surviving him as his sole heirs at law, his widow, the defendant Carrie Halverson, and six children, being the other defendants in the action. Upon an application to the county court in probate of Iowa county, the widow was appointed the administratrix of Ole Halverson's estate, and in the due course of the administration of said estate, the probate court by an order limited the time for creditors to file claims to April 16, 1920. No claim of the plaintiffs herein was filed in the matter of said estate, and at the close of the administration proceedings towards the end of the year 1920, the final account of the administratrix was filed and allowed, and the residue of the estate, both real and personal, was, by the decree of the court, assigned and distributed among the heirs at law according to the statutes.

Before the time for filing claims expired, the note above mentioned for $4,000 was paid by the defendants, and thereafter, until the year 1924, taxes on the real estate described in the contract, together with the interest on the amounts due on the contract, were paid. In the meantime, owing to the slump in the values of farm property, the value of this property decreased about 50 per cent., and the defendants concluded to abandon their interests in this property, and so notified the plaintiffs, and thereafter made no further payments, whereupon this action, having for its main purpose the specific performance of said contract, was commenced and prosecuted against the defendants herein.

At the conclusion of the trial the court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein among other things specific performance of the land contract was ordered and adjudged, the amount due thereon ascertained and fixed, the land was ordered to be sold, and a lien also was ordered upon all the other real estate of the deceased, Halverson, which descended to the defendants, for the payment of the amount due or to become due, and, judgment having been entered upon such findings, the defendants have prosecuted this appeal.

A palpable mistake appearing in the description of the property, the court also ordered a reformation of the contract, and the description was corrected.

Further facts will be found in the opinion.T. J. Webb, of Blanchardville, and H. E. Carthew, of Lancaster, for appellants.

Fiedler, Jackson & Boardman, of Mineral Point, for respondents.

DOERFLER, J.

The vital issue presented on the appeal embraces a question of the jurisdiction of the county court of Lafayette county (such court having jurisdiction of actions for specific performance, like that of the circuit court), it being argued by plaintiffs' counsel that such county court had full and adequate jurisdiction to grant full relief in the action for specific performance as prayed for in the complaint and as ordered and adjudged by such court, while the defendants' counsel insist that the only remedy afforded to the plaintiffs under the statutes consisted in the filing of their claim in the probate proceedings in the matter of the estate of Ole Halverson, deceased, in the probate court of Iowa county.

Defendants also claim that, inasmuch as they were not parties to the original contract, the court could not declare and enforce a lien for a deficiency for any amount as to any property which descended to them under the statutes of inheritance, other than the specific property involved in the land contract.

It is freely conceded by plaintiffs' counsel that the present action is prosecuted under the provisions of section 296.02 of the Statutes (formerly section 3499), and the court in its opinion fully agreed with plaintiffs' counsel in that behalf. Chapter 296 of the Statutes of 1925 is entitled as follows: “Estates of Wards; Specific Performance; Change Names and Establish Heirships.” Section 296.02 is as follows:

“ Specific Performance of Contract.--The circuit court shall have power to authorize or compel the specific performance of any bargain, contract or agreement made by any party who may die before the performance thereof, or by any person incompetent to manage his affairs by reason of insanity, idiocy, unsoundness of mind or habitual drunkenness, while he was capable of conducting his affairs, by any infant heir or devisee or other person, or by such incompetent person or his guardian, on the petition of the executors or administrators of such deceased person, the guardian of such incompetent person or of any other person interested in such bargain, contract or agreement.”

Chapter 313 of the Statutes of 1925 is entitled, “Proof and Payment of Debts and Legacies.” Section 313.08, under said chapter (formerly section 3844), provides as follows:

“ Statute of Limitations.--Every person having a claim against a deceased person, proper to be allowed by the court, who shall not after notice given as required by sections 313.03 and 313.04, exhibit his claim to the court within the time limited for that purpose, shall forever be barred from recovering such demand or from setting off the same in any action.”

Section 313.09, Statutes of 1925 (formerly section 3845), provides:

“ Actions Against Executors, etc.--No action shall be commenced against an executor or administrator, excepting actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, or actions to establish, enforce, or foreclose a lien or right of lien, on real or personal property, or to quiet title or remove a cloud on title, to construe wills, enforce the liability of stockholders, to avoid fraudulent conveyances, to affect or pass the title to real property and other actions in which the county court cannot afford a remedy as adequate, complete, prompt or efficient as the circuit court. Nor shall any attachment or execution be issued against the estate of a deceased or the executor or administrator thereof, until the expiration of the time limited for the payment of debts, except as provided in sections 266.25 and 272.14. Nothing in this section shall prevent any person having a lawful claim against a deceased person from bringing an action therefor against the executor, administrator, heir, devisee, or legatee of such deceased person, when no time has been fixed in which creditors may present their claims against the deceased for allowance, or when no notice of such limitations has been ordered or given.”

Section 313.22 of the Statutes (formerly section 3858), and section 313.23 (formerly section 3859), provide for the filing of a contingent claim and the manner of payment thereof. Section 313.24 (formerly section 3860) and section 313.25 (formerly section 3861) provide for the presentation and payment of subsequently accruing claims.

[1][2][3][4][5][6] The Legislature, in using the language contained in section 296.02, defining the power of the circuit court to entertain actions for specific performance of any bargain, contract, or agreement made by any party who may die before the performance thereof, on petition of the executors or administrators of such deceased person or any other person interested in such bargain, contract, or agreement, did not legislate in vain; and it must be assumed that it had a specific purpose in mind. The language is broad and inclusive, and must be held to apply not only to an action brought by the vendee, but also to one brought by the vendor. If this were the only statute upon the subject, the jurisdiction of the circuit court to grant the relief prayed for could not be successfully denied. The Legislature, however, has seen fit to enact other statutes expressly designed to furnish a remedy plain and simple in its nature, with respect to claims of creditors against decedents, and it therefore devolves upon the court in a case like this to construe not only one statute, but all statutes applicable, in such a manner as...