Harris v. Harris
Decision Date | 15 March 1968 |
Citation | 239 A.2d 783,428 Pa. 473 |
Parties | , 5 UCC Rep.Serv. 148 Millie HARRIS, a/k/a Millie B. Harris, Appellant, v. Joe HARRIS, First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., Adal Corp., Nitram, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation and Eleanor Meyers. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert H. Arronson, H. H. Hadra, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Leonard Spear, Philadelphia, Michael F. Walsh, Meranze, Katz, Spear & Bielitsky, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
This is an appeal from the decree of the court below sustaining appellee's (Nitram, Inc.) preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to appellant's cause of action in equity.
The record discloses the following pertinent facts: On March 5, 1965, First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. confessed judgment against appellant and her husband on a judgment note apparently signed by the parties and dated September 15, 1963. Damages were assessed and judgment was then entered in favor of First Pennsylvania in the amount of $168.08. The judgment was subsequently marked to the use of Adal Corp. Execution proceedings were then commenced against the premises in question, which premises were owned by appellant and her husband as tenants by the entireties.
Appellee purchased the premises at sheriff's sale. Immediately upon learning that the premises had been sold, 1 appellant filed a petition and a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be opened, alleging that her signature on the judgment note was a forgery. The rule to show cause was made absolute.
Thereafter, appellant instituted the present action in equity seeking to set aside the sheriff's sale and to compel appellee to account for all monies received from the use of the premises. Appellee filed preliminary objections to the complaint alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court below sustained the preliminary objections and this appeal followed.
We are required to determine whether an execution sale on a judgment procured as a result of a forged signature on a judgment note passes good title to property sold thereunder to a bona fide purchaser for value. Whether title will pass at an execution sale depends upon the validity of the underlying judgment. If the execution sale was based upon a voidable judgment, a bona fide purchaser will be protected against actions seeking to recover the purchased property. On the other hand, where a void judgment is the basis for an execution sale, one who purchases property will not acquire title even if a bona fide purchaser for value. See 33 C.J.S. Execution §§ 6, 230, 299a (1942); Restatement, Judgments § 115, comment j (1942) and Pennsylvania Annotations; 3 American Law of Property §§ 13.1, 18.60 (1952).
We are therefore confronted with the narrow issue of whether a judgment which has been procured by a forged signature on a judgment note is void or voidable. The court below, in sustaining appellee's preliminary objections, concluded that a judgment based on a forged instrument is merely voidable and consequently will not hamper the passage of good title to one considered a bona fide purchaser for value. We disagree. The cases are legion, at least with respect to negotiable instruments, that a forged, fraudulent and spurious instrument is not binding on any person and is wholly inoperative to transfer any title or right to property whether the holder is an innocent or guilty purchaser. 2 Johnson v. First National Bank of Beaver Falls, 367 Pa. 459, 81 A.2d 95 (1951); Lindsley v. First National Bank of Philadelphia, 325 Pa. 393, 190 A. 876 (1937); Real Estate Land Title & Trust Co. v. United Security Trust...
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