Harris v. Harris

• Decision Date: 03 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-01024-COA, No. 2001-CA-01457-COA., No. 2000-CA-00762-COA
• Citation: 879 So.2d 457
• Parties: Winston HARRIS, Appellant v. Janna D. HARRIS, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

879 So.2d 457

Winston HARRIS, Appellant v. Janna D. HARRIS, Appellee.

Nos. 2000-CA-00762-COA, 2001-CA-01024-COA, 2001-CA-01457-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

February 3, 2004.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 2004.

Certiorari Denied August 5, 2004.

John R. Reeves, attorneys for appellant.

James A. Becker, Susan Latham Steffey, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.

Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES and THOMAS, JJ.

BRIDGES, J., for the court.

¶ 1. This appeal was consolidated with two other appeals involving the same parties; however, this Court's ruling in this appeal renders all other consolidated appeals moot. The only issues that will be addressed are those contained in the immediate appeal.¹ The first appeal is from a final judgment entered March 28, 2000², and the other two appeals are from a May 1, 2001 judgment of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County styled "Judgment—Modifying Former Judgments and Finding Defendant [appellant Janna Harris] in Willful Contempt of Court,"³ and from a directly related judgment of that same court entered July 25, 2001.⁴

¶ 2. In this appeal, the Court will address not only Winston's four issues but also Janna's four issues stated in her brief/cross-appeal and in so doing the Court will combine certain issues from both appeals for the sake of practicality and clarity. These issues are stated verbatim.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES IN WINSTON'S APPEAL

I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT ORDERING JANNA TO REFUND WITH INTEREST $50,000 WINSTON HAD PAID HER PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER FOR HER DIVORCE ATTORNEY'S FEES BUT WHICH SHE FAILED TO PAY TO HER DIVORCE ATTORNEYS?

II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT HOLDING JANNA IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT?

III. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT TERMINATING WINSTON'S ALIMONY OBLIGATION TO JANNA?

IV. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE ALIMONY REDUCTION RETROACTIVE TO APRIL 13, 1998, THE DATE THE MOTION TO MODIFY WAS FILED?

JANNA'S CROSS-APPEAL ISSUES

I. THE ISSUE OF JANNA'S PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO HER FORMER ATTORNEYS, WILLIAM WRIGHT AND ROBERT KING IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.

II. THE CHANCELLOR CORRECTLY REFUSED TO HOLD JANNA IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT REGARDING HER PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE.

III. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN REDUCING JANNA'S ALIMONY FROM $4,000 PER MONTH TO $1,600 PER MONTH AND REDUCING CHILD SUPPORT FROM $2,020 PER MONTH TO $1,450 PER MONTH AS WINSTON FAILED TO PROVE A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING ANY REDUCTION, MUCH LESS SUCH A DRASTIC ONE.

IV. THE COURT ERRED IN REDUCING JANNA'S ALIMONY AND TREVOR'S CHILD SUPPORT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AND COMPOUNDED THAT ERROR BY MAKING THE REDUCTION RETROACTIVE.

V. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HEARD WINSTON'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION AS WINSTON WAS IN SUBSTANTIAL ARREARS IN ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT WHEN HE FILED HIS PETITION FOR MODIFICATION AND ON THE DATE OF THE HEARING ON MODIFICATION. FOR THESE SAME REASONS, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING WINSTON IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.

VI. JANNA SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

FOR DEFENDING WINSTON'S MOTIONS AND THIS APPEAL.

FACTS

¶ 3. Winston Harris and Janna Harris were married on June 4, 1984, in Houston, Texas. During their marriage, they had one child, Trevor, who was seven years old at the time of the divorce. Throughout the parties' separation and after their divorce, Janna and Trevor continued to reside in the marital home. After a lengthy trial, the court entered a judgment of divorce, dated November 3, 1994, in favor of Janna, finding Winston guilty of uncondoned adultery and awarding Janna full legal custody, care and control of Trevor.

¶ 4. Pursuant to the final judgment, Janna was awarded $4,000 per month periodic alimony and $1,000 per month child support. Initially, Janna's alimony was to terminate on the occurrence of any of the following: the minor child's emancipation; Janna's employment or remarriage; once Janna and Trevor no longer resided in the marital home; or a court-adjudicated material change in circumstances. Janna was to be solely responsible for the mortgage payment, taxes, and insurance on the marital home, but on the happening of any of the aforementioned events, the equity in the marital home was to be divided between the parties (the home to be apparently sold and equity divided). Both parties filed numerous post-trial motions, complaining about aspects of the final judgment including, but only naming a few, motion for a new trial and/or amendment of findings of fact and conclusions of law, motion for a new trial for consideration and/or to alter or amend judgment, motion for citation for contempt, motion to amend for reconsideration to alter or amend the judgment, motion to strike motion for reconsideration of plaintiff/counter-defendant, motion to recuse judge, and a motion for modification and alternatively for stay pending appeal and other relief.

¶ 5. On January 27, 1995, the chancellor entered an order on Janna's motion for modification, or alternatively, for stay pending appeal and other relief, and on Winston's counter-motion for modification, for sanction and for other relief. In this order, the court clarified the periodic alimony provisions of the final judgment and neither party appealed from this order.

¶ 6. Over the next several years, numerous motions were filed by Janna against Winston for contempt and other relief to obtain child support, alimony, and other awards Winston was required to pay pursuant to the final judgment. Simultaneously, Winston filed numerous motions for modification. There was an opinion and judgment dated September 8, 1995, a judgment dated March 26, 1996, and an order dated November 14, 1996.

¶ 7. On April 13, 1998, Winston again moved for modification of his child support and alimony obligations, claiming a decrease in his income. On April 24, 1998, Winston amended his motion for modification and then filed a second amended motion on February 11, 1999. In response to Winston's motion for modification, the court initially reduced Janna's alimony from $4,000 per month to $2,500 per month, retroactive to August 1, 1999, even though the judgment was entered November, 9, 1999.

¶ 8. On January 19, 2000, in response to more post-trial motions, the chancellor further reduced Winston's obligations. The court reduced Janna's alimony to $1600 per month and her child support to $1,200 per month plus one half of Trevor's private school tuition costs ($250 per month). Additional facts will follow in the opinion.

¶ 9. Janna and Winston now appeal to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10. "In domestic relations cases the scope of review is limited by the substantial evidence/manifest error rule. This Court may reverse a chancellor's findings of fact only when there is no substantial credible evidence in the record to justify his findings. Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited under the familiar rule that this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard." Jundoosing v. Jundoosing, 826 So.2d 85, 88(¶ 10) (Miss.2002) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT ORDERING JANNA TO REFUND WITH INTEREST $50,000 WINSTON HAD PAID HER PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER FOR HER DIVORCE ATTORNEY'S FEES BUT WHICH SHE FAILED TO PAY TO HER DIVORCE ATTORNEYS.

II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN NOT HOLDING JANNA IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT OF COURT REGARDING HER PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

¶ 11. Winston claims that the court should order Janna to refund Winston the money she fraudulently kept and did not turn over to her divorce attorneys as required by the court in the divorce judgment. Winston also claims that Janna should be held in criminal contempt of court for the misappropriation of $50,000 in attorney's fees for her own use and benefit. Further, he claims that Janna should have disclosed to the court that she felt she did not owe or would not pay her divorce attorneys. Instead, she kept all the money for herself and defied the court order by not using the money to pay her divorce attorneys. Further, Winston claims that if Janna is allowed to keep his money with no repercussions she is unjustly enriched with a pure windfall.

¶ 12. To collect under an unjust enrichment or quasi-contract theory, the claimant must show "there is no legal contract but . . . the person sought to be charged is in possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice he should not retain, but should deliver to another." Estate of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922, 926 (Miss.1987) (quoting Hans v. Hans, 482 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1986)).

¶ 13. The final judgment of divorce entered on November 3, 1994, by Chancellor Dillard, awarded Janna the sum of $ 50,000, which represented one half of the attorney's fees and court costs incurred by Janna as a result of Winston's actions at that time. In this judgment, the chancellor ordered that Janna shall pay the following fee outstanding:

1) To Robert W. King, the sum of six thousand one hundred ninety-nine dollars and 92/100 ($ 6,199.92).

2) To Shirley Payne, the sum of two thousand one hundred seventy-five dollars ($ 2,175); and

3) The difference between half the amount paid by Winston to Mr. Moore ($ 50,000) and the sums paid to Robert King ($ 6,199.92) and Shirley Payne ($ 2,175) to William Wright ($ 41,625.08).

¶ 14. These attorneys made a claim but later withdrew or dismissed it and since the record before us gives us no evidence in order to resolve this dilemma this Court has no way of knowing the circumstances surrounding that action. Either the attorneys were paid or they were satisfied in some manner or perhaps they just decided not to pursue the claim. Since these attorneys were not parties to this appeal, the dispute and claim is over with once and for all. "Under traditional...