Harris v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 09 July 1926
• Docket Number: 17590.
• Citation: Harris v. Hudson, 250 P. 532, 122 Okla. 171, 1926 OK 613 (Okla. 1926)
• Parties: HARRIS et al. v. HUDSON.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

250 P. 532

122 Okla. 171, 1926 OK 613

HARRIS et al. v. HUDSON.

No. 17590.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

July 9, 1926

Rehearing Denied Sept. 7, 1926.

Application to File Second Petition Denied Nov. 9, 1926.

Syllabus by the Court.

A district court of one judicial district of this state has no superior authority nor superintending control over a district court of another judicial district, nor any authority to enjoin or interfere with a judge of another judicial district in the enforcement of his own judgments.

Section 2, art. 7, of the Constitution, vests the Supreme Court with a general superintending control over all inferior courts and all commissions and boards created by law, and vests it with power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, and prohibition.

Where a district court of one judicial district assumes to exercise a superintending control over the judge of another district by issuing a restraining order, purporting to restrain the judge of such other district from enforcing a judgment of his own court, a writ of prohibition will issue to the judge thus exceeding his jurisdiction and powers.

Original prohibition by V. V. Harris, as receiver of the Riverside Oil & Refining Company, and others, against R. D. Hudson claiming to act as District Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial District. Writ ordered.

Lydick & McPherren and J. B. Dudley, all of Oklahoma City, for petitioners.

H. B Martin, of Tulsa, for respondent.

HARRISON J.

This is an original proceeding in this court for a writ of prohibition. Several grounds for the writ are presented, but stripped of all irrelevant and immaterial matters, the real abstract principle of law decisive of the case is whether a district court of one judicial district has authority to enjoin a district court of another judicial district from enforcing its own judgments.

The judge of the district court of Tulsa county, assuming superior authority over the judge of the district court of Oklahoma county, and assuming to exercise superintending control over the district court of Oklahoma county, has issued a restraining order, which purports and attempts to restrain the district court of Oklahoma county from enforcing a judgment which had been duly rendered by said district court of Oklahoma county, and which had been appealed from to this court and affirmed by this court, and mandate duly issued by this court, directing the said district court of Oklahoma county to enforce its said judgment in accordance with said mandate.

Complainants ask this court for a writ prohibiting the said judge of the district court of Tulsa county from attempting to enforce its said restraining order, and from further interference with the district court of Oklahoma county in the enforcement of its said judgment, as directed by mandate from this court.

The said restraining order, omitting the formal parts, is as follows:

"It is therefore considered, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the defendants and each of them except the defendant Riverside Oil & Refining Company, be enjoined and restrained until the further order of this court or the judge thereof from taking any step or doing any act to enforce against the plaintiff or his property any provision of the judgment appearing from the journal entry of the district court of Oklahoma county rendered in cause No. 30413 upon the dockets of said court, or under the mandate of the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma spread upon the journals of said district court of Oklahoma county; that this restraining order be in effect from and after notice thereof to the defendants upon each of said defendants upon whom notice shall be served; that it remain in force and effect until the 8th day of July, 1926, at which time this order is returnable, or until the further order of this court or the judge thereof; and that upon the return day of this order this cause shall be heard in this court upon the application and petition of the plaintiff for a temporary injunction, unless ordered by the court in the meantime.

[Signed] R. D. Hudson, Judge."

Respondent contends, in effect, that the party defendant, O. O. Owen against whom said judgment of the district court of Oklahoma county had been rendered, has begun an action in the district court of Tulsa county to set aside the said judgment of the district court of Oklahoma county and the decision and mandate of this court in said cause, and for damages resulting therefrom, upon the alleged grounds that the said judgment of the district court of Oklahoma county, and the decision and mandate of this court, were obtained through fraud, and rendered without any evidence to support said judgment, and as a result of a conspiracy among and on the part of the plaintiffs and their attorneys and the district judge of Oklahoma county and certain members of this court to defraud the said O. O. Owen, and that the said judgment, decision, and mandate, having been fraudulently obtained through a conspiracy to defraud the said O. O. Owen, was void because of such fraud, and that the district court of Tulsa county, being a court of general jurisdiction, and vested with general equity powers, had and has jurisdiction to sustain an action to set...