Harris v. Jackson Cnty.
| Decision Date | 09 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 1:14-cv-00435-LG-JCG |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
| Parties | HENRY HARRIS PLAINTIFF v. JACKSON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JACKSON COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, Individually and collectively; JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; JACKSON COUNTY NARCOTICS TASK FORCE; SHERIFF MIKE BYRD, OFFICER KEN McCLENIC, OTHER UNKNOWN JOHN and JANE DOES, A-Z, Individually and in their official capacities DEFENDANTS |
BEFORE THE COURT is the [14] Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Mike Byrd, Sheriff of Jackson County, and Ken McClenic, an agent with the Jackson County Narcotics Task Force. They request judgment in their favor as to certain claims against them in their individual capacities. Harris requested an extension of time within which to file a response, but that time elapsed without a response. The Court solicited additional briefing on Harris' claim of "criminal conversion" and both parties responded. After due consideration of the parties' arguments, the moving defendants' evidence, and the relevant law, it is the Court's opinion that Byrd and McClenic are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, in their individual capacities, as to all claims.
Plaintiff Harris filed his lawsuit in the Circuit of Jackson County, Mississippi, against Jackson County, Mississippi ("Jackson County") Defendants, including Mike Byrd, in his official and individual capacity, and Ken McClenic, in his official and individual capacity. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on July 10, 2013, the Jackson County Defendants violated his constitutional rights through use of excessive force, and asserts claims of conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, and state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, slander and libel, assault, battery, criminal conversion, common law conspiracy, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Jackson County Defendants removed the action to this Court and Sheriff Byrd and Officer McClenic now move for dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity, state law individual immunity, and the statute of limitations.
According to the County's records attached to the Motion, for a period of several months prior to the incident at issue here, McClenic, who was head of the Task Force at the time, received information from informants that Earnest Bradley, a convicted drug dealer, and others were running a "Gambling House" in a portion of a building owned by Harris located in Moss Point, Mississippi. (See Def. Mot. Ex. A at 1 (Report of Investigation), ECF No. 14-1). On July 10, 2013, McClenic received information from a confidential informant that he had played a game of poker at the establishment and also purchased poker chips from Harris. McClenic was also advised by the informant that the informant had witnessed Bradley sellingdrugs in the Gambling House. Agents of the Task Force surveilled the property on the afternoon of July 10, and observed Ricky Ducksworth, also a known drug dealer, enter and exit the Gambling House several times and saw Ducksworth place a bag inside a fuse panel of a vehicle. Based on this information, McClenic obtained a search warrant for the building located at 6813 Frederick Street. (Id.; Ex. B (Search Warrant), ECF No. 14-2).
At 10:00 p.m. on the night of July 10, the search warrant was executed on the building by the Task Force, with assistance from the Emergency Services Unit Team ("ESU Team") and Criminal Investigation Division of the Sheriff's Department. (See Def. Mot. Ex. A at 1-2, ECF No. 14-1). A distraction device was used by the ESU Team to gain entry to the building through a rear door, at which point McClenic was preparing to enter the building through the front door. (Id. at 2). As McClenic was approaching the front door, he heard the deployment of the distraction device and the ESU Team identifying themselves to the subjects within the building, yelling "get on the ground," "gun" and "where is the gun." McClenic saw several of the individual subjects run toward the front door of the building, refusing to comply with the instruction of law enforcement to get on the ground. Harris was one of these individuals. He ran into the door and fell to the ground. McClenic struck him once, in a "green area" as defined by the County's Use of Force policy, to obtain compliance. (Mot. Ex. C at 8 (Sheriff's Department SOP 5.01), ECF No. 14-3). Immediately after his arrest, Harris complained of an injury to his elbow. He alleges that as he fell, he "landed on his stomach and snapped his tricepstendon." (Compl. 5 (¶12), ECF No. 1-2). Harris was transported to the Singing River Hospital Emergency Room for treatment. He alleges he was never charged with any crimes in connection with this incident.
Summary judgment is mandated against the party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party has the burden of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy; that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The Plaintiff has not submitted any argument or evidence in opposition to the Defendants' Motion. Nevertheless, the Defendants have the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and, unless they have done so, the Court may not grant the Motion, regardless of whether any response was filed. Hibernia Nat'l. Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th Cir. 1985).
Harris describes this as a "federal civil rights action brought as a result of what the Plaintiff alleges was a blatant violation of, inter alia, the federal, civil, constitutional and human rights of the Plaintiff." (Compl. 1 (¶1), ECF No. 1-2). 42U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability upon any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of federally protected rights. Section 1983 affords a remedy to those who suffer, as a result of state action, deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 683 (5th Cir. 1981). A plaintiff cannot succeed on a § 1983 claim merely by showing any deprivation of his rights; § 1983 was intended to preserve rights protected by federal law. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1985).
In this summary judgment motion, the Defendants, in their individual capacities, assert that they are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. "Qualified immunity balances two important interests - the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). "When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)). This burden cannot be discharged by conclusory allegations and assertions. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005).
Evaluating a claim of qualified immunity involves two inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether thatright was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. "[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). A defendant will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that the defendant's actions were lawful; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue, immunity should be recognized. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). It is within the discretion of the district court to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first in light of the circumstances of each case. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. Each defendant's actions must be evaluated individually in the qualified immunity context. Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 2007).
Harris makes no allegation that Sheriff Byrd was personally involved in any of the events surrounding Harris' arrest. A supervisory government official such as Byrd "may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Instead, "a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, throughthe official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Id. As Harris' Complaint lacks any allegation that Byrd's individual actions violated the Constitution, Byrd is entitled to qualified immunity from Harris' § 1983 claims.
Without referring to any specific Constitutional provision, Harris alleges that McClenic's actions deprived him of "substantive and/or procedural due process of law, detaining him, physically assaulting...
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