Harris v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., A--71

• Decision Date: 02 March 1964
• Docket Number: No. A--71,A--71
• Parties: George HARRIS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 565

41 N.J. 565

197 A.2d 863

George HARRIS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A--71.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Feb. 4, 1964.

Decided March 2, 1964.

Nicholas Conover English, Newark, for defendant-appellant (McCarter & English, Newark, attorneys, Nicholas Conover English, Newark, of counsel).

Jerry M. Finn, Newark, for plaintiff-respondent (Greenstone & Greenstone, Newark, attorneys, Goldberger, Ostrow, Siegel & Finn and Jerry M. Finn, Newark, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HALL, J.

This suit for benefits under an accident insurance policy was decided below before our opinion in Linden Motor Freight Co., Inc. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 40 N.J. 511, 538, 193 A.2d 217 (1963). The Appellate Division affirmed a recovery for the insured awarded by the trial court sitting without a jury. 78 N.J.Super. 578, 189 A.2d 832 (1963). Certification was granted on the insurer's petition. 40 N.J. 506, 193 A.2d 140 (1963). The question is whether the result is correct in view of Linden.

Here plaintiff suffered a heart attack--a myocardial infarction--by reason of exertion in performance of his regular work. He was engaged in moving two heavy steel tanks from a truck to a platform. Nothing unusual occurred in the operation nor did anything involuntary or unforeseen happen with respect to plaintiff's physical movements. The effort was simply too great for his heart. The circumstances preceding the unexpected result as well as the nature of the result itself were no different from those in Linden.

Nor do we find any significant distinction, with respect to the issue before us, in the insuring language of the two policies. This contract provided coverage for disability arising out of bodily injury sustained 'as the direct result of an accident, independent of all other causes.' The double indemnity provision of the life policy in Linden was conditioned upon the sustainment of 'bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means.' (The effect of the language in the Linden policy calling for 'external' and 'violent' as well as 'accidental' means was not raised there. 40 N.J., at p. 516, n. 1, 193 A.2d at p. 219.). Neither contract insures merely against an accidental result. Cf. 40 N.J., at p. 527, n. 4, 193 A.2d at 225.

This case is therefore governed by Linden, in which we held that the contract did not cover under the following rationale: Where the policy does not, by its language, give coverage for simply an accidental result but requires that there...